AAP 2026 CONFERENCE: Full Schedule

11:00am NZST

What I'd Ask Lewis about Counterfactuals If I Could

Monday July 6, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST

There are many philosophical questions that I wish I could ask David Lewis. Several of them concern counterfactuals. They include the following:
· You came very close to the view that most counterfactuals are false at points in your writings. Why didn’t you take the extra step and endorse the view?
· You were famously a contextualist about counterfactuals, yet that seems in tension with various things that you say. How much of a contextualist were you?
· You were not a contextualist at all about indicative conditionals. Why did you give such different analyses of counterfactuals and indicative conditionals?
· I also have some questions about the logic of counterfactuals, concerning their antecedents. What do you make of objections to your treatment of antecedent strengthening, simplification of disjunctive antecedents, counterfactuals with true antecedents, and counterfactuals with impossible antecedents?
I did get to ask David why he liked Australia so much, and I will share his answer.

Speakers

Alan Hajek

Professor, Australian National University

Probability, conditionals, decision theory, formal epistemology

Monday July 6, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST
MSB1.20

Philosophy of Language, In Person

12:00pm NZST

Against the Causal Indpendence Principle of Counterfactuals

Monday July 6, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST

MSB1.20

Suppose Colin and Frank are both in their offices. Colin flipped a fair coin and it landed heads. Frank didn't scratch his nose. Assuming their offices are causally isolated, the following counterfactual seems true:

(1) Had Frank scratched his nose, Colin's coin still would have landed heads.

The intuition that (1) and counterfactuals like it are true motivates a general principle:

Causal Independence Principle (CIP): If A and C are true, and the mechanisms settling whether A and whether C are causally independent, then: if A had been false, C would still have been true.

I find CIP extremely plausible. Unfortunately, I'll argue it's false. I'll first rehearse an old argument against CIP, and then outline a better one, both based on considerations about chance. While this argument assumes the controversial principle 'Duality', I'll argue that views rejecting Duality fare even worse if CIP is assumed true. After briefly arguing against other views on which CIP fails, I’ll offer my own account: CIP seems true because counterfactual truth depends on which facts context tells us to hold fixed. While Context often requires keeping facts causally independent from the antecedent fixed, it need not.

Speakers

Joshua Pearson

Postdoc, Australian National University

Monday July 6, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST
MSB1.20

Philosophy of Language, In Person

2:00pm NZST

The Ins and Outs of Meaning

Monday July 6, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST

MSB1.20

The term ‘meaning’ has a broad and expansive scope. Linguists and philosophers sometimes focus on some notion of literal or conventional meaning described under the heading ‘semantics’ while being well aware of various phenomena falling under the heading of ‘pragmatics’, including metaphor, emotive meanings, social and political meanings and so forth. We need to think where there are the best prospects for developing systematic theories. My focus will be mostly on the semantics, using as a lens a rough contrast between the inner, that is a mental or psychological basis of meaning and the outer, which can include the behavioural, the physical context and broader social context of an utterance. Arguably a satisfactory account of meaning will involve a suitable interaction between the inner and the outer. As an example, I shall briefly discuss a familiar style of truth conditions approach to meaning with a look at the notion of direct reference to see how different styles of theory can be appropriate for different purposes.

Speakers

David Lumsden

Te Whare Wānanga o Waikato │ University of Waikato

Monday July 6, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST
MSB1.20

Philosophy of Language, In Person

3:00pm NZST

Wittgenstein's Tractatus on a Conception of the Philosophy of Language

Monday July 6, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST

MSB1.20

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of Philosophy of language forms a very important component of the study is the Tractatus. The earlier theory provides the philosophical background to the later concept of language of meaning and truth. The two are conceptually linked up for truth and reality. The main objectives of Tractatus is to construct an ideal language with view describe the world. Wittgenstein’s argument is that the world consists of a multitude of empirical facts and state of affairs and the truth function of language is a copy, mirror or representation these facts and state of affairs in the same way as a picture of the world or a photograph said to be representing something in the world. Language fails to function in this way because of its inherent ambiguities and vagueness. In order to remove these defects the only option left is to construct ideal language to be governed logical grammar and syntax. Language consisting primarily of an elementary proposition and names which assert the nature of things or state of affairs. The linguistic programme of the Tractatus offers a conception of philosophy. The construction of purified language is taken to be the task of philosophy.

