AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

In the field of metaphysics concerned with causal powers (powers ontology) a central debate concerns whether all properties are powers, or whether some properties are nonpowerful. Some philosophers argue that we need inert (nonpowerful) properties called categorical properties or qualities in order to avoid problematic regresses that emerge if we have a powers-only ontology. In this paper, I argue that all properties are powerful. I propose that what seem like inert properties are powers-in-act, i.e. manifesting powers. I define powers as starting points of change which can be potentialities for motion and change, or already manifesting powers. This definition is in contrast to mainstream definitions in the powers literature wherein powers are defined as mere potentialities, that, when manifested, are replaced by other potentialities. I argue that my definition of powers helps us resolve the regresses normally associated with powers-only ontologies. 
Further, some philosophers have suggested that phenomenal properties (qualia) are paradigmatic categorical properties because they are not potentialities to do anything beyond the experience itself. I suggest in this paper that phenomenal properties are manifestations of potentialities that are nonproductive (i.e., powers that have no end extrinsic to the manifestation of the power). Nonproductive properties are not categorical properties, but manifestations of powers. As such, even phenomenal properties are powers.