AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

Presentism is often seen as the simplest most intuitive ontology of time, yet direct comparisons between presentism and eternalism based on simplicity are limited. Philosophical consensus holds that presentism is quantitatively parsimonious but qualitatively identical to eternalism. Presentists also risk introducing qualitative and scientific/structural extravagance in addressing standard objections.

This paper defends presentism on all fronts – quantitative, qualitative, and structural. I, first, examine arguments extolling quantitative parsimony as incidentally virtuous but not inherently virtuous. I propose, instead, a ‘Principle of Sufficient Explanation,’ where inclusion of any explanans must be justified, undermining the traditional quantitative-qualitative asymmetry.

I, then, argue accepting qualitative equivalence between presentism and eternalism concedes the latter’s truth. Instead, presentists should assert that non-present objects are fundamentally different from present ones by undermining space-time analogies and accusing eternalists of inexcuably gerrymandering qualitative categories. Furthermore, I bypass any extravagance introduced by presentist solutions to semantic objections, defending a novel justification of ‘ontological cheating’ grounding truth not in being but in what statements are 'about'.

Finally, I address objections from special relativity, arguing that any structural bloat introduced by presentism in this regard is either subject to uncertain future empirical investigation, justified metaphysically, or simply a descriptive theoretical artefact.

Much of my recent research has centred on the polemic between Henri Bergson and Gaston Bachelard. In particular, I have focused on the notions of continuity and discontinuity within the two philosopher’s work. I have found that recent Bergsonian scholarship has, at times, dismissed Bachelard uncharitably. I ask, however, whether such a hasty dismissal of Bachelard is necessary, let alone justified. My argument is that Bachelard understood Bergson’s work at a depth greater than what he is often credited, and therefore, he provides a critique that warrants a deeper level of engagement from Bergsonians in return. My aim here is not to discredit Bergson so much as it is to develop an interpretation of Bergson that has sincerely engaged with Bachelard’s novel and insightful critique.

Both philosophers present compelling philosophies of temporality that, at the very least, generate an interesting polemic. At most however, I have found that a sincere engagement with the tension found in their opposition has led to a deeper appreciation of both. Personally, I have not concluded my research and my ultimate position on the matter remains indefinite. That being said, I am certain that Bergsonian scholars will benefit from an encounter with Bachelard’s critique.

Science makes progress in a way that metaphysics seems not to. From Locke, Hume, and Kant through logical positivists and deconstructionists and down to (for example) David Lewis, Amy Thomasson, Mark Balaguer, John Heil and hundreds of others, philosophers have written engagingly about "progress" in philosophy. Some have concluded that it is time to give up even trying to answer metaphysical questions. I will suggest that Balaguer is right to think that it is prudent to rely on only a very "thin" metaphysics for practical purposes; but also that Heil is right in maintaining that giving up on metaphysics is not an option. I will also try to give a more positive spin to the whole business. There is a reason why answers to metaphysical questions cannot be proved correct; and there are also reasons why this is a good thing, and why this provides a reason for doing metaphysics rather than abandoning it.

Various philosophers have thought that the propensity interpretation of probability faces fatal objections. They include: “Propensities are mysterious.” “We don’t know how propensities behave.” “We do know that they don’t obey the probability calculus.” “Propensities are not Humean supervenient.” And “propensities do not vindicate the Principal Principle” (Lewis’s bridge principle between chances and rational credences).

I will revive the propensity interpretation. In a slogan: chances measure graded dispositions. More carefully, conditional chances measure graded dispositions to produce given outcomes, conditional on specifications of physical situations. Comparative dispositions are entirely familiar. My wine glass is more fragile than my beer mug; salt is more soluble than plastic. And I argue that we can get from comparative dispositions to numerical propensities that obey the probability calculus, answering all of the objections above (and more). Reports of the death of the propensity interpretation have been greatly exaggerated.