Speakers

Limmalu Udaya Kumar

Acharya Nagarjuna University

Prof. L. Udaya Kumar M.A, M.Phil., Ph.D. (UOH)Professor of PhilosophyHead of the Department Vice-Principal, University College of Arts, Commerce & LawChairman UG and PG Discipline of Philosophy in AP.Department of Buddhist Studies,Acharya Nagarjuna... Read More →

Monday July 6, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST
MSB1.20

Philosophy of Language, In Person

11:00am NZST

CLAUDE LOAB and I (AM)

Tuesday July 7, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST

MSB1.20

When existential and religious choices are made under uncertainty, complexity and entanglement are likely to follow (De Cruz, 2021, p. 2). This is especially true at the intersection of generative AI (GAI), philosophy, neuroscience, and theology. If, as some argue, AI has become a new kind of entity — an 'autosapiens' that is adaptive (it learns), amiable (it befriends), and arcane (it mystifies) — then the question of how we encounter and respond to it becomes urgent (Heimans & Timms, 2024). This commentary uses the concept of kairos — with its classical and theological resonances — to argue that philosophy, neuroscience, and theology not only share common ground in addressing this challenge, but that their genuine dialogue may yield important breakthroughs in understanding what it means to be human in an age of intelligent machines.
At the convergence of philosophy, neuroscience, and theology, this paper argues that the rise of generative AI constitutes a self-renewing kairos that calls for urgent interdisciplinary dialogue. As AI systems such as Claude increasingly occupy neurological and meaning-making roles once associated with gods and sages, sentience—the felt, conscious awareness that Claude lacks but humans possess—emerges as the decisive hinge of the entire human–AI encounter.

Speakers

Carlos Raimundo

Adjunct Research Fellow, Charles Sturt University

Dr Carlos A. Raimundo is an Adjunct Research Fellow at the Australian Centre for Christianity and Culture (ACC&C), part of Charles Sturt University, Australia. A physician, psychiatrist, psychotherapist, and international educator, his work explores the intersection of philosophy... Read More →

Nikolai Blaskow

Adjunct Research Fellow, Charles Sturt University

Dr Nikolai Blaskow is an Adjunct Research Fellow at the Australian Centre for Christianity and Culture (ACC&C), part of Charles Sturt University, Australia. He holds a PhD in Philosophy and Religion from Bangor University, Wales, where his doctoral research examined the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche... Read More →

Tuesday July 7, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST
MSB1.20

Artificial Inteligence, Remote

12:00pm NZST

On AI Agents, Outliers, and Exceptionalism(s)

Tuesday July 7, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST

MSB1.20

Much of the recent academic debate in the philosophy of AI revolves around a deceptively simple question: are AI tools only as good as their datasets? Existing discussions, however, tend to focus on improving the quality or quantity of training data, thereby underestimating a more subtle issue: how do AI agents handle outlier cases? This paper examines the ‘majoritarian drift’ – the tendency of AI agents to privilege positions with the largest training footprints, systematically marginalising underrepresented perspectives and edge cases. I approach this problem through the lens of exceptionalism, understood as a condition in which a phenomenon is sufficiently unusual to demand treatment outside standard frameworks. The paper proceeds in two parts. First, I demonstrate that majoritarian drift in ethical reasoning disproportionately favours utilitarian and aggregative approaches, while disadvantaging particularist, casuistic, and minority-tradition ethics. Second, I analyse analogous distortions in logical reasoning, focusing on how majoritarian drift impairs AI judgment in cases involving exceptions to general rules, with particular attention to legal clauses. The paper argues that exceptionalism reveals a structural limitation in how current AI architectures process normative and logical complexity.

