AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

The aim of Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy is to discover the first principles of human knowledge, that is, what must be known before anything else can be known. If we are to understand this work, it is important to understand the methodology he employs. Descartes does not reveal the method utilized in the Meditations in this work, nor in any of his other books.

It is only in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections that he explains the method he utilizes in this work - he calls this method ‘analysis’; ‘synthesis’ is the method of mathematics. I explain the method of ‘analysis’ contra ‘synthesis’, and the employment of ‘analysis’ in leading the mind to the first principles of human knowledge. Examples are provided by focusing on Descartes’ analytic proofs of his existence as a thinking thing (second meditation), and that God is his creator (third meditation). In neither case is the analytic proof inferential. Further, if no inference is involved in gaining knowledge of God, then the charge of circular reasoning (raised by Arnauld and others) is without merit. Finally, I show the importance of meditation for Descartes in arriving at the first principles of human knowledge."

This paper focusses on the problem of doxastic normativity in Hume i.e., on what basis does Hume approve of some methods of belief-formation over others, given his radically sceptical conclusions about the possibility of justified belief? Without an answer to this question, Hume seems left with no basis for discriminating between better and worse belief-forming methods, but clearly he seems to think he can.

I review a variety of existing approaches to the problem, including approaches based on irresistibility, stability, liveliness, practical or moral desirability and love of truth. I argue that, while many of these proposals identify factors which play important roles in Hume’s approved belief-forming methods, none of them is sufficient to characterise the basis on which Hume discriminates between such methods.

I put forward a proposal according to which Hume discriminates between belief-forming methods based on their “apparent reliability” in predicting and controlling events and argue that the proposed criterion avoids the problems identified with existing approaches. I also compare this proposal to other reliability-based proposals in the literature, arguing that the sceptical nature of the proposed criterion distinguishes it from those proposals in a way that is more consistent with Hume’s sceptical philosophy.

Finally, I identify the source of normativity for the criterion as the ability to anticipate and control events, which contributes in its turn to the practical benefits accruing from the` successful execution of our designs. On this account, the normativity of Hume’s belief-forming criterion is ultimately derived from its contribution to practical success, but its particular role in contributing to that success results in its own particular form of “relative normativity”– belief-forming mechanisms are judged good or bad according to their apparent reliability in anticipating and controlling events.

Leibniz often uses a mirror analogy to explain his monads. Referring to a monad as a simple substance, he writes in a typical passage: “each simple substance is a perpetual, living mirror of the universe” (M 56). Although Leibniz’s mirror analogy is well-known, it is not well understood. Accordingly, the goal of my talk is to show how Leibniz’s mirror analogy can shed light on his monadic metaphysics. Unlike other commentators, my strategy is to draw on Leibniz’s writings on perspectiva because it is now clear that Leibniz had expertise in a branch of mathematics known as perspectiva and that his mirror analogy is based on his work in perspectiva.

My talk is divided into three parts. First, I outline a fact that Leibniz learned from perspectiva, which is that any point on a body can be projected onto a drawing in such a way so as to preserve its relations to other points on the body. I then claim that Leibniz took this fact to imply that there is an equivalence between a body and its perspectival representations. I close by sketching how this equivalence can make sense of Leibniz’s thesis that a body is an aggregate of monads.

Descartes’ rejection of the resemblance between sensory ideas and extramental objects and the inferior status of the former in his epistemology makes researchers believe that Descartes takes resemblance as the principle for veridical representation of intellectual ideas. On top of that, they attempt to explicate the nature of resemblance through property-sharing and identity, which is upheld by the scholastic reading of Descartes’ distinction between formal being and objective being. I contend that resemblance as the principle of representation cannot be sustained as it is theoretically incompatible with Descartes’ substantial dualism and universal conceptualism, and it is textually ungrounded. On top of that, I propose my reading of the objective being according to which it only denotes ideas’ ontological status.

Scholarly accounts of Hobbes’s theory of passions focus on fear of death and glory. Honour is often conflated with glory. I argue that honour is not a passion but a power. Honouring is a natural attribute that recognises another's higher value (power). Honour is always a relative term that varies with the standing of the parties and the context.  If one is honoured too highly, this is flattery. If too lowly, then one is dishonoured.

Given the ubiquity of flattery and miserliness, how do we know true honour? While not explicit, Hobbes suggests that self-knowledge measures honours proffered and being dispassionate assists since passions reduce power. The constraints on honour are clearer. Most significant is Hobbes’s principle of equality. In the seventeenth century, honour was closely aligned to social status: one should act honourably within one’s social rank. Hobbes sweeps rank aside, insisting we are equal as members of a species. If inequality does exist, we should treat others as equals in the interest of peace. Honour, then, demands modesty in the name of equality and acceptance of impermanence in context and status. Though modest, honour can be valued more highly than life itself, as in war and duels. Used wisely, it is a powerful tool for the sovereign.

This paper explores whether, for Hobbes, having power is intrinsically comparative. Is having power always already 'more power' than someone else, so that some people having power means that others lack it? In more contemporary terms, is power 'zero-sum'? Or can many individuals simultaneously have power? I will argue that Hobbes does initially conceive of power as zero-sum, but that he later repudiates this conceptualisation. I'll reconstruct the weaknesses of his early view, and how these are remedied in his later work. I'll then trace the ramifications of this conceptual shift for Hobbes's moral psychology of justice and equity.

Spinoza emphasizes the value of intuition, the third kind of knowledge, which he associates with the greatest human joy (E5p32=Ethics, Part 5, Proposition 32). He writes little, however, about how we might come to attain intuitive knowledge. The clearest suggestion is that such knowledge somehow arises from a different, less valuable sort of knowledge, reason (E5p28), but it is difficult to see how it might do so. After all, for Spinoza, it appears that (1) reason consists in common notions (E2p40s2), which are ideas of what is common to things (E2p38C); (2) intuition is knowledge of the essence of things (E2p40s2); and (3) what is common to things does not constitute the essence of anything (E2p37). In this essay, I try to make a little headway against this problem. I argue, first, against (1), that the Ethics may suggest that there are other ideas that are also ideas of reason but that are not common notions; second, that there is good reason to think that such ideas include ideas of laws of nature; and third, mitigating the problem that (3) presents, that laws of nature do, for Spinoza, constitute the essence of things.

This paper challenges the widespread interpretation under which Spinoza understands the modes of God as propria. This interpretation is based on three principal doctrines:(i) Spinoza’s familiarity with the Scholastic tradition which defines propria as God’s necessary but non-essential properties; (ii) Spinoza’s claim that each mode necessarily follows from the essence of God; and (iii) Spinoza’s two-category ontology (substance and modes). I argue that the distinction between God’s modes and propria is compatible with (i)-(iii) because, whereas modes are intrinsic denominations of the only substance (properties that are predicated of a thing in virtue of something inherent to that thing), propria are its extrinsic denominations. First, I argue that for Late Scholastics, such as Suárez, the propria of God (such as eternity and infinity) are distinguished from God by reason and hence extrinsic denominations. Second, I show that Spinoza’s understanding of propria is consistent with Suárez’s characterisation. I contrast this with Spinoza’s view of modes as inherent properties and distinguished from God by a modal distinction. Third, I contend that by rendering propria as extrinsic denominations, my interpretation not only accommodates (i)-(iii) but also avoids the challenge of explaining how finite, durational things can follow from an eternal and infinite substance.