AAP 2026 CONFERENCE: Full Schedule

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8:30am NZST

Check-in Desk Day 5

Thursday July 9, 2026 8:30am - 9:00am NZST

MSB Foyer

Check-in Desk open

Thursday July 9, 2026 8:30am - 9:00am NZST
MSB Foyer

9:00am NZST

Agentic Ai: The New Cartesian Theatre

Thursday July 9, 2026 9:00am - 10:25am NZST

PWC

This analysis identifies the designation "Agentic AI" as a syntactic architecture of institutional immunity. We treat the term not as an ontological classification, but as a governing picture that restructures the landscape of corporate accountability. The institution deploys the grammar of "Agency" to construct a "New Cartesian Theatre"—a space where the statistical model occupies the seat of the subject while the human decision-makers vanish into the background. This performance functions as a "Colonial God Trick," presenting the algorithm as an autonomous, neutral knower to secure total exemption from contestation. I dismantle this bewitchment by restoring the human practitioner to the centre of the epistemic act. I defend that responsibility adheres strictly to the embodied, situated actors who design, prompt, and deploy these systems. Authority remains with the human and institutional subjects who hold the power to act, correct, and justify. This inquiry locates the site of agency in the institutional incentives and human choices that the "Agentic AI" label serves to obscure. I replace the metaphysical debate about machine intelligence with a practice-centred reconstruction of accountability, centring the norms of reason-giving, oversight, and relational redress.

Chair

Michael Hemmingsen

Tunghai University

Speakers

Inês Hipólito

Macquarie University

Inês Hipólito is a lecturer of Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence at Macquarie University. researchers.mq.edu.au/en/persons/ines-hipolitoineshipolito.com x.com/ineshipolito... Read More →

Thursday July 9, 2026 9:00am - 10:25am NZST
PWC

KEYNOTE

10:30am NZST

Morning Break

Thursday July 9, 2026 10:30am - 10:55am NZST

MSB Foyer

Morning Break

Thursday July 9, 2026 10:30am - 10:55am NZST
MSB Foyer

Breaks

11:00am NZST

Cognitive Value of Fiction in Relation to Perspectival Imagination

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST

MSB1.20

This paper defends the cognitive value of art by analyzing the role of perspectival imagination in the appreciation of fictional narratives. Against the anti-cognitivist challenge posed by Peter Lamarque(2006) that cognitive value is irrelevant to artistic value, I argue that perspectival imagination is both essential to the practice of appreciating fictional narratives and a source of genuine cognitive value.
Drawing on Elisabeth Camp(2017)'s account of perspective as an "open-ended disposition", I distinguish two modes of perspectival imagination: imagination oriented toward the work-world, and imagination oriented toward fictional characters. Both are argued to be indispensable for adequate comprehension of fictional narratives, and thus constitutive of their artistic value. I then examine imaginative resistance as evidence that appreciators continuously evaluate the perspectives they occupy during engagement with fiction. Finally, I argue that both empathy and imaginative resistance, as manifestations of perspectival imagination, yield cognitive value: enabling appreciators to interpret unfamiliar viewpoints, reflect on their own perspectives, and develop a richer understanding of human experience.

Speakers

Su-An Do

Department of Aesthetics, Seoul National University

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST
MSB1.20

Aesthetics, In Person

11:00am NZST

Adversarial examples and AI-based knowledge

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST

MSB1.21

This talk investigates the following two questions: Q1. Under what conditions do human AI-based beliefs qualify as knowledge? Q2. Do the seemingly crazy errors that AI systems sometimes make pose a threat to human AI-based beliefs qualifying as knowledge? The discussion of Q1 and Q2 is set against the background of a stock of examples of AI errors, including adversarial examples drawn from the large literature on image classifiers and LLMs. Many of these errors strike humans as bizarre or crazy—e.g., LLMs ‘hallucinating’ references or an image classifier correctly classifying an image of a panda but switching the output to ‘gibbon’ after the original image is subjected to a humanly imperceptible manipulation of its pixel structure. The talk brings Q1 and Q2 into connection with mainstream epistemology—more specifically, modal epistemology. The key idea is that, in order for a belief output of a given method to qualify as knowledge in a given world w, the belief must not only be true in w; it must likewise be sufficiently modally robust. The talk discusses the prospects of AI-based knowledge, given modal conditions on knowledge and the wealth of adversarial examples that have surfaced in AI research.

Speakers

Nikolaj JJL Pedersen

Yonsei University

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST
MSB1.21

Artificial Inteligence, In Person

11:00am NZST

Phenomenology of Disability and the Doctor/Patient Relationship

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST

MSB1.36 & 37

In her book, Illness, Havi Carel writes of her own experience, “I quickly learned that when doctors ask ‘How are you?’ they mean ‘How is your body?’” (Illness 48). While this mismatch between the use of ‘you’ here might be excused by most as a mundane confusion of language, this dual role of the self, as both bodily and social, revealed through the doctor/patient relationship, speaks to the heart of a long-lasting intellectual debate within ‘disability studies theory’ regarding how we conceptualise what it means to be disabled. In this paper, I critically evaluate this relationship and look to what the emerging field of ‘disability phenomenology’ can contribute here. In particular, I develop an argument for the reinterpretation and use of Jean-Paul Sartre’s chapter on ‘The Body’ in Being and Nothingness for the field of disability studies. Arguing against Sarah Richmond’s criticisms of his view in her article, “Sartre and the Doctors,” I propose that Sartre provides a foundation for an effective philosophy of disability, explaining the dual role of the body for the disabled subject while being sensitive to their individual conception of selfhood.

Speakers

Mikel Van Dyken

University of Queensland

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST
MSB1.36 & 37

Continental Philosophy, In Person

11:00am NZST

Conspiracy Theories: Particularism vs Generalism vs Anti-Generalism

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST

MSB1.05

In the increasingly interdisciplinary study of conspiracy theories - conspiracy theory theory - there is a debate (at least in philosophy) between generalism (the view that there is something generally wrong about conspiracy theories) and particularism (the view that conspiracy theories ought to be assessed on their relative merits, and thus no assumption can be made about their warrant sans some investigation of the particular theory). In this panel discussion three of the main contributors to that debate (Charles Pigden, M R. X. Dentith, and Steve Clarke) discuss why it seems that particularism is the dominant view (at least among philosophers), whether generalists are right to claim that non-philosophers agree with generalism, and whether there is some intermediate position between the two views.