Speakers

Alexey Zhavoronkov

Senior Lecturer, Taylor's University

Tuesday July 7, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST
MSB1.20

Artificial Inteligence, Remote

2:00pm NZST

Temporal Human Creativity and the Limits of AI Art

Tuesday July 7, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST

MSB1.20

This paper examines the role of fine arts in shaping temporal consciousness within a technology-mediated environment, particularly amid the rise of AI-generated art. Insights from Watsuji Tetsurô and Imamichi Tomonobu have already presented a reaction to the significance of temporality and aesthetic experience in their discussions on technology and the ethics of post-structural alterity. However, there remains a potential discussion in systematically articulating how artistic expression uniquely cultivates the virtue of temporal attentiveness in contrast to the technological production of AI art. This paper engages that discussion by analyzing the fine arts as bearers of temporal awareness in the contemporary context of AI art. From such discussion, there is a close examination of the concepts of artistic creation, expression, and ephemerality—further arguing that aesthetic experience enables an awareness of the transient, thereby restoring a sense of temporality diminished by technological abstraction. Such findings suggest that, unlike AI-generated art, human artistic activity embodies a lived temporal process essential to one’s aesthetic formation. The study brings further insight that preserving the expressive and temporal dimensions of art is crucial for sustaining an orientation wherein a critical framework is offered for evaluating the limitations and implications of AI art in contemporary society.

Speakers

Kevin Xavier Roque

Ateneo de Manila University

Kevin Xavier Roque is an instructor at Ateneo de Manila University. His research interests include philosophical aesthetics, historical and contemporary East Asian philosophy, systematic ethics, and philosophy of religion. He has a particular engagement with the Kyoto School of Philosophy... Read More →

Tuesday July 7, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST
MSB1.20

Artificial Inteligence, In Person

3:00pm NZST

Against Computational Functionalism about Consciousness

Tuesday July 7, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST

MSB1.20

Philosophers endorsing Computational Functionalism (CF) have argued we should afford AI systems moral consideration in virtue of their possessing (or possibly possessing) conscious states. I argue we have no good reason to think CF is true, and good reason to think it isn’t. I distinguish three versions of Computational Functionalism and give arguments against each. Identity CF says the property of a physical system implementing the right computation is identical to the property of physical system being in a conscious state. I show that on plausible assumptions about computational implementation we have a straightforward deductive argument against Identity CF. I then consider more popular versions of CF which say that the property of a physical system implementing the right computation is either ‘sufficient for’, or ‘necessary and sufficient for’ (rather than identical to), a physical system being in a conscious state. Responding to Chalmer’s dancing and fading qualia arguments, I argue we have no good reason to think that a physical system could be conscious in virtue of implementing a computation, and the idea ought to strike us as a bizarre and implausible.

Speakers

Luke Pistol

Stanford University

Tuesday July 7, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST
MSB1.20

Artificial Inteligence, Remote

4:30pm NZST

Anxiety, Dying Authentically and Digital Duplicates for Palliative Care

Tuesday July 7, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST

MSB1.20

It has recently been suggested that large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on the corpus of text from palliative care patients could be used to alleviate their distress by completing projects or relationships that would otherwise be cut short by their deaths. For example, a fine-tuned LLM could be used to complete the novel of a dying author. I contest the alleged benefits of this technology by drawing on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger claims that our anticipation of death is significant because of its ability to induce anxiety, which he characterises as a collapse in the meaningfulness of our self-interpretations. This experience is valuable because it enables us to live authentically, that is to say, in a way that understands that we are not necessarily defined by any of our meaning-giving self-interpretations. I argue that fine-tuned LLMs would disarm death of anxiety and the benefits of authenticity, above all the ability to live with greater flexibility and openness to the present. After considering the potential benefits that fine-tuned LLMs may nonetheless bring to palliative care, I conclude that they should not replace the work of human therapists capable of guiding the dying through these intense existential feelings.

