Spinoza emphasizes the value of intuition, the third kind of knowledge, which he associates with the greatest human joy (E5p32=Ethics, Part 5, Proposition 32). He writes little, however, about how we might come to attain intuitive knowledge. The clearest suggestion is that such knowledge somehow arises from a different, less valuable sort of knowledge, reason (E5p28), but it is difficult to see how it might do so. After all, for Spinoza, it appears that (1) reason consists in common notions (E2p40s2), which are ideas of what is common to things (E2p38C); (2) intuition is knowledge of the essence of things (E2p40s2); and (3) what is common to things does not constitute the essence of anything (E2p37). In this essay, I try to make a little headway against this problem. I argue, first, against (1), that the Ethics may suggest that there are other ideas that are also ideas of reason but that are not common notions; second, that there is good reason to think that such ideas include ideas of laws of nature; and third, mitigating the problem that (3) presents, that laws of nature do, for Spinoza, constitute the essence of things.
Thursday July 9, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm AEST GCI-275 HYBRID
This paper challenges the widespread interpretation under which Spinoza understands the modes of God as propria. This interpretation is based on three principal doctrines:(i) Spinoza’s familiarity with the Scholastic tradition which defines propria as God’s necessary but non-essential properties; (ii) Spinoza’s claim that each mode necessarily follows from the essence of God; and (iii) Spinoza’s two-category ontology (substance and modes). I argue that the distinction between God’s modes and propria is compatible with (i)-(iii) because, whereas modes are intrinsic denominations of the only substance (properties that are predicated of a thing in virtue of something inherent to that thing), propria are its extrinsic denominations. First, I argue that for Late Scholastics, such as Suárez, the propria of God (such as eternity and infinity) are distinguished from God by reason and hence extrinsic denominations. Second, I show that Spinoza’s understanding of propria is consistent with Suárez’s characterisation. I contrast this with Spinoza’s view of modes as inherent properties and distinguished from God by a modal distinction. Third, I contend that by rendering propria as extrinsic denominations, my interpretation not only accommodates (i)-(iii) but also avoids the challenge of explaining how finite, durational things can follow from an eternal and infinite substance.
Thursday July 9, 2026 3:00pm - 4:00pm AEST GCI-275 HYBRID