Speakers

Steve Clarke

Charles Sturt University

M R. X. Dentith

Beijing Normal University

M R. X. Dentith is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the International Center for Philosophy at Beijing Normal University at Zhuhai. Their chief research interests concern the epistemic analysis of conspiracy theories, rumours, fake news, and the epistemology of secrecy. In 2014... Read More →

Charles Pigden

Ōtākou Whakaihu Waka | University of Otago

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST
MSB1.05

Epistemology, In Person

11:00am NZST

Forgiveness and the Purpose of Rememberance

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST

MSB1.01

Victims of wrongdoing are frequently encouraged to forgive in order to move forward in peace. Victims who keep reminding the perpetrators of the past wrongdoing might be accused of not having forgiven at all. Arguably, real healing will be achieved by victims who let bygones be bygones, who forgive and forget. However, victims of extreme wrongdoing are also regularly encouraged to participate in memorials and collective acts of remembrance which repeatedly pull them back to condemn the past wrongdoing. We are told that remembrance is part of the vigilance required in order to protect against wrongs of this kind being perpetrated again. These victims are told that they should forgive but never forget. In this talk I will ask whether we can resolve the tension between these two claims by thinking more carefully about the conceptual relationship between forgiving and forgetting, and about the moral function of remembrance.

Speakers

Luke Russell

Professor, University of Sydney

I work on forgiveness, evil, moral emotions, virtue and vice.

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST
MSB1.01

Ethics, In Person

11:00am NZST

Religious Fictionalism: A Ritualistic Approach

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST

MSB1.15

One major approach to religious fictionalism is to highlight the moral benefits of religious practices, i.e., to argue that even non-doxastic acceptance of the content of religious claims may help practitioners with their moral growth, moral sensibility, moral motivation, and so on (cf. Eshleman 2005; Le Poidevin 2019, 2023; Jay 2014, Leng 2023). In this paper, I argue that this approach fails. Since our worldviews, value systems, and belief systems form an integrated whole in religious practice, it is difficult to isolate moral values (within which moral growth, moral sensibility, and moral motivation are all deeply involved) from this whole. Accordingly, moral benefits seem to be intimately connected with moral and religious belief and cannot be gained separately in religious practices. Instead, I suggest a ritualistic approach. I argue that religious rituals can be beneficial for attaining the meaningfulness of life. As Nozick (1981) argues, meaning consists in transcending limits: being part of God’s plan could be a way of pursuing the meaning of life. While the meaning of life may collapse with the rejection of religious belief, meaningfulness may nevertheless survive through non-doxastic acceptance alone. In this paper, I propose such a novel approach to religious fictionalism.

Speakers

Fang-Ru Kuo

National Taiwan Normal University

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST
MSB1.15

Philosophy of Religion, In Person

11:00am NZST

Worthless Science: Against the Equivalence of Pursuits

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST

MSB1.02

Despite the recent interest surge in the topic of pursuitworthiness within philosophy of science, Philip Kitcher's claim that science is, by its very nature, a significant pursuit has yet to be challenged within the literature. I argue in favor of the relevance of the category of worthless science, by establishing that it is irreducible to non-pursuitworthiness in the standard sense. I introduce a distinction between the internal epistemic aims constitutive of a research program and its external (or collateral) aims, those objectives satisfiable across disciplinary boundaries as a byproduct of internal inquiry. I then propose three jointly sufficient desiderata for worthless scientific pursuits: small research community size, minimal goal-set overlap with other scientific communities, and relative absence of achievable external aims, and formalize them within a utilitarian expected-utility framework. I subsequently address the principal challenge to this account raised by the Feyerabendian equivalence principle of pursuits, as recently discussed by Shaw, arguing that it collapses prescriptively into absurdity. I then identify two paradigmatic instantiations of worthless science: self-referential classificatory inquiry and speculative exploratory modeling, providing some case studies. I conclude by examining institutional mechanisms, as offsetting arrangements and better-structured interdisciplinary collaboration, capable of minimizing worthless pursuits without foreclosing epistemic pluralism.

Speakers

Luca Molinari

PhD Student, Nanyang Technological University

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST
MSB1.02

Philosophy of Science, In Person

11:00am NZST

Epistemic Errors in Prosocial Behaviour-Promoting Virtual Reality and Associated Moral Wrongs

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST

N3.01

Prosocial behaviour-promoting virtual reality (PBP-VR) experiences often claim to foster empathy and understanding by allowing users to virtually embody members of marginalised groups. In this talk, I argue that PBP-VR can also produce distinctive epistemic errors that generate morally problematic forms of social understanding. I identify and analyse two such errors: synecdoche epistemic arrogance, in which users mistake a narrow or artificial virtual experience for genuine insight into the experiences of marginalised people more broadly, and epistemic overestimation, in which users significantly overestimate the depth or reliability of the understanding they have acquired through virtual embodiment.
I argue that these errors are morally significant because they can encourage misplaced epistemic confidence, diminish appropriate deference to lived testimony, and reinforce distorted beliefs about oppression and social identity. Moreover, PBP-VR may sometimes unintentionally lead users to misinterpret emotionally salient virtual experiences as morally enlightening, even where those experiences are highly artificial, and or, affectively misleading (think, for example, a man embodied as a woman who concludes that being sexually harassed is 'fun' and therefore 'not that bad').
The talk concludes by considering how these risks complicate common claims about VR as an “empathy machine” and by outlining several ethical implications for the design and implementation of PBP-VR systems.

Speakers

Eliana Horn

Monash Univesity

Hello all,

I am awaiting examination on my doctoral thesis which looks at prosocial behaviour promoting virtual reality. I ask: what can we plausibly know about others' experiences through virtual embodiment, and is acquiring this knowledge ethically desirable in the first place?
... Read More →

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST
N3.01

Social Epistemology, Remote

12:00pm NZST

Imagining New Narratives: Documentary Film, Trauma, and Affective Justice

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST

MSB1.20

I show that documentary film, and art more broadly, can function as a vehicle for both epistemic and affective justice in contexts of psychological trauma. The central claim is that trauma often persists not only because of the initial harm suffered, but because survivors are denied the epistemic and emotional resources necessary to process that harm. Through the imaginative reshaping of narrative, documentary can help lessen what the author calls "dwelling," the temporal and affective stagnation that is characteristic of trauma. By enabling new narratives to emerge, documentaries can facilitate forms of closure, recognition, and emotional repair for both participants and audiences. This can then allow for the argument to be applied to art more generally, showing how art can serve as an alternative in areas where other techniques for resolution might not be available.