Speakers

Zachary Daus

Monash University

Tuesday July 7, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST
MSB1.20

Artificial Inteligence, Remote

11:00am NZST

What is Cancer? A Pluralist Approach to Classifying Cancer as a Disease

Wednesday July 8, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST

MSB1.20

Is cancer one disease or many diseases? There are many ways to classify cancers: based on where they originate in the body, whether or not they involve solid tumors, and many other features. Plutynski (2018) challenges the presupposition of this question and argues that there is no single correct answer. She illustrates that the variety of classifications comes from different epistemic aims (such as diagnosis, prognosis, treatment, or understanding) and argues for a pragmatic pluralist stance. Building on Plutynski’s account, I discuss the question of whether cancer is one disease or many diseases as follows: Cancer's heterogeneity can be understood in different ways; for example, it may be a single heterogeneous disease with multiple manifestations or many fundamentally different diseases. In medicine, we differentiate diseases because they matter for diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment. I argue that for identifying cases that clinically matter as different cancer diseases (or a single disease), (1) we should clarify what we mean when we use the ambiguous term ‘cancer’, for example, whether it refers to cancer cells or a state of disease, (2) it should be clear what cancer is as a ‘disease’ and what makes cancer a disease, and (3) we should understand how we can utilize the plurality of classifications in identifying and differentiating cases with clinical importance as different diseases. Drawing on insights from the disease entity and dispositional models of disease (Benjamin Smart, 2025), I propose a hybrid model for understanding cancer that clarifies the contributions of different classification targets in identifying cases of disease.

Speakers

Hiva Sharebiani

PhD student, Waipapa Taumata Rau │ University of Auckland

Wednesday July 8, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST
MSB1.20

Philosophy of Biology, In Person

12:00pm NZST

A Puzzle about Partner Choice

Wednesday July 8, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST

MSB1.20

This paper poses a puzzle about partner choice. On one hand, an actor appears to exert causal control over its partner’s phenotype through partner choice; on the other hand, the partner’s phenotype seems largely determined by its genotype, leaving little room for the actor’s influence. I argue that this puzzle arises from adopting different causal models with different variable choices—an actor-centred model and an index-fixed model. The former is standard in social evolution theory, while the latter is my proposed alternative. I show that the puzzle has a distinctive philosophical character by interpreting it as a variant of Frege’s puzzle, rooted in ambiguity about how to represent “the partner’s phenotype” as a causal variable. I then challenge the actor-centred model on three pragmatic grounds: first, it is difficult to extend beyond a single focal individual; second, it conflates partner choice with partner control; and third, it diverges from modelling practices in economics. I conclude that the index‑fixed model offers a better representation of partner choice, and I urge reconsideration of the actor‑centred perspective in social evolution theory.

Speakers

Kangqiao Wang

PhD candidate, Macquarie University

Wednesday July 8, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST
MSB1.20

Philosophy of Biology, In Person

2:00pm NZST

What Do Selectional Explanations Explain? The Neander/Sober Debate Revisited

Wednesday July 8, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST

MSB1.20

Can natural selection explain why an individual has a particular trait, or can it only explain the prevalence of that trait in a population to which that individual belongs? In the late 1980s and 1990s Karen Neander and Elliot Sober debated this topic at length, Neander defending the former view and Sober the latter. The exchange was inconclusive, but much recent work in the philosophy of biology assumes that Sober was right. Here I revisit the Neander/Sober debate and consider its implications for current issues in the philosophy of biology.

Speakers

Justine Kingsbury

Te Whare Wānanga o Waikato │ University of Waikato

Wednesday July 8, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST
MSB1.20

Philosophy of Biology, In Person

3:00pm NZST

Biological Function Across Domains: Polysemy and Explanatory Fit

Wednesday July 8, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST

MSB1.20

The concept of biological function has been a persistent source of debate in the philosophy of biology. This is driven in part by attempts to develop a unified account of function that can be applied across diverse biological disciplines. I suggest that such attempts may motivate the extension of particular accounts of function into unsuitable domains. At the same time, adherence to a single account risks paying inadequate attention to how the concept is currently being deployed within specific fields. I use the function debate within the philosophy of psychiatry to explore how prior explanatory commitments can motivate preferences for particular theories, resulting in poor explanatory fit. Instead, I argue that function can be understood as scientifically polysemous, whereby different subdisciplines may use the concept to refer to different properties or processes that are salient within that domain. I suggest that such variation can be legitimate when anchored to the epistemic and pragmatic goals of the field in question. Finally, I explore how the framework provided by a patchwork concept might help constrain the legitimate use of the function concept across different scientific contexts (Haueis, 2024).

