In the increasingly interdisciplinary study of conspiracy theories - conspiracy theory theory - there is a debate (at least in philosophy) between generalism (the view that there is something generally wrong about conspiracy theories) and particularism (the view that conspiracy theories ought to be assessed on their relative merits, and thus no assumption can be made about their warrant sans some investigation of the particular theory). In this panel discussion three of the main contributors to that debate (Charles Pigden, M R. X. Dentith, and Steve Clarke) discuss why it seems that particularism is the dominant view (at least among philosophers), whether generalists are right to claim that non-philosophers agree with generalism, and whether there is some intermediate position between the two views.
M R. X. Dentith is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the International Center for Philosophy at Beijing Normal University at Zhuhai. Their chief research interests concern the epistemic analysis of conspiracy theories, rumours, fake news, and the epistemology of secrecy. In 2014... Read More →
An agent makes an epistemic trade-off when she forms a belief, that is prima facie irrational, to achieve some larger epistemic good (such as the attainment of a more valuable belief). Most epistemologists contend that trade-offs are impermissible; however, I argue that examples of permissible trade-offs can be found in a recognizable phenomenon in social epistemology: the adoption of unique belief-formation norms by agents in epistemic roles (e.g., scientists, reporters, etc.). On my view, these norms are authoritative since they help the agents who occupy these roles transmit specialized knowledge to the public. And just like ethical role norms, epistemic role norms often conflict with the norms that govern typical agents. Agents in these roles are thus permitted to form prima facie irrational beliefs so that others can achieve a larger epistemic good (the acquisition of specialized knowledge), which fits the definition of a trade-off. As an example, I analyze mid-century belief-formation norms that instructed anthropologists to irrationally disbelieve any moral claim about the practices of other cultures. These norms led to the adoption of irrational morally relativistic beliefs; however, they were a necessary step to ending the Eurocentric biases that led early anthropologists to adopt implausible theories.
Recent work on the philosophy of conspiracy theory in Philosophy has largely consolidated around the thesis of Particularism. Particularists argue that we cannot make broad generalisations about the class of conspiracy theories. Instead, we have to assess particular instances of conspiracy theories on their merits. However, like many emerging consensus positions in philosophy, particularism is not unassailed. Generalists argue that we have reasons to treat conspiracy theories - as a class - as epistemically suspect, and they have found particularism as a thesis to be wanting. In this paper I examine both how generalists have described particularist positions, as well we how particularists have articulated particularism. I argue that if generalists want to challenge the particularist consensus, then it is going to be important to show that their construals of particularist positions accurately reflect what particularists argue for if they want to then show where particularism asa. thesis falls down. That is, I will ask and then answer the question of what, exactly, generalists need to show in order to both undermine particularism and challenge the particularist consensus.
M R. X. Dentith is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the International Center for Philosophy at Beijing Normal University at Zhuhai. Their chief research interests concern the epistemic analysis of conspiracy theories, rumours, fake news, and the epistemology of secrecy. In 2014... Read More →
Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST MSB1.05
Keith DeRose's (1992, 2009, 2011) epistemic contextualism maintains that when S makes a knowledge attribution, the truth conditions of the statement "S knows that P" vary in a specific way depending on the context of S's assertion. This "specific way" is jointly determined by both epistemic and practical factors. In particular, the claim that stakes (as a practical factor) affect knowledge attributions has been challenged by experimental philosophy, generating a substantial body of literature (among others, Beaman & Francis 2023; Buckwalter 2021; Dinges & Zakkou 2020; Francis, Beaman & Hansen 2019; Pinillos 2012, 2024; Porter et al. 2024; Rose et al. 2019; Shurakov 2025; Wu 2023). However, I argue that when experimental philosophy tests these claims, it fails to clearly distinguish between the interpretations of objective knowledge and knowledge attributions under different theoretical frameworks. Consequently, existing experimental results fail to provide an objective evaluation of DeRose's contextualism. Therefore, this paper will argue that, due to the failure to clearly distinguish between knowledge attributions and objective knowledge, the empirical findings of experimental philosophy cannot provide an objective assessment of DeRose's contextualism.
Hearer-oriented etiological functionalism explains the epistemic norm of assertion by appeal to assertion’s characteristic epistemic function. On the version defended by Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion, assertion characteristically functions to generate testimonial knowledge in audiences, and an assertion is epistemically permissible when it is disposed to do so under normal conditions. The view is stronger than a crude actual-success condition, because it asks about normal functioning. The view is also more social than speaker-centered rule accounts, because it places the hearer at the center of evaluation. I argue that confidentiality practices create a deeper problem for the account than existing discussion has recognized. Some true assertions that would predictably give a hearer testimonial knowledge of their content are epistemically impermissible, because the hearer’s knowledge of that content would block the route to the knowledge the inquiry is organized to secure. The argument concerns a constitutive epistemic role. A promotional gain alone would not suffice. Finite inquirers sometimes need managed ignorance in order to know what they often set out to know. Science makes the pattern vivid, and ordinary evaluative practices display the same pattern.