Speakers

G Hanley-Steemers

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST
MSB1.20

Aesthetics, In Person

12:00pm NZST

Revisiting Scientific Realism: Lessons from Explainable AI

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST

MSB1.21

According to scientific realists, the success of a scientific theory provides strong evidence that it is (approximately) true (Putnam, 1975). In response, antirealists argue that the theories we have are successful because they are survivors of a selection process where unsuccessful theories are rejected, so truth is not necessary to explain success (van Fraassen 1980). This paper argues that the training and testing process of artificial intelligence is structurally analogous to the selection process of scientific theories. Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) achieve human-level performance in image classification through iterative training procedures that adjust weights and biases to minimise errors.
Moreover, recent techniques in explainable AI (XAI) can approximate concept-level interpretations of the CNN’s structure. Some of these concepts align with human concepts, while others do not, even when predictive performance is comparable. The CNN is interpreted as encoding a structural representation of the data, analogous to how a scientific theory represents phenomena. To the extent that the AI classifier uses similar concepts to humans, we have support for realist interpretations of successful representation. Conversely, divergence from human concepts lends weight to antirealist interpretations.

Speakers

Yunus Prasetya

National University of Singapore

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST
MSB1.21

Artificial Inteligence, In Person

12:00pm NZST

What Does It Mean To Be 'Always Ready'?

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST

MSB1.36 & 37

Since the 1980s, and especially into the 1990s, the phrase “always already” came to be used well beyond its specialised context in Continental Philosophy, becoming ubiquitous in a range of academic disciplines within the general orbit of poststructuralism, and loosely in connection with the legacy of Heidegger’s Being and Time. In this paper, I want to do three things: (i) trace the conceptual background of the “always already” (immer schon) formulation in Kantian and post-Kantian thought, especially via the phenomenology of Hegel through to Husserl and Heidegger, as well as touching on the phrase’s implicit theological overtones; (ii) consider the terms ‘always’ and ‘already’ very literally as they are used in ordinary language in English in order to then think more about what it means for them to be put together (and how this in turn helps us consider the phrase’s distinct usage in the Phenomenological tradition); and (iii) to argue for the implications of thinking about the ‘always already’ formulation in such a way for engaging both with Indigenous conceptions of temporality and place, and with the phenomenology of Deep Time.

Speakers

Leah McGarrity

Australian Catholic University

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST
MSB1.36 & 37

Continental Philosophy, In Person

12:00pm NZST

Doubt Aversion Theory

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST

N3.01

How does wishful thinking (the ‘desirability bias’) work? Existing theories (e.g., cognitive dissonance, motivated reasoning, psychological immune theory) struggle to adequately explain this phenomenon, so I apply theory construction methodology and standard critical thinking tools to improve on them. I find that wishful thinkers accurately perceive that attaining self-serving beliefs will confer genuine benefits to them, but underperceive their potential costs, leading to a distorted perception of the true personal benefit-cost ratio (BCR). Wishful thinkers must also maintain their beliefs over time, which they achieve with the strategic avoidance of doubt-inducing stimuli (even though this strategy has fundamental constraints). I posit that wishful thinking necessarily produces an aversive attitude towards self-doubt, and that such doubt aversion is a crucial causal factor: the overperception of the BCR of wishful thinking is locked in by it, as it obstructs future learning about costs. All of this produces serious risks for the wishful thinker, but they may reduce their exposure to these by developing conditional metacognitive knowledge about self-doubt. Unfortunately, doubt aversion can again obstruct this process. My main contention is that without the metacognitive neglect (i.e., the failure to develop metacognitive knowledge) of self-doubt and doubt aversion, wishful thinking could not be sustained.

Speakers

Ted Hennicke

University of Queensland

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST
N3.01

Critical Thinking, In Person

12:00pm NZST

Irrationality is in the Job Description: Why Epistemic Role Norms Imply the Permissibility of Trade-Offs

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST

MSB1.05

An agent makes an epistemic trade-off when she forms a belief, that is prima facie irrational, to achieve some larger epistemic good (such as the attainment of a more valuable belief). Most epistemologists contend that trade-offs are impermissible; however, I argue that examples of permissible trade-offs can be found in a recognizable phenomenon in social epistemology: the adoption of unique belief-formation norms by agents in epistemic roles (e.g., scientists, reporters, etc.). On my view, these norms are authoritative since they help the agents who occupy these roles transmit specialized knowledge to the public. And just like ethical role norms, epistemic role norms often conflict with the norms that govern typical agents. Agents in these roles are thus permitted to form prima facie irrational beliefs so that others can achieve a larger epistemic good (the acquisition of specialized knowledge), which fits the definition of a trade-off. As an example, I analyze mid-century belief-formation norms that instructed anthropologists to irrationally disbelieve any moral claim about the practices of other cultures. These norms led to the adoption of irrational morally relativistic beliefs; however, they were a necessary step to ending the Eurocentric biases that led early anthropologists to adopt implausible theories.

Speakers

Levi Smith

University of Colorado Boulder

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST
MSB1.05

Epistemology, In Person

12:00pm NZST

Death and Lament: A Deprivationist Argument Against Lamenting Death

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST

MSB1.01

A widely accepted view about the badness of death is the Deprivation Account (DA), according to which death is bad for the person who dies because it deprives them of future goods. A natural idea for DA proponents is that we should lament our death if and only if, and to the extent that, it is bad for us—a view called the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption (NBNL). However, Travis Timmerman has recently argued that DA proponents should reject NBNL. This paper has two aims. First, I argue, pace Timmerman, that DA is compatible with NBNL. Second, I explore what follows if both DA and NBNL are true. I shall tentatively defend the claim that, given both claims, we should not lament our death in most actual cases. My defense relies on the observation that we normally lack sufficiently good reasons to believe that our death is bad for us. In most actual cases, we have only a very limited amount of information about what our own circumstances would be like in the remote future had we not died.

Speakers

Ryota Ishihara

PhD Candidate, Kyoto University

I am a PhD candidate at Kyoto University, Japan. I am working mainly on the philosophy of death, the philosophy of harm, and animal ethics.

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST
MSB1.01

Ethics, In Person

12:00pm NZST

Hermeneutic Religious Fictionalism: A Defence

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST

MSB1.15

Religious fictionalism is roughly the view that our engagement with religious discourse, ritual and practise involves pretense. According to the fictionalist, religious talk does not involve assertion and religious thought does not involve belief. When we say things like ‘God is good’, we are merely expressing something like a make-belief that God is good (and perhaps inviting others to do the same). In this paper, I defend a version of hermeneutic religious fictionalism, suggesting that religious fictionalism is not just a practise we should adopt, it is a practise that many (if not most) religious practitioners currently adopt. If I am correct, religious practitioners are not in error; but many philosophers and athiests are.