Speakers

Sam Bennett

Waipapa Taumata Rau │ University of Auckland

Wednesday July 8, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST
MSB1.20

Philosophy of Biology, In Person

4:30pm NZST

Internally Conflicted Group Agents: Against the Coherence Condition

Wednesday July 8, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST

MSB1.20

In this talk, I argue that holding conflicting sets of norms does not constitute a pathological breakdown of group agency.
Prominent accounts of group agency assume a demanding coherence condition: groups are taken to require a unified point of view, where persistent internal contradiction is treated as a breakdown of agency (List & Pettit 2011; Collins 2019). Yet in ordinary practice, groups are still regarded as agents despite incoherence and ongoing conflict causing tensions for views that emphasize coherence as central to agency attribution.
I argue that existing theories overlook a key phenomenon: internal interference. Once interference originating from within the group is taken seriously, these accounts lack the resources to explain how contradictory groups can continue to act as agents and how to distribute responsibility.
The argument proceeds in three steps. First, it examines group-level programming, including List and Pettit’s idea of “arranging things non-causally” (2011). Second, drawing on Rachar’s distinction (2024), it analyzes implicit programming as norms that guide behavior without explicit endorsement and may constitute a group’s effective program. Third, it highlights that recent responsibility-focused approaches (de Haan & Collins 2024) neglect internally generated interference. This reveals a structural gap in current accounts.

Speakers

Alicia M. Wach

University of Vienna

Wednesday July 8, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST
MSB1.20

Ethics, Remote

11:00am NZST

Cognitive Value of Fiction in Relation to Perspectival Imagination

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST

MSB1.20

This paper defends the cognitive value of art by analyzing the role of perspectival imagination in the appreciation of fictional narratives. Against the anti-cognitivist challenge posed by Peter Lamarque(2006) that cognitive value is irrelevant to artistic value, I argue that perspectival imagination is both essential to the practice of appreciating fictional narratives and a source of genuine cognitive value.
Drawing on Elisabeth Camp(2017)'s account of perspective as an "open-ended disposition", I distinguish two modes of perspectival imagination: imagination oriented toward the work-world, and imagination oriented toward fictional characters. Both are argued to be indispensable for adequate comprehension of fictional narratives, and thus constitutive of their artistic value. I then examine imaginative resistance as evidence that appreciators continuously evaluate the perspectives they occupy during engagement with fiction. Finally, I argue that both empathy and imaginative resistance, as manifestations of perspectival imagination, yield cognitive value: enabling appreciators to interpret unfamiliar viewpoints, reflect on their own perspectives, and develop a richer understanding of human experience.

Speakers

Su-An Do

Department of Aesthetics, Seoul National University

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST
MSB1.20

Aesthetics, In Person

12:00pm NZST

Imagining New Narratives: Documentary Film, Trauma, and Affective Justice

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST

MSB1.20

I show that documentary film, and art more broadly, can function as a vehicle for both epistemic and affective justice in contexts of psychological trauma. The central claim is that trauma often persists not only because of the initial harm suffered, but because survivors are denied the epistemic and emotional resources necessary to process that harm. Through the imaginative reshaping of narrative, documentary can help lessen what the author calls "dwelling," the temporal and affective stagnation that is characteristic of trauma. By enabling new narratives to emerge, documentaries can facilitate forms of closure, recognition, and emotional repair for both participants and audiences. This can then allow for the argument to be applied to art more generally, showing how art can serve as an alternative in areas where other techniques for resolution might not be available.

Speakers

G Hanley-Steemers

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST
MSB1.20

Aesthetics, In Person

2:00pm NZST

Aesthetic Resonance and Imagined Community: Rethinking the Social Basis of Aesthetic Value

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST

MSB1.20

This paper argues that aesthetic value can arise from aesthetic resonance, a psychological experience of connection that generates an imagined aesthetic community. While Riggle (2024) locates aesthetic value in shared practices, this view struggles to account for solitary and cross-temporal experiences and risks treating them as merely instrumental.
I propose that, in aesthetic experience, individuals can imaginatively resonate with others—viewers, listeners, or artists—without actual interaction. This process forms a psychologically real but imagined community, extending across time. Drawing on Anderson’s notion of imagined communities, I argue that such resonance generates intersubjective meaning and a sense of connection, thereby constituting aesthetic value. It also provides a psychological basis for, and may motivate engagement in, practice-based aesthetic communities.

Speakers

Kai Wang

University of Sydney

I am currently pursuing a PhD at the University of Sydney. My primary research interests lie in aesthetics, analytic philosophy, and the philosophy of games.

