AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

In Language Animal and Cosmic Connections, Charles Taylor advances a theory of constitutive-expressive language. Taylor argues that this model developed in the 1790s, following Johann Herder’s theorisation of Besonnenheit ("reflective-awareness") in his Ursprung der Sprache ("Origin of Language") (1772) essay. Despite Herder’s dominant influence, Taylor names his theory after three contributors, labelling it the ‘HHH’ (Hamann-Herder-Humboldt) language model. Building on analysis of J.G. Hamann’s early essay, Socratic Memorabilia (1759), this article argues that the constitutive-expressive approach to language, attributed by Taylor to a post-Enlightenment language turn, was already operative, if unacknowledged, within Enlightenment philosophy itself. Taylor does not recognise that Hamann’s mimetic technique—labelled here ‘philosophical portraiture’—catches the period’s leading philosophers relying on constitutive-expressive language in the founding documents of the French Encyclopédie project, against their professed ideal of a transparent language that unveils “Truth.” Two implications follow from this correction: (I) the transitional period between the Enlightenment and Romanticism should be reevaluated, and (II) the longstanding debate about poetry as untruth and philosophy as truth should be revisited in light of philosophy’s unacknowledged ‘poetic’ practice.

The attention economy is often blamed for the severe deterioration of credible, high-quality content on social media. This is a bit perplexing. I give my attention to some platforms in exchange for some entertaining content. The exchange itself seems perfectly innocuous, sounds like a textbook win-win situation. Where did everything go wrong?
Contrary to public opinion, I argue that the credibility crisis does not stem from the game of maximizing attention per se. Instead, the underlying problem comes from a market failure that plagues the attention market. A risk of using attention as currency is that it must be ‘paid’ before a consumer can evaluate the content's quality. You cannot determine if a post is entertaining or credible until you have seen it. Yet, once your attention is spent, the transaction is complete; you cannot claw it back even if the content is sloppy or false. This is a kind of information asymmetry. Economic theories show that information asymmetry often lead to adverse selection, a situation where low-quality goods inevitably squeeze out high-quality ones. This presentation will demonstrate how such market failure happens on social media, and how it ultimately fosters the rampant spread of misinformation and fake news online.

There has been concern that B-series eternalism could imply fatalism about future objects and events. That is, if B-series eternalism is true, then propositions concerning our future should not be considered differently from those concerning our past; they must have a definite truth value. This was exemplified by Russell’s account of Cambridge change. If a poker is hot at t1 and cold at t2, it will always be so. If all future propositions are true or false, our free will is threatened. In a similar fashion, van Inwagen’s direct argument threatens moral responsibility if determinism is true. This paper offers a construction of eternalist fatalism in a similar fashion, utilising the same structure of Van Inwagen’s argument. I will start by introducing the B-series and eternalism, before explaining the direct argument and resistances to its validity. I will then formulate a similar argument for fatalism using eternalism, overcoming the charge that the B-series does not entail necessary future truths, therefore it does not imply fatalism. I shall conclude with the conditional that if eternalism is true, fatalism is true, whilst remaining neutral on whether this should be used in a modus ponens or a modus tollens. 

Individuals and groups frequently resist well-evidenced claims while readily accepting others that are, on more objective examination, highly dubious or false. Philosophical analyses of this phenomenon tend to focus on right-wing or conservative predispositions, invoking mechanisms such as motivated reasoning, deference to unreliable authorities, and epistemic pollution by vested interests. These analyses rarely apply equivalent scrutiny to left-wing or progressive patterns of selective receptivity to evidence.

It appears, however, that the underlying mechanisms of belief formation and resistance to unwelcome truths operate symmetrically across the political spectrum. People evaluate evidence through filters shaped by their core values, social identities, prior commitments, and off-the-shelf worldviews or ideologies. Information that coheres with these feels intuitively vindicating and is readily assimilated, while dissonant information triggers suspicion, rationalization, rejection, or moral outrage.
Thus, conservatives and libertarians have often resisted well-established findings in climate science where they appeared to threaten commitments to free markets, technological optimism, and small government. But many self-identified liberals or progressives have been quick to endorse dubious claims – such as characterizations of Israel’s military operations in Gaza as “genocidal” – despite countervailing arguments and evidence.

This underscores the importance of epistemic humility, self-reflective scrutiny of one’s own priors, and efforts at detached objectivity.