Speakers

Stuart Brock

Ōtākou Whakaihu Waka | University of Otago

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST
MSB1.15

Philosophy of Religion, In Person

12:00pm NZST

Gaston Bachelard's Non-Kantian Philosophy of Science in the Philosophy of No

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST

MSB1.02

Gaston Bachelard has received increasing interest in analytic philosophy (Massimiliano Simons and Matteo Vagelli, 2021; Brenner, 2015; Chimisso, 2024), yet it remains controversial whether Bachelard simply develops the neo-Kantian philosophy of science (Tiles, 1984; Guo, 2019; Panero, 2021) or breaks with this tradition to establish a novel approach (Souto, 2022). In this paper, I argue, through a reading of The Philosophy of No (1940), that Bachelard’s philosophy of science is best understood as a movement away from Léon Brunschvicg’s neo-Kantian critical idealism towards a phenomenological account of science inspired by Edmund Husserl. First, I contrast Brunschvicg’s and Husserl’s divergent modifications of Kantian doctrines, principally regarding the cognitive capacity to grasp noumena. Second, I trace in The Philosophy of No how Bachelard inherits Brunschvicg’s neo-Kantian concerns for the autonomy, progress, and demystifying role of science while adapting these commitments into a variation of Husserl’s metaphysics of history. With this background in mind, I argue that Bachelard’s philosophy of science constitutes a pedagogical doctrine primarily aimed at transforming those initiated in Kantian doctrine into practitioners of a phenomenology of science.

Speakers

Jacob Ritz

University of Queensland

Jacob Ritz is a casual academic in German and mathematics and a PhD student at the University of Queensland, where he studied German, French, and pure mathematics. His current research interests lie in nineteenth- and twentieth-century German and French metaphysics, particularly at... Read More →

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST
MSB1.02

Philosophy of Science, Remote

12:00pm NZST

The Symmetry of Epistemic Resistance

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST

MSB1.03

Individuals and groups frequently resist well-evidenced claims while readily accepting others that are, on more objective examination, highly dubious or false. Philosophical analyses of this phenomenon tend to focus on right-wing or conservative predispositions, invoking mechanisms such as motivated reasoning, deference to unreliable authorities, and epistemic pollution by vested interests. These analyses rarely apply equivalent scrutiny to left-wing or progressive patterns of selective receptivity to evidence.

It appears, however, that the underlying mechanisms of belief formation and resistance to unwelcome truths operate symmetrically across the political spectrum. People evaluate evidence through filters shaped by their core values, social identities, prior commitments, and off-the-shelf worldviews or ideologies. Information that coheres with these feels intuitively vindicating and is readily assimilated, while dissonant information triggers suspicion, rationalization, rejection, or moral outrage.
Thus, conservatives and libertarians have often resisted well-established findings in climate science where they appeared to threaten commitments to free markets, technological optimism, and small government. But many self-identified liberals or progressives have been quick to endorse dubious claims – such as characterizations of Israel’s military operations in Gaza as “genocidal” – despite countervailing arguments and evidence.

This underscores the importance of epistemic humility, self-reflective scrutiny of one’s own priors, and efforts at detached objectivity.

Speakers

Russell Blackford

Conjoint Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Newcastle

I'm a philosopher (obviously), legal scholar, and literary critic, and a widely published essayist and commentator. I've enjoyed a career in academia, public policy management, and the legal profession, and since the 1980s, I've also built an international profile as a writer and... Read More →

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST
MSB1.03

Truth, Remote

1:00pm NZST

Lunch

Thursday July 9, 2026 1:00pm - 1:55pm NZST

Breaks

2:00pm NZST

Aesthetic Resonance and Imagined Community: Rethinking the Social Basis of Aesthetic Value

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST

MSB1.20

This paper argues that aesthetic value can arise from aesthetic resonance, a psychological experience of connection that generates an imagined aesthetic community. While Riggle (2024) locates aesthetic value in shared practices, this view struggles to account for solitary and cross-temporal experiences and risks treating them as merely instrumental.
I propose that, in aesthetic experience, individuals can imaginatively resonate with others—viewers, listeners, or artists—without actual interaction. This process forms a psychologically real but imagined community, extending across time. Drawing on Anderson’s notion of imagined communities, I argue that such resonance generates intersubjective meaning and a sense of connection, thereby constituting aesthetic value. It also provides a psychological basis for, and may motivate engagement in, practice-based aesthetic communities.

Speakers

Kai Wang

University of Sydney

I am currently pursuing a PhD at the University of Sydney. My primary research interests lie in aesthetics, analytic philosophy, and the philosophy of games.

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST
MSB1.20

Aesthetics, In Person

2:00pm NZST

Outputs First: Rethinking Bullshit in Large Language Models

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST

MSB1.21

A fast-moving debate has emerged over whether LLMs are bullshitters in any significant sense. This talk develops an account of LLM bullshit that, in contrast to the most influential existing accounts, is entirely output-based.
I begin with an overview of the best-known treatment of LLM bullshit, due to Hicks, Humphries, and Slater, along with some of the main critical reactions to their views. One response, from Gunkel and Coghlan, argues that Hicks et al.’s process-based account should be replaced by an output-based one. I take this response to be compelling, though it is notable that Gunkel and Coghlan do not attempt to develop a detailed output-based account.
To fill this gap, I review Florian Cova’s recent output-based account of bullshit, explain how it can be streamlined, and show how it can be applied to LLMs. The main upshots are: (i) some but not all LLM outputs are bullshit; (ii) LLMs engage in the activity of bullshitting sometimes but not always; and (iii) LLMs are bullshitters in only a rather weak sense.

Speakers

Jeremy Wyatt

Senior Lecturer, Te Whare Wānanga o Waikato │ University of Waikato

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST
MSB1.21

Artificial Inteligence, In Person

2:00pm NZST

The Double Bind of Self: Cultural Legacies that Affect Critical Thinking and Experience

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST

N3.01

With global reports of substantial mental health issues, there is an imperative to take seriously the criticisms of the traditional Western paradigm that entails the predominant epistemological and ontological assumptions about mental health. In this paper we argue that the historical development of concepts and theories related to self have created deeply embedded cultural legacies that are based on the ontological and epistemological assumptions of our individual and societal expectations about, and experiences of, wellbeing. Further, we will argue that ontological and epistemological assumptions in the Western paradigm concerning a fundamental ontological separation of selves from the world and of an intra-psychic divide mean that the way that the self is understood in relation to the experience of wellbeing is conceptually flawed. These embedded assumptions are demonstrated to be problematic by framing them in the double-bind scenario, whereby contradictory inputs create an irresolvable situation causing anxiety and confusion. Understanding the web of ontological and epistemological tangles and their consequent conceptual and lived ‘binds’ provides a framework within which to consider a paradigm shift in understanding the self in relation to critical thinking and the experience of wellbeing.

