How does wishful thinking (the ‘desirability bias’) work? Existing theories (e.g., cognitive dissonance, motivated reasoning, psychological immune theory) struggle to adequately explain this phenomenon, so I apply theory construction methodology and standard critical thinking tools to improve on them. I find that wishful thinkers accurately perceive that attaining self-serving beliefs will confer genuine benefits to them, but underperceive their potential costs, leading to a distorted perception of the true personal benefit-cost ratio (BCR). Wishful thinkers must also maintain their beliefs over time, which they achieve with the strategic avoidance of doubt-inducing stimuli (even though this strategy has fundamental constraints). I posit that wishful thinking necessarily produces an aversive attitude towards self-doubt, and that such doubt aversion is a crucial causal factor: the overperception of the BCR of wishful thinking is locked in by it, as it obstructs future learning about costs. All of this produces serious risks for the wishful thinker, but they may reduce their exposure to these by developing conditional metacognitive knowledge about self-doubt. Unfortunately, doubt aversion can again obstruct this process. My main contention is that without the metacognitive neglect (i.e., the failure to develop metacognitive knowledge) of self-doubt and doubt aversion, wishful thinking could not be sustained.
With global reports of substantial mental health issues, there is an imperative to take seriously the criticisms of the traditional Western paradigm that entails the predominant epistemological and ontological assumptions about mental health. In this paper we argue that the historical development of concepts and theories related to self have created deeply embedded cultural legacies that are based on the ontological and epistemological assumptions of our individual and societal expectations about, and experiences of, wellbeing. Further, we will argue that ontological and epistemological assumptions in the Western paradigm concerning a fundamental ontological separation of selves from the world and of an intra-psychic divide mean that the way that the self is understood in relation to the experience of wellbeing is conceptually flawed. These embedded assumptions are demonstrated to be problematic by framing them in the double-bind scenario, whereby contradictory inputs create an irresolvable situation causing anxiety and confusion. Understanding the web of ontological and epistemological tangles and their consequent conceptual and lived ‘binds’ provides a framework within which to consider a paradigm shift in understanding the self in relation to critical thinking and the experience of wellbeing.
In this presentation, I critically evaluate the popular use of slippery slope arguments (SSAs) by opponents of Voluntary Assisted Dying (VAD). I begin by evaluating different forms of SSA. I then identify recurrent methodological deficiencies appearing in SSAs opposing VAD, such as speculative causal chains of events, conflation of logical possibility with empirical probability, selective engagement with jurisdictional evidence, and the application of an asymmetric burden of proof that treats hypothetical future harms as certain or very likely, while down-playing, and sometimes even ignoring, the proven immediate suffering of VAD patients. Drawing on case studies from the philosophical literature, and legislative debates from jurisdictions where VAD has been permitted, I demonstrate that slippage toward the negative consequences predicted by opponents of VAD either have not occurred or have occurred in ways reflective of deliberative democratic debate, and clinical review. Further, I argue that the rhetorical force of SSAs, used in debates about VAD, often effectively conceals deeply held theological commitments (such as the sanctity of life) that advocates are reluctant to defend directly. I conclude by advocating for ways to distinguish legitimate SSAs from fallacious ones.
Group deliberation is a discursive process whereby participants seek to reach understanding by exchanging considerations, aiming to build consensus for the purpose of action-coordination. My PhD thesis develops formal (mathematical) models to study the mechanics of group deliberation. In this talk, I first address the question of whether formal models are appropriate to study group deliberation in the first place. On Jürgen Habermas' influential theory of communicative action, formal models are inappropriate to study processes of communicative action (such as deliberation), because they model agents as engaging in purposive strategic action, rather than as acting so as to reach understanding. I develop a concept, deliberative strategic action, and argue that it provides a conceptual warrant to study deliberation using formal models. An agent engaged in deliberative strategic action relies on purposive rationality to carry out a plan of action for the end of reaching understanding. Second, I present a framework, objects of deliberation. Here, deliberating agents seek consensus on one or more parts of a hypothetical imperative: ends, means, or facts. I argue that this framework helps us make sense of the diversity of formal models of deliberation.
