This paper examines the Māori stewardship framework of kaitiakitanga as a philosophical basis for climate activism. Based on current work carried out with Indigenous philosopher Krushil Watene, funded by Ngā Pae o te Māramatanga and Waipapa Taumata Rau, I explore whether kaitiakitanga generates normative obligations that extend beyond permitting climate action to requiring it.
The talk discusses how contemporary institutional frameworks in Aotearoa and beyond engage with Indigenous stewardship concepts whilst simultaneously constraining Indigenous authority in environmental governance. This tension reveals a fundamental problem: the translocation of relational obligations into administrative and consultative mechanisms often fails to protect the socioenvironmental relationships those mechanisms purport to serve.
The paper investigates three dimensions: what kaitiakitanga means as an ontological and relational framework; what forms of activism this framework demands; and how we might philosophically justify more confrontational approaches to environmental protection.
By grounding the analysis in Indigenous thought rather than Western environmental ethics, the talk demonstrates how kaitiakitanga offers resources for rethinking the relationship between activism, obligation, and environmental protection. The framework challenges assumptions embedded in dominant approaches to climate action and reveals what is at stake when Indigenous concepts are institutionalised without substantive transformation of the power relations they critique.
I extend Kate Manne’s account of misogyny by theorizing the rewards and forms of valorization offered to women who accept patriarchal social arrangements as a sustaining branch of patriarchal social order. Manne briefly notes that such rewards warrant critical attention, but she does not theorize their structural function. Contemporary discourse increasingly frames the pursuit of these rewards as a feminist choice or a lower‑cost form of empowerment compared to resisting patriarchal norms. I argue that this empowerment is illusory. Although such rewards may temporarily improve women’s material conditions, they reinforce economic dependence and narrow the range of opportunities meaningfully available to women. By presenting patriarchal arrangements as desirable and empowering, these reward‑based mechanisms attract women’s participation and thereby sustain the patriarchal order. I also address the concern that women may accept patriarchal arrangements out of adaptive preference or under conditions of survival. Following Iris Marion Young’s Social Connection Model, I stress that my argument concerns structural processes, not individual liability. This account shows that patriarchal order is upheld not only through punishment and justification but also through reward‑based mechanisms that draw women into its reproduction.
This paper develops a revised account of political responsibility for structural injustice. Building on and revising Iris Marion Young’s influential theory of “political responsibility,” it argues that responsibilities regarding structural injustice are best understood as duties of superintendence: duties to monitor, evaluate, and manage the functioning of social systems in light of the demands of justice. The paper contends that this framework better explains the distinctive moral character of political responsibility than Young’s contrast between “forward-looking” political responsibility and “backward-looking” liability. Duties of superintendence are presented as second-order responsibilities borne by citizens and institutions alike, especially states and other powerful actors charged with regulating social life. On this account, failures of political responsibility can ground warranted grievance and blame even where no individual agent is culpable for directly causing unjust outcomes. The paper also addresses objections concerning demandingness, excuse, and the limits of moral culpability in cases of structural injustice.
Transitional justice is traditionally associated with democratic consolidation, yet this relationship is empirically contingent rather than guaranteed. Canada consolidated democracy without transitional justice, while Chad failed to democratize despite it. Moreover, transitional mechanisms can be double-edged, sometimes reinforcing illiberal regimes rather than dismantling them. These vulnerabilities raise a prior question: how should democracy itself be conceptualized to effectively support transitional justice? This paper compares two interpretations of liberal democracy. The first, grounded in Isaiah Berlin's "freedom as non-interference," proves inadequate because it ignores structural power asymmetries and remains indifferent to regime type, leaving it unable to robustly reject authoritarianism. The second, grounded in Philip Pettit's "freedom as non-domination," offers a more defensible framework. Republican democracy targets arbitrary power and builds institutional safeguards for citizens. Through Pettit's model of contestatory democracy, citizens acquire meaningful capacity to challenge unjust policies and hold power accountable. Nevertheless, overcoming entrenched domination may demand more than formal legalism alone. Institutional rules must be complemented by civic virtue and sustained social dialogue. This republican framework, attentive to both structural inequality and participatory agency, offers a normatively superior path for genuinely advancing transitional justice.
Faith is often defended not as blind belief, but as trust in God after belief that God exists has already been formed. On this view, trusting God is analogous to trusting a spouse, friend, doctor, or pilot. This paper challenges that analogy. I argue that even if God’s existence is granted, trust in God’s present guidance differs from ordinary interpersonal trust in three respects. First, interpersonal trust presupposes reasonable confidence in authorship. Before I decide whether to trust a message, I must first determine who sent it. Alleged divine guidance however, often arrives through thoughts, impressions, circumstances, and interpretations that are equally compatible with ordinary psychological explanations. Second, interpersonal trust is corrigible. Trust grows because experience can confirm or challenge our assessment of another person’s reliability. By contrast, trust in God is often insulated from disconfirmation by explanations such as “yes, no, or wait.” Third, trust in God is often rationalised retrospectively through selected memories and reconstructed narratives. Human relationships are also vulnerable to such bias, but they are constrained by observable behaviour, direct feedback, and third-party correction. Retrospective trust in God often lacks these constraints. Together, these asymmetries challenge the God/Spouse analogy.