Speakers

Pru Steinerts

Lincoln University

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST
N3.01

Critical Thinking, In Person

2:00pm NZST

Some Varieties of Particularism

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST

MSB1.05

Recent work on the philosophy of conspiracy theory in Philosophy has largely consolidated around the thesis of Particularism. Particularists argue that we cannot make broad generalisations about the class of conspiracy theories. Instead, we have to assess particular instances of conspiracy theories on their merits. However, like many emerging consensus positions in philosophy, particularism is not unassailed. Generalists argue that we have reasons to treat conspiracy theories - as a class - as epistemically suspect, and they have found particularism as a thesis to be wanting.
In this paper I examine both how generalists have described particularist positions, as well we how particularists have articulated particularism. I argue that if generalists want to challenge the particularist consensus, then it is going to be important to show that their construals of particularist positions accurately reflect what particularists argue for if they want to then show where particularism asa. thesis falls down. That is, I will ask and then answer the question of what, exactly, generalists need to show in order to both undermine particularism and challenge the particularist consensus.

Speakers

M R. X. Dentith

Beijing Normal University

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST
MSB1.05

Epistemology, In Person

2:00pm NZST

A sympathetic response to skepticism about empathy

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST

MSB1.36 & 37

Empathy was introduced to philosophy as a solution to the problem of other minds skepticism, the doubt whether other minds exist at all, which arises from the Cartesian dualist picture of the mind as metaphysically hidden (Lipps 1907). Already in Lipps’s work, and from then on into contemporary philosophical discussion, empathy in its various forms is commonly seen as our way to know what specific minds believe and feel and desire in specific scenarios. In this paper, I focus on affective empathy, usually seen as the success of a simulation effort, where one tries to adopt the perspective of another and imagine oneself in the other’s situation (e.g. Coplan 2011). I shall argue that this attempt is resting on a misguided notion of similarity between two people, and that the epistemic stance simulation involves is objectifying and obliterating of the other’s individuality. Relying on the work of the psychoanalyst Neville Symington (2018), I propose a new associative-imaginative account of affective empathy, which involves the surrender of the epistemic position and a genuine moment of a communion in feeling.

Speakers

Talia Morag

Australian Catholic University

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST
MSB1.36 & 37

Philosophy of Mind, Remote

2:00pm NZST

Thibodeau and the Horrendous Deeds Objection: A Reply

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST

MSB1.15

Jason Thibodeau has recently developed a revised version of the Horrendous Deeds Objection against Modified Divine Command Theory (MDCT). On his formulation, if God has “moral grounding power”—the capacity for a being’s commands to constitute moral obligations—then any omnipotent being would possess the same power. This purportedly allows for a possible world in which a non‑omnibenevolent deity renders horrendous acts morally obligatory. I argue that this objection fails once the nature of moral grounding power is correctly understood. On standard versions of MDCT, moral obligation is identical to being commanded by God. When grounding is construed as identity rather than causal production, Thibodeau’s key premise collapses: identity is not transferable, and it is therefore logically impossible for the property of being morally required to be identical to the commands of any distinct agent, regardless of omnipotence. I further respond to two recent attempts to rehabilitate the objection, concerning alleged cases of type‑identical commands constituting the same normative phenomenon and the purported arbitrariness of restricting moral grounding power to God alone. I conclude that the revised Horrendous Deeds Objection does not undermine MDCT.

Speakers

Matthew Flannagan

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST
MSB1.15

Philosophy of Religion, In Person

2:00pm NZST

An Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Theoretical Parsimony

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST

MSB1.02

There is disagreement over why theoretical virtues are good for theories to have. On the one hand, they may be epistemic; they may be guides to the truth. On the other hand, they may be pragmatic; they merely facilitate inquiry. I present an evolutionary debunking argument against the view that parsimony is an epistemic theoretical virtue. Our disposition to prefer simpler theories over more complex theories is at least partly explained by our evolutionary history. We evolved a preference for parsimony due to constraints imposed on our evolutionary ancestors arising from the costs of cognitively demanding tasks. We also have no independent explanation of why parsimony should track the truth. As such, we have some reason to doubt that parsimony is a purely epistemic theoretical virtue, and more reason to think that parsimony is a pragmatic theoretical virtue.

Speakers

James Vlachoulis

Australian National University

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST
MSB1.02

Philosophy of Science, Remote

2:00pm NZST

Discerning Truthfulness and the Fear of Betrayal

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST

MSB1.03

We extend trust to those we deem trustworthy. Trustworthiness involves both a competence component and a motivation component. Insofar as we aim to trust only those who are trustworthy, we have reason not to extend our trust when the target is either incompetent or not properly motivated. However, of these two ways that trust can be violated, the latter tends to elicit much stronger reactive attitudes: here we speak of resentment and betrayal, modulated perhaps by whether the violation of trust was out of ill will (when we think they weren't truthful) or insufficient care and attentiveness. In this paper I explore whether the desire to avoid situations that might elicit these stronger reactive attitudes -- especially those having to do with being deemed untruthful -- may have a significant effect on our epistemic lives. I venture that this desire may partly explain our tribalistic tendencies and our tendency to seek out and remain in epistemic bubbles. If this is correct, it might also explain why generating fear – in particular, fear that others do not share our values – is one of the most effective ways to sow the seeds of polarization.

Speakers

Sanford Goldberg

Northwestern University

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST
MSB1.03

Truth, In Person

3:00pm NZST

Film and the Mode of Dream

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST

MSB1.36 & 37

I take it that in watching a film one is imaginatively presented with an as-if reality. In this talk I’d like to explore the idea that the mode of viewing a film is closely analogous to the imaginative mode of viewing a dream. I shall take up and extend Suzanne Langer’s suggestion in “A Note on the Film” that film is presented to the viewer in “the dream mode” by reflecting on the relation between dream and imagination as theorized by Bernard Williams (“Imagination and the Self”). I end with some tentative thoughts about why this connection between film and dream is important.

Speakers

David Macarthur

Professor of Philosophy, University of Sydney

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST
MSB1.36 & 37

Aesthetics, Remote

3:00pm NZST

Pluralistic World Views, AI Adoption, and Trustworthy AI

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST

MSB1.21

The de facto situation regarding trustworthy AI is that the principles and supporting guidelines of are largely settled, from a pan-cultural perspective, and that if we build this trustworthy AI—all other things being equal—this will lead to greater AI adoption.

There are some consequences that may be drawn by AI accelerationists from this. First, we don’t need to expend resources engaging with the communities impacted by AI to determine what makes AI trustworthy for them. Instead, it is a matter of building trustworthy AI and getting that AI in front of people to facilitate AI adoption. Second, on balance, this version of trustworthy AI constitutes a societal good: real trustworthy AI mitigates harms while delivering maximal benefits. Third, if we build trustworthy AI according to these assumptions, it is not rational for people to be sceptical of AI.

And, following from that, those who raise fears among the community regarding AI adoption are both doing a disservice to that community and are not acting in a rationally-justified manner.
In this paper I critique this common notion of trustworthy AI, discussing AI in the context of a plurality of world views, and critique the claims made above.

