This paper argues that Spinoza’s concept of active joy provides a philosophical grounding for contemporary theory of serious leisure. For Spinoza, active joy is a sustained increase in our power of acting, achieved through activities rooted in understanding, autonomy, and rational self‑cultivation. This paper cites empirical evidence from the current leisure studies scholarship and explains how such joy emerges when we engage in practices that systematically expand our capacities and align with our conatus. The term “serious leisure”, defined as the committed, skill‑based, identity‑forming pursuit of a chosen activity, mirrors this structure. Both frameworks emphasise disciplined engagement and the transformation of ordinary pursuits into personal flourishing. By interpreting serious leisure through Spinoza’s lens, this paper shows how amateurism, volunteerism and hobbies generate active joy by enhancing competence, agency, and social embeddedness. The paper also illustrates that Spinoza’s philosophy clarifies why serious leisure contributes to resilience and wellbeing. Consequently, the sustained engagement in serious leisure embodies a Spinozist pathway toward freedom, where joy emerges from the rational understanding of our potential within a structured yet intrinsically rewarding domain of activity.
Panpsychism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is a fundamental feature of reality, gained significant attention in the recent decades as a potentially better alternative to physicalism or substance dualism. However, panpsychism runs into a serious problem—the combination problem—according to which the multiplicity of microphenomenally conscious particles somehow combine into a macrophenomenal consciousness that we have. Very recently, Kadic (2024) proposed a version of panpsychism which he calls monadic panpsychism. This version comes in two main varieties: dynamic version and global version. The former states that microphenomenally conscious particles stand in causal relations such that they make one particle macrophenomenally conscious. The latter states that the same causal process makes all particles conscious. In both cases, macrophenomenal consciousness is explained by avoiding all of the problems that hunt its alternatives. In this paper, I explore monadic panpsychism by raising objections and solving them in its favor. To solve all objections I appeal to the theory of evolution. The first objection is the incredulous stare problem according to which both versions of monadic panpsychism have a low prior probability. I argue that evolution could in principle either produce an organism which contains a single macrophenomenal particle, or an organism which contains a large totality of macrophenomenal particles. Given that to be the case, we should increase our credences about both versions of monadic panpsychism. Also, monadic panpsychism and evolution are similar in a sense that they contain elements of apparent arbitrariness in their theories. The second problem is the selection problem against the dynamic version in particular: why is this particle dominant but not some other one? I respond that evolution could select for a mechanism which randomly chooses particles to be dominant, even though, I admit that there are residual questions that cannot be answered even by evolution. Lastly, I compare two versions of monadic panpsychism in general and I conclude that we should: (i) increase our credences in both versions of monadic panpsychism, and that (ii) we might favor the global version over the dynamic version so far.
Debates about Generative AI often focus on empirical claims concerning cognitive enhancement or decline. This paper argues that the deeper issue is aesthetic. AI reshapes the form, tempo, and structural movement of reflective thought. Drawing on multi-modal critical thinking framework (Gilbert, 1994) and a conception of improvisational thinking as the aesthetic mode of dialectical engagement (Yazici, 2025), I defend a middle-way position. Generative AI threatens thinking only when engaged passively, encouraging aesthetic flattening through premature closure and conceptual smoothness. When approached through an improvisational stance, however, AI-generated outputs become material for reinterpretation, resistance, and creative transformation. The impact of AI on human thought is therefore not technologically determined but dependent on the aesthetic posture of the thinker. The philosophical task in an AI age is to cultivate forms of engagement that preserve the open-ended, self-revising thus improvisational ways of thinking.
The rise of critical thinking in Greece’s early philosophy can be traced back to the earliest written literature of ancient Greece, with the works of the epic poets Hesiod and Homer. Critical thinking was not just limited to the logical philosophies of Plato and Aristotle of the classical age, nor with interpretation to the sixth century BCE natural philosophers’ empirical observations and theories.Through a comparative analysis of the themes and structures surrounding concepts of creation in the myths of Greece’s epic poems, with the theories of the early Presocratic natural philosophers, this paper proposes to pinpoint when ancient Greece’s formal critical reasoning began. It argues the Presocratic philosophers were the transition point from mythological thinking of Greece’s archaic age to the scientific reasoning of Greece’s classical age. However, the earlier epic poetry also employed this critical reasoning, which makes it Greece’s earliest instance of recorded critical reasoning. Both mediums of epic poetry and natural philosophy used critical reasoning to explain natural phenomena and justify human existence. Thus the early Greek thinkers employed critical reasoning in what were early quasi-scientific explanations for what they observed around them that were based on empirical observation and practice combined with logic and reasoning.
Tolerance is firmly established in political, religious, and legal contexts, yet in the sphere of belief its boundaries remain undefined. In matters of opinion, no legal obligation requires individuals to justify or defend their claims. For that reason, the task of setting limits falls to critical thinking. It safeguards the conditions under which knowledge can be distinguished from mere opinion and responsible judgment from arbitrary assertion. An epistemic community endures only where practices of verification, argumentation, and reason-giving are preserved. Institutions do not think or tolerate on their own, but they shape the environment in which justification is either encouraged or replaced by unchecked expression. Tolerance should be understood as a starting assumption rather than a final value. It reflects a willingness to acknowledge the existence of the other. Critical thinking, however, asks a further question: is a given position genuinely different, grounded in a distinct but coherent conceptual framework, or is it simply false within a shared one? What is truly other may resist direct comparison and require broader criteria of evaluation. What is false demands critical rejection. Failing to distinguish between these cases erodes standards of judgment. The spread of fake information makes this risk visible. The problem is not openness to difference, but the elevation of error to the status of a legitimate alternative.
