AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

This paper defends the cognitive value of art by analyzing the role of perspectival imagination in the appreciation of fictional narratives. Against the anti-cognitivist challenge posed by Peter Lamarque(2006) that cognitive value is irrelevant to artistic value, I argue that perspectival imagination is both essential to the practice of appreciating fictional narratives and a source of genuine cognitive value.
Drawing on Elisabeth Camp(2017)'s account of perspective as an "open-ended disposition", I distinguish two modes of perspectival imagination: imagination oriented toward the work-world, and imagination oriented toward fictional characters. Both are argued to be indispensable for adequate comprehension of fictional narratives, and thus constitutive of their artistic value. I then examine imaginative resistance as evidence that appreciators continuously evaluate the perspectives they occupy during engagement with fiction. Finally, I argue that both empathy and imaginative resistance, as manifestations of perspectival imagination, yield cognitive value: enabling appreciators to interpret unfamiliar viewpoints, reflect on their own perspectives, and develop a richer understanding of human experience.

I show that documentary film, and art more broadly, can function as a vehicle for both epistemic and affective justice in contexts of psychological trauma. The central claim is that trauma often persists not only because of the initial harm suffered, but because survivors are denied the epistemic and emotional resources necessary to process that harm. Through the imaginative reshaping of narrative, documentary can help lessen what the author calls "dwelling," the temporal and affective stagnation that is characteristic of trauma. By enabling new narratives to emerge, documentaries can facilitate forms of closure, recognition, and emotional repair for both participants and audiences. This can then allow for the argument to be applied to art more generally, showing how art can serve as an alternative in areas where other techniques for resolution might not be available.

This paper argues that aesthetic value can arise from aesthetic resonance, a psychological experience of connection that generates an imagined aesthetic community. While Riggle (2024) locates aesthetic value in shared practices, this view struggles to account for solitary and cross-temporal experiences and risks treating them as merely instrumental.
I propose that, in aesthetic experience, individuals can imaginatively resonate with others—viewers, listeners, or artists—without actual interaction. This process forms a psychologically real but imagined community, extending across time. Drawing on Anderson’s notion of imagined communities, I argue that such resonance generates intersubjective meaning and a sense of connection, thereby constituting aesthetic value. It also provides a psychological basis for, and may motivate engagement in, practice-based aesthetic communities.

In the field of metaphysics concerned with causal powers (powers ontology) a central debate concerns whether all properties are powers, or whether some properties are nonpowerful. Some philosophers argue that we need inert (nonpowerful) properties called categorical properties or qualities in order to avoid problematic regresses that emerge if we have a powers-only ontology. In this paper, I argue that all properties are powerful. I propose that what seem like inert properties are powers-in-act, i.e. manifesting powers. I define powers as starting points of change which can be potentialities for motion and change, or already manifesting powers. This definition is in contrast to mainstream definitions in the powers literature wherein powers are defined as mere potentialities, that, when manifested, are replaced by other potentialities. I argue that my definition of powers helps us resolve the regresses normally associated with powers-only ontologies. 
Further, some philosophers have suggested that phenomenal properties (qualia) are paradigmatic categorical properties because they are not potentialities to do anything beyond the experience itself. I suggest in this paper that phenomenal properties are manifestations of potentialities that are nonproductive (i.e., powers that have no end extrinsic to the manifestation of the power). Nonproductive properties are not categorical properties, but manifestations of powers. As such, even phenomenal properties are powers.

Contemporary interpretations of Immanuel Kant often present autonomy as one of the decisive achievements of modern philosophy. By grounding knowledge in the self-legislating use of reason, Kant sought to liberate humanity from intellectual immaturity and dogmatism. Yet his restriction of knowledge to the realm of phenomena also raises an enduring epistemological tension concerning the relation between the finite intellect and transcendent truth. This paper argues that Kant’s transcendental idealism, while methodologically rigorous, risks a form of epistemic enclosure in which reason becomes confined within its own constitutive structures. In response to this tension, I propose Saint Augustine’s doctrine of divine illumination as a necessary complement to the Kantian project. Augustine presents an account of epistemic humility in which the human intellect recognizes that immutable truth cannot be generated autonomously, but must ultimately be received through participation in a higher source of intelligibility. To develop this argument, I place Augustine’s semiotic reflections in De Magistro and his distinction between lux and lumen in dialogue with Kant’s transcendental deduction. This comparison highlights the contrast between an intrinsically receptive intellect and a self-grounding transcendental subject. Drawing on contemporary scholarship, including the critical retrievals of John Milbank and the historical studies of Lydia Schumacher, this study argues that genuine enlightenment requires not only critical autonomy but also receptivity to transcendent truth. Thus, the imperative of sapere aude finds its completion in accipere aude: reason is most fully enlightened not when it encloses itself within its own limits, but when it acknowledges its participation in the Divine Word.