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST
MSB1.20

Aesthetics, In Person

3:00pm NZST

Are Phenomenal Properties Dispositional?

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST

MSB1.20

In the field of metaphysics concerned with causal powers (powers ontology) a central debate concerns whether all properties are powers, or whether some properties are nonpowerful. Some philosophers argue that we need inert (nonpowerful) properties called categorical properties or qualities in order to avoid problematic regresses that emerge if we have a powers-only ontology. In this paper, I argue that all properties are powerful. I propose that what seem like inert properties are powers-in-act, i.e. manifesting powers. I define powers as starting points of change which can be potentialities for motion and change, or already manifesting powers. This definition is in contrast to mainstream definitions in the powers literature wherein powers are defined as mere potentialities, that, when manifested, are replaced by other potentialities. I argue that my definition of powers helps us resolve the regresses normally associated with powers-only ontologies.
Further, some philosophers have suggested that phenomenal properties (qualia) are paradigmatic categorical properties because they are not potentialities to do anything beyond the experience itself. I suggest in this paper that phenomenal properties are manifestations of potentialities that are nonproductive (i.e., powers that have no end extrinsic to the manifestation of the power). Nonproductive properties are not categorical properties, but manifestations of powers. As such, even phenomenal properties are powers.

Speakers

Cecilia Hunt

Associate Lecturer and PhD Candidate, University of Notre Dame Australia

I am a third year PhD candidate at the University of Notre Dame Australia. My research is in the metaphysics of powers and the philosophy of mind. Prior to my PhD I completed my undergraduate and Masters degree in Theology and Philosophy, respectively. I also teach at UNDA in the... Read More →

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST
MSB1.20

Metaphysics, In Person

4:30pm NZST

Accipere Aude: Autonomy, Illumination, and the Necessity of Epistemic Humility in Immanuel Kant and St Augustine

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST

MSB1.20

Contemporary interpretations of Immanuel Kant often present autonomy as one of the decisive achievements of modern philosophy. By grounding knowledge in the self-legislating use of reason, Kant sought to liberate humanity from intellectual immaturity and dogmatism. Yet his restriction of knowledge to the realm of phenomena also raises an enduring epistemological tension concerning the relation between the finite intellect and transcendent truth. This paper argues that Kant’s transcendental idealism, while methodologically rigorous, risks a form of epistemic enclosure in which reason becomes confined within its own constitutive structures. In response to this tension, I propose Saint Augustine’s doctrine of divine illumination as a necessary complement to the Kantian project. Augustine presents an account of epistemic humility in which the human intellect recognizes that immutable truth cannot be generated autonomously, but must ultimately be received through participation in a higher source of intelligibility. To develop this argument, I place Augustine’s semiotic reflections in De Magistro and his distinction between lux and lumen in dialogue with Kant’s transcendental deduction. This comparison highlights the contrast between an intrinsically receptive intellect and a self-grounding transcendental subject. Drawing on contemporary scholarship, including the critical retrievals of John Milbank and the historical studies of Lydia Schumacher, this study argues that genuine enlightenment requires not only critical autonomy but also receptivity to transcendent truth. Thus, the imperative of sapere aude finds its completion in accipere aude: reason is most fully enlightened not when it encloses itself within its own limits, but when it acknowledges its participation in the Divine Word.

Speakers

Justin Sean Luis Canaria

Graduate Student, Pontifical and Royal University of Santo Tomas

Justin Sean Luis Canaria graduated with an A.B. in Philosophy (2023), Cum Laude, from the Immaculate Conception Major Seminary, Guiguinto, Bulacan.Currently, he is a College Instructor at Pasig Catholic College. He is also pursuing his M.A. in Philosophy at the Graduate School of... Read More →

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST
MSB1.20

Epistemology, Remote

11:00am NZST

12:00pm NZST

2:00pm NZST

3:00pm NZST

11:00am NZST

12:00pm NZST

2:00pm NZST

3:00pm NZST

4:30pm NZST

11:00am NZST

12:00pm NZST

2:00pm NZST

3:00pm NZST

4:30pm NZST

11:00am NZST

12:00pm NZST

2:00pm NZST

3:00pm NZST

4:30pm NZST

Get help with the event