Contrary to the view that ideological purity and practical politics are fundamentally incompatible, this paper theorises a symbiotic, self-correcting relationship between deontological purists and pragmatic incrementalists as essential to sustainable social justice movements. Through a pop-culture thought experiment contrasting Barry Allen (The Flash)—whose “deontological narcissism” externalises catastrophic fallout onto others—with Oliver Queen (Arrow), a tragic “dirty hands” agent, I examine the morality-preserving conditions required for both forms of ethical agency. Drawing on Walzer’s dirty hands, Bernard Williams’ moral remainder, Weberian responsibility, and Kantian universalisability, I argue that deontological purists serve as uncompromised moral anchors only when motivated by radical solidarity with the most vulnerable rather than the preservation of personal moral purity. Conversely, pragmatic incrementalists retain moral legitimacy only by refusing to sanitise or universalise their compromises, instead maintaining a painful awareness of the human cost left behind in bartering away an erased minority’s immediate safety to secure survival for the majority. I conclude by applying this framework to the ethics of contemporary social activism using the lived narrative of implementing restricted sex-education curricula under state bans in India.
Recent MA Graduate (Philosophy)., Ōtākou Whakaihu Waka | University of Otago
I've recently completed my Master's in Philosophy at the University of Otago. My research interests include feminist philosophy, political philosophy, applied ethics, queer and trans, disability, mad, and fat studies. I've always been keen to bridge the gap between academia and activism... Read More →
Why are we moral equals, given how different we are? In Section I, I review what it means to reject fundamental moral equality and endorse moral hierarchy. I argue that the hierarchical challenge is more pressing than egalitarians concede, and that merited hierarchy is more attractive than egalitarians admit. In Section II, I consider the solution of proposing a 'range property' or threshold degree of some morally relevant capacity (generally moral agency, personal autonomy, or something similar). I argue that existing accounts cannot motivate the relevance of the threshold, and are thus driven to accept scalar moral status in proportion to one's possession of the relevant capacity. In Section III, I consider the ‘decisionistic’ defence of basic equality, which argues that moral equality is a fundamental commitment, motivated by the evils of denying it. This approach has two flaws. First, it offers a contingent, non-ideal objection to moral hierarchy, which concedes crucial ground that egalitarians generally want to defend. Second, that it is fatally vague: it fails to sufficiently specify what we thereby commit to. In Section IV I propose an alternative approach, locating the basis of equality in the badness of social alienation. I consider a series of objections.
