Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) are widely regarded as counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). In response, Widerker (1995), Ginet (1996), and others have advanced the well-known Dilemma Defense: in any FSC, either the agent is not morally responsible, or the agent could have done otherwise. This defense is often thought to depend on a “prior sign”—an indicator of how the agent is likely to act. To address this, Mele and Robb (1998), Hunt (2000), and others have revised FSCs to eliminate the role of such signs. This paper sets that debate aside and argues instead that all standard FSCs face a deeper structural dilemma, one that arises from the very nature of these cases and does not depend on prior signs. As a result, FSCs cannot serve as genuine counterexamples to PAP.
Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am AEST Steele-262
Free will skepticism is a position that either doubts or explicitly denies the existence of free will. In contrast, some proponents of free will—particularly compatibilists—affirm its existence by appealing to the concept of "agency." They argue that if individuals act with agency, then, even if determinism is true and their actions lack alternative possibilities or sourcehood, they still possess the freedom necessary for moral responsibility.
However, free will skepticism does not necessarily focus on agency. If a form of free will skepticism can meet the compatibilist criteria for agency while still remaining valid, it would present a significant philosophical challenge. In this presentation, I will examine Galen Strawson’s 'Basic Argument' as an example of free will skepticism and consider the question: "Is free will skepticism incompatible with agency?" I will explore how agency can be satisfied within free will skepticism and whether, despite this, it can still raise fundamental doubts about our freedom and moral responsibility. Such an inquiry, I believe, can help avoid the issue of talking past one another in free will debates, fostering a more productive discussion.
Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm AEST Steele-262
Doomsday is the last moment in time. Nothing comes after. In the recent literature on temporal metaphysics, several theories have been challenged by arguments invoking doomsday. In this talk I focus on the papers of Loss (2019), Andreoletti (2022), and Bigg and Miller (2024). A shared premise in these arguments is that it would be a problem or drawback for a theory of time, if it failed to allow for moments of undetermineddoomsday. In this scenario, time ends, despite it not being determined to by the laws plus the state of the world. Each of these authors argues that this scenario is at least possible, so we should expect a good theory of time to make room for it. In this talk, I argue against this point. In general, if a theory of time is incompatible with undetermined doomsday, then that is merely an interesting but neutral consequence of that theory. More broadly, we can expect various theories of time to be incompatible with various doomsday scenarios, up to and including being incompatible with any doomsday at all. I argue that this is not a prima facie problematic stance to adopt.
Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm AEST Steele-262
This paper explores a possible explanation for why we care about truth. As human beings, we are naturally inclined to seek truth over falsehoods. Normatively, we are also expected to believe and assert truths rather than lies. But why is truth so important to us? One common view holds that truth has instrumental value—it helps us achieve our goals. Another view sees truth as intrinsically valuable, valuable in itself. However, Wrenn (2010, 2017, 2023) argues that both views fall short. He denies that truth itself has value but claims that caring about truth is a moral virtue; we morally ought to seek it. Following Wrenn’s strategy, I will also reject the idea that truth itself has value. Instead, I focus on the process of acquiring truth. I propose that acquiring truth is a kind of achievement, and achievement is intrinsically valuable. The pursuit of truth involves overcoming challenges and exercising our will, a core human character. Thus, the value lies not in truth itself, but in the act of seeking it. By emphasizing the value of achievement, we can explain why we ought to care about truth without assuming that truth is valuable in itself.
Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm AEST Steele-262
