AAP 2026 CONFERENCE: Full Schedule

2:00pm NZST

Redefining the Problem of Justification: On the Tension Between Language and Reality

Monday July 6, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST

The problem of justification has long been the central question of philosophy. At stake is what accounts as sufficient justification for claiming that a statement genuinely refers to the object in question. Unless we address this ontological gap between language and the external world, we cannot confidently claim that our statements are directly related to the object we aim to describe. With this, this paper proposes a redefinition of the problem of justification by examining the persistent gap between language and the external world. Traditional accounts of epistemic justification often assume a relatively direct relation between language and reality. However, linguistic mediation complicates this relation: our access to the world is structured through concepts, interpretive frameworks, and socially conditioned practices of meaning. By clarifying the distinction between linguistic representation and worldly causation, this study redefines justification not primarily as a property of the world or isolated beliefs, but what counts as a meaningful and responsible representation of the world. By situating justification within our linguistic practices, this approach offers a more precise account of how beliefs can be answerable to a world that is never accessed except through language, concepts, and interpretations.

Speakers

Vincent Ray Daut

Ateneo de Manila University

Monday July 6, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST
MSB1.05

Epistemology, Remote

4:30pm NZST

Higher Uncertainty and Epistemic Vagueness

Monday July 6, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST

MSB1.05

Following Dorst (2026), this paper develops a higher-order account of epistemic vagueness. I begin by reconstructing Williamson’s epistemicist account of vagueness, focusing on the margin principle. I argue that epistemic vagueness cannot be explained by first-order indiscriminability alone, since such an explanation is self-undermining. A satisfactory account therefore appeals to higher-order uncertainty. I then clarify that the margin principle rests on two assumptions: the indiscriminability of just-noticeable differences (JNDs) and gradualness. I suggest that the former must be restricted, while the latter is incompatible with empirical data and unnatural. Finally, I argue that higher-order uncertainty provides a better explanation of non-gradual patterns in epistemic vagueness, and that this explanation is supported by psychological studies on discrimination and metacognition.

Speakers

Ming Dai

Zhejiang University

Monday July 6, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST
MSB1.05

Epistemology, Remote

4:30pm NZST

Accipere Aude: Autonomy, Illumination, and the Necessity of Epistemic Humility in Immanuel Kant and St Augustine

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST

MSB1.20

Contemporary interpretations of Immanuel Kant often present autonomy as one of the decisive achievements of modern philosophy. By grounding knowledge in the self-legislating use of reason, Kant sought to liberate humanity from intellectual immaturity and dogmatism. Yet his restriction of knowledge to the realm of phenomena also raises an enduring epistemological tension concerning the relation between the finite intellect and transcendent truth. This paper argues that Kant’s transcendental idealism, while methodologically rigorous, risks a form of epistemic enclosure in which reason becomes confined within its own constitutive structures. In response to this tension, I propose Saint Augustine’s doctrine of divine illumination as a necessary complement to the Kantian project. Augustine presents an account of epistemic humility in which the human intellect recognizes that immutable truth cannot be generated autonomously, but must ultimately be received through participation in a higher source of intelligibility. To develop this argument, I place Augustine’s semiotic reflections in De Magistro and his distinction between lux and lumen in dialogue with Kant’s transcendental deduction. This comparison highlights the contrast between an intrinsically receptive intellect and a self-grounding transcendental subject. Drawing on contemporary scholarship, including the critical retrievals of John Milbank and the historical studies of Lydia Schumacher, this study argues that genuine enlightenment requires not only critical autonomy but also receptivity to transcendent truth. Thus, the imperative of sapere aude finds its completion in accipere aude: reason is most fully enlightened not when it encloses itself within its own limits, but when it acknowledges its participation in the Divine Word.

Speakers

Justin Sean Luis Canaria

Graduate Student, Pontifical and Royal University of Santo Tomas

Justin Sean Luis Canaria graduated with an A.B. in Philosophy (2023), Cum Laude, from the Immaculate Conception Major Seminary, Guiguinto, Bulacan.Currently, he is a College Instructor at Pasig Catholic College. He is also pursuing his M.A. in Philosophy at the Graduate School of... Read More →

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST
MSB1.20

Epistemology, Remote

AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

2:00pm NZST

Vincent Ray Daut

4:30pm NZST

Ming Dai

4:30pm NZST

Justin Sean Luis Canaria

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