Speakers

Daniel Wilson

Waipapa Taumata Rau │ University of Auckland

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST
MSB1.21

Artificial Inteligence, In Person

3:00pm NZST

The Misuse of Slippery Slope Arguments by VAD Opponents

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST

N3.01

In this presentation, I critically evaluate the popular use of slippery slope arguments (SSAs) by opponents of Voluntary Assisted Dying (VAD). I begin by evaluating different forms of SSA. I then identify recurrent methodological deficiencies appearing in SSAs opposing VAD, such as speculative causal chains of events, conflation of logical possibility with empirical probability, selective engagement with jurisdictional evidence, and the application of an asymmetric burden of proof that treats hypothetical future harms as certain or very likely, while down-playing, and sometimes even ignoring, the proven immediate suffering of VAD patients. Drawing on case studies from the philosophical literature, and legislative debates from jurisdictions where VAD has been permitted, I demonstrate that slippage toward the negative consequences predicted by opponents of VAD either have not occurred or have occurred in ways reflective of deliberative democratic debate, and clinical review. Further, I argue that the rhetorical force of SSAs, used in debates about VAD, often effectively conceals deeply held theological commitments (such as the sanctity of life) that advocates are reluctant to defend directly. I conclude by advocating for ways to distinguish legitimate SSAs from fallacious ones.

Speakers

Jessie McDonnell

Charles Sturt University

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST
N3.01

Critical Thinking, In Person

3:00pm NZST

Contextualism, a Challenge from Experimental Philosophy

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST

MSB1.05

Keith DeRose's (1992, 2009, 2011) epistemic contextualism maintains that when S makes a knowledge attribution, the truth conditions of the statement "S knows that P" vary in a specific way depending on the context of S's assertion. This "specific way" is jointly determined by both epistemic and practical factors. In particular, the claim that stakes (as a practical factor) affect knowledge attributions has been challenged by experimental philosophy, generating a substantial body of literature (among others, Beaman & Francis 2023; Buckwalter 2021; Dinges & Zakkou 2020; Francis, Beaman & Hansen 2019; Pinillos 2012, 2024; Porter et al. 2024; Rose et al. 2019; Shurakov 2025; Wu 2023). However, I argue that when experimental philosophy tests these claims, it fails to clearly distinguish between the interpretations of objective knowledge and knowledge attributions under different theoretical frameworks. Consequently, existing experimental results fail to provide an objective evaluation of DeRose's contextualism. Therefore, this paper will argue that, due to the failure to clearly distinguish between knowledge attributions and objective knowledge, the empirical findings of experimental philosophy cannot provide an objective assessment of DeRose's contextualism.

Speakers

Hsin Che Wang

National Chung Cheng University

Pre postgraduate of National Chung Cheng University

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST
MSB1.05

Epistemology, In Person

3:00pm NZST

Product Boycott: Morally Good Boycotts vs Morally Bad Boycotts

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST

MSB1.01

Product boycotts are a common feature of our political lives. Vegans avoid animal products, and many Americans boycott Tesla for political reasons. Boycotts are a central mechanism through which consumers attempt to hold firms morally accountable within market systems. Consequentialists defend consumer boycotts on the basis of their expected effects. Non-consequentialists, by contrast, defend boycotts on grounds such as non-complacency, the expression of disapproval and public solidarity, or their role as instruments of democratic values. I reject these defences and provide a novel non-consequentialist framework to evaluate the moral goodness of consumer boycotts. I argue that the moral significance of product boycotts does not depend on their causal efficacy but on their expressive role in reflecting consumers’ moral concerns. Consumer boycotts are actions through which agents manifest what they care about and what they take to be morally important. When such actions express morally admirable concerns — for instance, concern for animal welfare or justice — they reflect well on the consumer’s moral concerns; when they express morally objectionable concerns, they reflect poorly. Consequently, even causally inefficacious boycotts can be morally meaningful, not as instruments of change, but as expressions of moral commitments that contribute to making us morally better persons.

Speakers

Ritam Chakraborty

University of Colorado, Boulder

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST
MSB1.01

Ethics, In Person

3:00pm NZST

Are Phenomenal Properties Dispositional?

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST

MSB1.20

In the field of metaphysics concerned with causal powers (powers ontology) a central debate concerns whether all properties are powers, or whether some properties are nonpowerful. Some philosophers argue that we need inert (nonpowerful) properties called categorical properties or qualities in order to avoid problematic regresses that emerge if we have a powers-only ontology. In this paper, I argue that all properties are powerful. I propose that what seem like inert properties are powers-in-act, i.e. manifesting powers. I define powers as starting points of change which can be potentialities for motion and change, or already manifesting powers. This definition is in contrast to mainstream definitions in the powers literature wherein powers are defined as mere potentialities, that, when manifested, are replaced by other potentialities. I argue that my definition of powers helps us resolve the regresses normally associated with powers-only ontologies.
Further, some philosophers have suggested that phenomenal properties (qualia) are paradigmatic categorical properties because they are not potentialities to do anything beyond the experience itself. I suggest in this paper that phenomenal properties are manifestations of potentialities that are nonproductive (i.e., powers that have no end extrinsic to the manifestation of the power). Nonproductive properties are not categorical properties, but manifestations of powers. As such, even phenomenal properties are powers.

Speakers

Cecilia Hunt

Associate Lecturer and PhD Candidate, University of Notre Dame Australia

I am a third year PhD candidate at the University of Notre Dame Australia. My research is in the metaphysics of powers and the philosophy of mind. Prior to my PhD I completed my undergraduate and Masters degree in Theology and Philosophy, respectively. I also teach at UNDA in the... Read More →

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST
MSB1.20

Metaphysics, In Person

3:00pm NZST

Lucid Reflections: Moral Injury Turning the Earth

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST

MSB1.15

Metaphysical freedom, experienced as a state of lucidity, can allow for balanced change in our understanding of ecology as it creates opportunities for individuals to develop a dynamic moral mindset in line with our ever-changing relationship with nature and empower them to enact intentional change. Entering a state of lucidity, a state where we recognise our responsibility in creating our own meaning, will give us a position from which to birth creative solutions in the face of loss. Processing eco-grief and moral injury, in our current state of global climate-crisis, provides opportunities to reflect on our appeals to futility or authority, and other approaches to nature that are frequented as means to exonerate us from our responsibility to nature. I argue that environmental disseminators and organisations have the more difficult job of empowering individuals to reflect on their moral injury, than corporations and institutions who wish to offer exoneration to the individual from their moral injury for continued capital gain. How we act in response to our moral injury and eco-grief comes to shape our world.

Speakers

Paige Maguire

PhD Student, University of Queensland

I am an eco-feminist and focus my research primarily on eco-revolution, Aboriginal dipomacy and relationality.

