AAP 2026 CONFERENCE: Full Schedule

arrow_back View All Dates

11:00am NZST

Beyond Imagination: The Absent Object and Non-Sense of the Mental

Wednesday July 8, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST

Imagination is an intriguing faculty of our mind. Its objects often do not exist in the external world but entirely within the mental, such as the “golden mountain.” However, there are limits to imagination when paradoxical concepts such as the “round square” are examined. Such concepts disclose the logical contradiction away from possible worlds and locate themselves in the impossible, also referred to as non-sense. But as Wittgenstein suggests, even non-sense can retain meaning in certain contexts, through language games or philosophical play. This paper will examine the limits of imagination by exploring the objects of imagination and their non-sense, often reflected in language. Further, the study will compare the philosophical non-sense to the psychoanalytical non-sense. By aligning the philosophical concern of the impossible with Lacan’s interpretation of the unconscious, this study contends that non-sense, when viewed through the functioning of the unconscious, becomes intelligible and does not mark an epistemic failure rather unravels the unconscious meaning that resists representation. Thus, letting the logical limits of thought serve as a pathway to its meaning, suggesting that non-sense can itself be meaningful.

Speakers

Zeenia Bhat

Mahindra University

Wednesday July 8, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST
MSB1.05

Philosophy of Mind, Remote

12:00pm NZST

Brain Simulation and the Implementation Challenge for Mind Uploading

Wednesday July 8, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST

MSB1.05

Whole-brain simulation seems to support mind uploading if computational functionalism about consciousness is true. Implementationists deny this: a digital brain model running on a computer may represent rather than implement consciousness-relevant computation. Dung and Kersten (2025) argue that such constraints cannot be general conditions on computational implementation, since mainstream theories imply that ordinary computers implement computations, whereas implementationist constraints would rule out such systems. I argue that this response moves too quickly. Implementationist constraints are, in fact, substantively equivalent to constraints in mainstream theories of physical computation: computational structure must be borne by objective mechanistic, causal, or dynamical processes. Strictly applied, these theories may not license high-level software implementation. They distinguish low-level physical/digital computations from the looser sense in which computer science says machines “implement” programs. On this reading, implementationists can deny that ordinary computers implement the high-level computation described by a brain model, without denying that they implement some lower-level computation. This does not refute mind uploading. Rather, it clarifies its hardest challenge: computationalist defenders of simulated consciousness must explain how that possibility remains open while taking seriously the prima facie appeal of implementationist theories that privilege objective physical processes.

Speakers

Tonghao Liu

University of New South Wales

Wednesday July 8, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST
MSB1.05

Philosophy of Mind, In Person

2:00pm NZST

The Presentness of Pain: Why We Cannot Remember a Sting

Wednesday July 8, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST

MSB1.05

Does the qualitative "sting" of past pain inevitably elude our mnemonic grasp? This paper argues that the qualitative character of pain is best understood as a measure of presentness. Building on Montero’s observation that pain is inherently "occurrent," I propose an interpretation wherein occurrent states denote strictly "new" sensations. I evaluate the work of Coninx and de Brigard, who suggest that episodic memory can involve genuine sensory re-experiencing of past pain. I contend, however, that these sensations are not retrieved qualitative states but are instead novel, "new" pains triggered by the present act of recollection. By analyzing de Brigard’s account of permissible pain recollection alongside recent neuropsychological findings, I demonstrate that these sensations fail to escape characterization as occurrent, present states. I conclude that pain is phenomenologically indexed to the "now"; to "remember" the feeling of pain is not to travel back in time, but to generate a new qualitative state in the present. This suggests that the very nature of pain serves as a biological and experiential marker of temporal presence.

Speakers

Hao Wei Koo

PhD student, Nanyang Technological University Singapore

Wednesday July 8, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm NZST
MSB1.05

Philosophy of Mind, In Person

3:00pm NZST

Defending Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure from the Isolability Requirement

Wednesday July 8, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST

MSB1.05

Phenomenological theories of pleasure, according to which pleasures are constituted by a common phenomenal quality, face the seemingly intractable heterogeneity problem: that pleasures feel too phenomenally heterogeneous to be constituted by a common phenomenal quality. First, I argue that the heterogeneity problem is forceful mainly due to the isolatability requirement, according to which the pleasure-making quality, if phenomenal, must also be isolatable. Second, I argue that we should reject the isolatability requirement as it assumes that the pleasure-making quality is sufficiently sensation-like. Third, I argue that phenomenological theories, of both the distinctive feeling and hedonic tone kinds, have the resources necessary to reject the isolatability requirement. Finally, I conclude that without the isolatability requirement, the heterogeneity problem loses much of its force against phenomenological theories, and phenomenological theories become as plausible, if not more plausible than its chief rival, attitudinal theories.

Speakers

Jolly Cheong

Masters Research Scholar, National University of Singapore

Hi, I’m Jolly! My primary research concerns the nature of pleasure. I’m currently working on defending a commonsensical view of pleasure’s nature, phenomenological theories of pleasure, according to which pleasure is essentially a feeling. I’ll be presenting this research... Read More →

Wednesday July 8, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm NZST
MSB1.05

Philosophy of Mind, In Person

4:30pm NZST

Consciousness Does Not Have Boundaries

Wednesday July 8, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST

MSB1.05

The boundary problem is a component of the hard problem of consciousness. Whereas the binding problem is concerned with what unifies different experiential components (e.g. sights and sounds) within a co-conscious whole, the boundary problem is concerned with what puts an end to unification—what prevents my experience from ‘spilling over’ and incorporating your experience, say.
Many inventive solutions to the boundary problem have been offered, e.g. phenomenal bonding relations in panpsychism, and topological segmentations in EM-field theories of consciousness. But, whatever their merits, there hasn't been much serious questioning as to whether experience does, in fact, have boundaries. I’d like to advance a deflationary account which denies boundaries. I take analogous views in the metaphysics of time and personal identity as precedents. One upshot of this account is to dissolve the boundary problem, making the hard problem a bit easier in that respect.

Speakers

Nicholas Osborn

University of Tasmania

Wednesday July 8, 2026 4:30pm - 5:25pm NZST
MSB1.05

Philosophy of Mind, In Person

AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

11:00am NZST

Zeenia Bhat

12:00pm NZST

Tonghao Liu

2:00pm NZST

Hao Wei Koo

3:00pm NZST

Jolly Cheong

4:30pm NZST

Nicholas Osborn

Get help with the event