AAP 2026 CONFERENCE: Full Schedule

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11:00am NZST

Worthless Science: Against the Equivalence of Pursuits

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST

Despite the recent interest surge in the topic of pursuitworthiness within philosophy of science, Philip Kitcher's claim that science is, by its very nature, a significant pursuit has yet to be challenged within the literature. I argue in favor of the relevance of the category of worthless science, by establishing that it is irreducible to non-pursuitworthiness in the standard sense. I introduce a distinction between the internal epistemic aims constitutive of a research program and its external (or collateral) aims, those objectives satisfiable across disciplinary boundaries as a byproduct of internal inquiry. I then propose three jointly sufficient desiderata for worthless scientific pursuits: small research community size, minimal goal-set overlap with other scientific communities, and relative absence of achievable external aims, and formalize them within a utilitarian expected-utility framework. I subsequently address the principal challenge to this account raised by the Feyerabendian equivalence principle of pursuits, as recently discussed by Shaw, arguing that it collapses prescriptively into absurdity. I then identify two paradigmatic instantiations of worthless science: self-referential classificatory inquiry and speculative exploratory modeling, providing some case studies. I conclude by examining institutional mechanisms, as offsetting arrangements and better-structured interdisciplinary collaboration, capable of minimizing worthless pursuits without foreclosing epistemic pluralism.

Speakers

Luca Molinari

PhD Student, Nanyang Technological University

Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST
MSB1.02

Philosophy of Science, In Person

12:00pm NZST

Gaston Bachelard's Non-Kantian Philosophy of Science in the Philosophy of No

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST

MSB1.02

Gaston Bachelard has received increasing interest in analytic philosophy (Massimiliano Simons and Matteo Vagelli, 2021; Brenner, 2015; Chimisso, 2024), yet it remains controversial whether Bachelard simply develops the neo-Kantian philosophy of science (Tiles, 1984; Guo, 2019; Panero, 2021) or breaks with this tradition to establish a novel approach (Souto, 2022). In this paper, I argue, through a reading of The Philosophy of No (1940), that Bachelard’s philosophy of science is best understood as a movement away from Léon Brunschvicg’s neo-Kantian critical idealism towards a phenomenological account of science inspired by Edmund Husserl. First, I contrast Brunschvicg’s and Husserl’s divergent modifications of Kantian doctrines, principally regarding the cognitive capacity to grasp noumena. Second, I trace in The Philosophy of No how Bachelard inherits Brunschvicg’s neo-Kantian concerns for the autonomy, progress, and demystifying role of science while adapting these commitments into a variation of Husserl’s metaphysics of history. With this background in mind, I argue that Bachelard’s philosophy of science constitutes a pedagogical doctrine primarily aimed at transforming those initiated in Kantian doctrine into practitioners of a phenomenology of science.

Speakers

Jacob Ritz

University of Queensland

Jacob Ritz is a casual academic in German and mathematics and a PhD student at the University of Queensland, where he studied German, French, and pure mathematics. His current research interests lie in nineteenth- and twentieth-century German and French metaphysics, particularly at... Read More →

Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST
MSB1.02

Philosophy of Science, Remote

2:00pm NZST

An Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Theoretical Parsimony

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST

MSB1.02

There is disagreement over why theoretical virtues are good for theories to have. On the one hand, they may be epistemic; they may be guides to the truth. On the other hand, they may be pragmatic; they merely facilitate inquiry. I present an evolutionary debunking argument against the view that parsimony is an epistemic theoretical virtue. Our disposition to prefer simpler theories over more complex theories is at least partly explained by our evolutionary history. We evolved a preference for parsimony due to constraints imposed on our evolutionary ancestors arising from the costs of cognitively demanding tasks. We also have no independent explanation of why parsimony should track the truth. As such, we have some reason to doubt that parsimony is a purely epistemic theoretical virtue, and more reason to think that parsimony is a pragmatic theoretical virtue.

Speakers

James Vlachoulis

Australian National University

Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST
MSB1.02

Philosophy of Science, Remote

3:00pm NZST

Structuralism in Loop Quantum Gravity

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST

MSB1.02

I investigate the viability of ontic structural realism (OSR) in loop quantum gravity (LQG) (in both its canonical and covariant formulations). This is done through the introduction of two tests for the viability of OSR: the intrinsic properties test and the intrinsic identity test. A list of candidates for the fundamental structure of LQG is identified. The application of the aforementioned tests demonstrates that structuralism is possible in each of the options for fundamental structures in LQG. This establishes a prima facie case for ontic structural realism in LQG. I then discuss potential objections to OSR in LQG. These objections include the problem that the existence of highly symmetric structures poses for OSR, as well as an objection based on the status of the Immirzi parameter (a key parameter in LQG). I argue that, with some caveats, OSR has the resources to address these objections.

Speakers

Aiden Meyer

Phd student, University of Melbourne

Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST
MSB1.02

Philosophy of Science, Remote

4:30pm NZST

Mental Disorders, Symptom Networks, and Dispositions

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST

MSB1.02

On the Symptom Network Theory (SNT), a mental disorder is a network of symptoms, not an underlying condition that causes symptoms. The SNT offers an intriguing alternative to views that try to make mental disorder just like physical disorder, on the one side, and views that reject the whole idea of mental disorder, on the other. I suggest that there are counterexamples to the SNT: there can be mental disorders without networks of symptoms, and there can be networks of symptoms without mental disorders. But, I argue, those counterexamples can be avoided if mental disorders are conceived not as symptom networks, but as dispositions to display symptoms in certain patterns. I offer a theory of mental disorders as dispositions as a sympathetic amendment to the SNT. The goal is to retain the attractions of the SNT while retaining a conceptual distance between mental disorders and their symptoms.

Speakers

Simon Keller

Te Herenga Waka │ Victoria University of Wellington

I am presently working on the philosophy of mental health and disorder. I've previously written on topics in ethics, political philosophy, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy. I'm the author of The Limits of Loyalty and Partiality, and a co-author of The Ethics of Patrioti... Read More →

Thursday July 9, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST
MSB1.02

Philosophy of Science, In Person

AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

11:00am NZST

Luca Molinari

12:00pm NZST

Jacob Ritz

2:00pm NZST

James Vlachoulis

3:00pm NZST

Aiden Meyer

4:30pm NZST

Simon Keller

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