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST
MSB1.15

Other, Remote

3:00pm NZST

Structuralism in Loop Quantum Gravity

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST

MSB1.02

I investigate the viability of ontic structural realism (OSR) in loop quantum gravity (LQG) (in both its canonical and covariant formulations). This is done through the introduction of two tests for the viability of OSR: the intrinsic properties test and the intrinsic identity test. A list of candidates for the fundamental structure of LQG is identified. The application of the aforementioned tests demonstrates that structuralism is possible in each of the options for fundamental structures in LQG. This establishes a prima facie case for ontic structural realism in LQG. I then discuss potential objections to OSR in LQG. These objections include the problem that the existence of highly symmetric structures poses for OSR, as well as an objection based on the status of the Immirzi parameter (a key parameter in LQG). I argue that, with some caveats, OSR has the resources to address these objections.

Speakers

Aiden Meyer

Phd student, University of Melbourne

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST
MSB1.02

Philosophy of Science, Remote

3:00pm NZST

Is Truth Correspondence, Coherence, Pragmatic Utility? - A Decision Procedure

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST

MSB1.03

The question whether truth is correspondence, coherence, pragmatic utility, or something else is a perennial philosophical question for which there has so far been no decision procedure. In this talk I propose a decision procedure for this question. The basis for this decision procedure is the consideration of what we lose and what we don’t lose when we lose truth in a “post-truth” crisis. “Post-truth crisis” can be understood, in this context, either as the actual crisis taking place today or as a thought experiment.

Speakers

Gila Sher

Professor, University of California, San Diego

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST
MSB1.03

Truth, In Person

4:00pm NZST

Afternoon Break

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:00pm - 4:25pm NZST

MSB Foyer

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:00pm - 4:25pm NZST
MSB Foyer

Breaks

4:30pm NZST

Taxonomically Transformative Technologies: AI, Conceptual Engineering, and Hermeneutical Impoverishment

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST

MSB1.21

Critics rightfully identify that AI models are biased against marginalised groups. These biases deteriorate our shared hermeneutical resources—the narratives, frameworks, and concepts that structure how we understand the world and ourselves—by reflecting and exacerbating existing oppressive narratives. However, this is not the only way that AI models are sources of hermeneutical impoverishment. I propose that AI models warp our hermeneutical resources, not only by reinforcing existing problematic representations of identity groups, but by changing how these groups are represented. That is, AI models are conceptual engineers, capable of revising our social concepts.
When certain deep machine learning models perform predictions, they construct social concepts. Crucially, these algorithmic concepts differ from their human-constructed counterparts due to unavoidable trade-offs in model development. In constructing revised algorithmic concepts, AI models act as conceptual engineers. Once introduced, algorithmic concepts can take the place of our own concepts. Through these hermeneutical changes, AI models can also make a difference to our underlying social ontology: in redefining how we think of ourselves, they can redefine who we are. Finally, I offer upshots of attending to AI models as novel sources of epistemic and ontological harm.

Speakers

Lena Wang

University of Cambridge

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST
MSB1.21

Artificial Inteligence, Remote

4:30pm NZST

Between Reason and Desire: Brandom on the Moral Valet

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST

MSB1.36 & 37

In this paper we propose a critical reading of Robert Brandom’s reading, in A Spirit of Trust, of the final eleven paragraphs of the Spirit chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, especially the crucial paragraph 665 – the discussion of the Kammerdiener, or “moral valet”. We argue that Brandom significantly understates the role that desire plays in Hegel’s account of the institution of normativity. This interpretive disagreement has implications for Brandom’s broader philosophical project, including his critical treatment of the “genealogical” tradition, and his rejection of the “instrumental pragmatist” strand in classical U.S. pragmatism. On our preferred interpretation of the moral valet passage, Hegel’s project in the Phenomenology is closer to both of these post-Hegelian traditions than Brandom’s rational reconstruction acknowledges.

Speakers

Duncan Law

Nicole Pepperell

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST
MSB1.36 & 37

Continental Philosophy, In Person

4:30pm NZST

Deliberative Strategic Action

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST

N3.01

Group deliberation is a discursive process whereby participants seek to reach understanding by exchanging considerations, aiming to build consensus for the purpose of action-coordination. My PhD thesis develops formal (mathematical) models to study the mechanics of group deliberation. In this talk, I first address the question of whether formal models are appropriate to study group deliberation in the first place. On Jürgen Habermas' influential theory of communicative action, formal models are inappropriate to study processes of communicative action (such as deliberation), because they model agents as engaging in purposive strategic action, rather than as acting so as to reach understanding. I develop a concept, deliberative strategic action, and argue that it provides a conceptual warrant to study deliberation using formal models. An agent engaged in deliberative strategic action relies on purposive rationality to carry out a plan of action for the end of reaching understanding. Second, I present a framework, objects of deliberation. Here, deliberating agents seek consensus on one or more parts of a hypothetical imperative: ends, means, or facts. I argue that this framework helps us make sense of the diversity of formal models of deliberation.

Speakers

Michael Demetrius

Waipapa Taumata Rau | University of Auckland

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST
N3.01

Critical Thinking, In Person

4:30pm NZST

Accipere Aude: Autonomy, Illumination, and the Necessity of Epistemic Humility in Immanuel Kant and St Augustine

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST

MSB1.20

Contemporary interpretations of Immanuel Kant often present autonomy as one of the decisive achievements of modern philosophy. By grounding knowledge in the self-legislating use of reason, Kant sought to liberate humanity from intellectual immaturity and dogmatism. Yet his restriction of knowledge to the realm of phenomena also raises an enduring epistemological tension concerning the relation between the finite intellect and transcendent truth. This paper argues that Kant’s transcendental idealism, while methodologically rigorous, risks a form of epistemic enclosure in which reason becomes confined within its own constitutive structures. In response to this tension, I propose Saint Augustine’s doctrine of divine illumination as a necessary complement to the Kantian project. Augustine presents an account of epistemic humility in which the human intellect recognizes that immutable truth cannot be generated autonomously, but must ultimately be received through participation in a higher source of intelligibility. To develop this argument, I place Augustine’s semiotic reflections in De Magistro and his distinction between lux and lumen in dialogue with Kant’s transcendental deduction. This comparison highlights the contrast between an intrinsically receptive intellect and a self-grounding transcendental subject. Drawing on contemporary scholarship, including the critical retrievals of John Milbank and the historical studies of Lydia Schumacher, this study argues that genuine enlightenment requires not only critical autonomy but also receptivity to transcendent truth. Thus, the imperative of sapere aude finds its completion in accipere aude: reason is most fully enlightened not when it encloses itself within its own limits, but when it acknowledges its participation in the Divine Word.

