Sextus Empiricus plainly states that the sceptics take the goal to be tranquillity. Commentators usually understand this to be a claim about the goal of life, and note, with some discomfort, that it is a little strange for sceptics to take any position on this at all. The goal of life is a hotly contested topic, and the sceptics believe we should suspend belief in the face of disagreement. Worse still, the sceptics believe we should live in accordance with convention and appearances. Other candidates, such as pleasure and wisdom, appear to be the goal to many people and are more conventional than tranquillity.
In this paper, I argue that commentators have been misled by Sextus’ point blank statement that tranquillity is the goal. Across PH I, Sextus makes multiple and mutually incompatible claims about the sceptics’ goal. Drawing on Bett’s analysis of Sextus’ use of “variation”, I argue that these contradictions constitute a deliberate strategy to induce suspension of belief about the sceptics’ take on the goal. Moreover, I show how Sextus uses “ersatz goals” to sell scepticism to readers no matter their life-orientation. The appeal of these goals depends on the success of the sceptics at balancing arguments.
