AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

Discussions of certainty in epistemology often focus on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of “hinges,” the background certainties that make justification and epistemic evaluation possible. While the nature and epistemic status of hinges remain contested, this paper argues that they are best understood not as propositions or merely individual commitments, but as socially grounded, non-propositional certainties. Although hinge statements often take the form of empirical propositions, they function beyond justification and empirical testing while structuring the possibility of empirical knowledge.
Engaging with interpretations such as Moyal-Sharrock’s account of verbalized non-propositional certainties and Pritchard’s notion of hinge commitments, I argue that hinges are instantiated pragmatically through action, embodied practice, and social participation. Drawing on theories of collective intentionality, I propose that hinges constitute a shared normative background that enables coordinated epistemic practices and underlies the possibility of inquiry.
This account clarifies how background certainties are acquired, maintained, and shared across individuals, while also helping explain disagreement and misunderstanding when such certainties diverge. More broadly, it highlights the fundamentally social character of human cognition and knowledge, opening new avenues for dialogue between epistemology, cognitive science, and related disciplines.

Prosocial behaviour-promoting virtual reality (PBP-VR) experiences often claim to foster empathy and understanding by allowing users to virtually embody members of marginalised groups. In this talk, I argue that PBP-VR can also produce distinctive epistemic errors that generate morally problematic forms of social understanding. I identify and analyse two such errors: synecdoche epistemic arrogance, in which users mistake a narrow or artificial virtual experience for genuine insight into the experiences of marginalised people more broadly, and epistemic overestimation, in which users significantly overestimate the depth or reliability of the understanding they have acquired through virtual embodiment.
I argue that these errors are morally significant because they can encourage misplaced epistemic confidence, diminish appropriate deference to lived testimony, and reinforce distorted beliefs about oppression and social identity. Moreover, PBP-VR may sometimes unintentionally lead users to misinterpret emotionally salient virtual experiences as morally enlightening, even where those experiences are highly artificial, and or, affectively misleading (think, for example, a man embodied as a woman who concludes that being sexually harassed is 'fun' and therefore 'not that bad').
The talk concludes by considering how these risks complicate common claims about VR as an “empathy machine” and by outlining several ethical implications for the design and implementation of PBP-VR systems.