Speakers

Justin Sean Luis Canaria

Graduate Student, Pontifical and Royal University of Santo Tomas

Justin Sean Luis Canaria graduated with an A.B. in Philosophy (2023), Cum Laude, from the Immaculate Conception Major Seminary, Guiguinto, Bulacan.Currently, he is a College Instructor at Pasig Catholic College. He is also pursuing his M.A. in Philosophy at the Graduate School of... Read More →

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST
MSB1.20

Epistemology, Remote

4:30pm NZST

Confidentiality, Assertion, and Finite Inquiry

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST

MSB1.05

Hearer-oriented etiological functionalism explains the epistemic norm of assertion by appeal to assertion’s characteristic epistemic function. On the version defended by Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion, assertion characteristically functions to generate testimonial knowledge in audiences, and an assertion is epistemically permissible when it is disposed to do so under normal conditions. The view is stronger than a crude actual-success condition, because it asks about normal functioning. The view is also more social than speaker-centered rule accounts, because it places the hearer at the center of evaluation. I argue that confidentiality practices create a deeper problem for the account than existing discussion has recognized. Some true assertions that would predictably give a hearer testimonial knowledge of their content are epistemically impermissible, because the hearer’s knowledge of that content would block the route to the knowledge the inquiry is organized to secure. The argument concerns a constitutive epistemic role. A promotional gain alone would not suffice. Finite inquirers sometimes need managed ignorance in order to know what they often set out to know. Science makes the pattern vivid, and ordinary evaluative practices display the same pattern.

Speakers

Anish Seal

Nanyang Technological University Singapore

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST
MSB1.05

Epistemology, In Person

4:30pm NZST

Is there an obligation not to incentivise dishonesty?

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST

MSB1.01

People should be honest, but we know, or ought to know, that being honest is more demanding for some people, in some circumstances, than it is for others. Do we have a duty to avoid putting those people in those circumstances if we can? I argue that we do have that duty and that it is evident (even if not explicitly recognised) in some institutional arrangements (e.g., the legal privilege against self-incrimination), but that it is ignored in others (e.g., when we incentivise dishonesty about relationship status in welfare systems). At least occasionally, failure to recognise the obligation imposes heavy burdens on people and amounts to a significant wrong.

Speakers

Tim Dare

University of Auckland

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST
MSB1.01

Ethics, In Person

4:30pm NZST

Mental Disorders, Symptom Networks, and Dispositions

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST

MSB1.02

On the Symptom Network Theory (SNT), a mental disorder is a network of symptoms, not an underlying condition that causes symptoms. The SNT offers an intriguing alternative to views that try to make mental disorder just like physical disorder, on the one side, and views that reject the whole idea of mental disorder, on the other. I suggest that there are counterexamples to the SNT: there can be mental disorders without networks of symptoms, and there can be networks of symptoms without mental disorders. But, I argue, those counterexamples can be avoided if mental disorders are conceived not as symptom networks, but as dispositions to display symptoms in certain patterns. I offer a theory of mental disorders as dispositions as a sympathetic amendment to the SNT. The goal is to retain the attractions of the SNT while retaining a conceptual distance between mental disorders and their symptoms.

Speakers

Simon Keller

Te Herenga Waka │ Victoria University of Wellington

I am presently working on the philosophy of mental health and disorder. I've previously written on topics in ethics, political philosophy, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy. I'm the author of The Limits of Loyalty and Partiality, and a co-author of The Ethics of Patrioti... Read More →

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST
MSB1.02

Philosophy of Science, In Person

4:30pm NZST

Defending egalitarianism against merited hierarchy

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST

MSB1.15

Why are we moral equals, given how different we are?
In Section I, I review what it means to reject fundamental moral equality and endorse moral hierarchy. I argue that the hierarchical challenge is more pressing than egalitarians concede, and that merited hierarchy is more attractive than egalitarians admit.
In Section II, I consider the solution of proposing a 'range property' or threshold degree of some morally relevant capacity (generally moral agency, personal autonomy, or something similar). I argue that existing accounts cannot motivate the relevance of the threshold, and are thus driven to accept scalar moral status in proportion to one's possession of the relevant capacity.
In Section III, I consider the ‘decisionistic’ defence of basic equality, which argues that moral equality is a fundamental commitment, motivated by the evils of denying it. This approach has two flaws. First, it offers a contingent, non-ideal objection to moral hierarchy, which concedes crucial ground that egalitarians generally want to defend. Second, that it is fatally vague: it fails to sufficiently specify what we thereby commit to.
In Section IV I propose an alternative approach, locating the basis of equality in the badness of social alienation. I consider a series of objections.

Speakers

Leo Rogers

University of Oxford

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST
MSB1.15

Political Philosophy, Remote

4:30pm NZST

Why Does Truth Seem Valuable?

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST

MSB1.03

This paper examines why we intuitively regard truth as valuable. Philosophical theories of truth are traditionally divided into normativism (e.g., coherence theory, pragmatism), which treat truth as a normative property, and non-normativism (e.g., correspondence theory, deflationism), which do not (Wrenn, 2023). While normativism can account for truth’s value directly, non-normativist theories require additional explanation. Within non-normativism, object-given views attribute value directly to truth, whereas state-given views locate value in truth-oriented states or activities (Ferrari, 2018; Lynch, 2004; Motiva, 2021; Wrenn, 2023). Although state-given accounts avoid problems faced by object-given approaches, they struggle to explain why we intuitively see truth itself as valuable—a phenomenon termed the object-given intuition.
This paper offers a game-based model to address this. Drawing on Nguyen (2019)’s notion of “striving-play” games, truth-seeking is treated as a provisional, goal-directed activity analogous to a game, where the apparent aim (i.e., truth) is pursued for a deeper purpose (i.e., understanding). The object-given intuition arises because agents overgeneralize the temporary value of truth within inquiry to the value of truth itself. This framework preserves the strengths of state-given accounts while explaining the object-given intuition, contributing to debates on truth’s value without positing truth as independently valuable.

Speakers

Tamaki Komada

Hokkaido University

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST
MSB1.03

Truth, In Person

7:00pm NZST

CONFERENCE DINNER 2026

Thursday July 9, 2026 7:00pm - 10:30pm NZST

Reggies

Join us for the Conference Dinner at Reggies, Made Mezzanine, to mark the final evening of the conference.

The dinner is a chance to gather with colleagues, continue conversations from the week, and celebrate the close of the conference in a relaxed setting.

Time: 7.00–11.00pm
Location: Reggies, Made Mezzanine, 401 Grey Street, Hamilton
Tickets: NZD $110 / NZD $75

Please note: This is an optional event for conference registrants and tickets must be booked in advance.

If you have not yet booked for the dinner and would like to attend, please email [email protected] and we can organise tickets.

Thursday July 9, 2026 7:00pm - 10:30pm NZST
Reggies

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