Kantian constructivism (KC) highlights the sociopolitical dimension of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy. While there is extensive literature on KC, its educational implications remain understudied. In this paper, I posit the cultivation of responsible reciprocity (RR) among teachers and students in classrooms as the foremost educational implication of KC. By focusing on Kant’s On Education (2003) and Critique of the Power of Judgment (2000), and Christine Korsgaard’s Creating the Kingdom of Ends (1996), I clarify why the cultivation of RR is the foremost educational implication of KC and how RR can be manifest in classrooms. I underpin the sociopolitical dimension of Kant’s idea of Kingdom of Ends in the context of education by highlighting Korsgaard’s notion of RR vis-à-vis Kant’s three rules for thinking: think for oneself, think in the place of every other, and think universally. I argue that education institutions must recognize that people can think for themselves and with each other and that such institutions must provide spaces where people can realize their capacity for thinking. I conclude that settings as small – but as fundamental – as classrooms must empower teachers and students not only to think for oneself but also to think with each other, and ultimately, cultivate RR.
Tuesday July 7, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am AEST GCI-273 HYBRID
Animal laboratory technicians (henceforth lab technicians) are at risk of sustaining moral injuries when complicit in unethical experiments. Prima facie, it would be puzzling to offer the perpetrator of an unethical experiment psychological support in the form of moral repair. However, we argue that lab technicians are owed moral repair as a special case of our proposed duty of special concern. The duty of special concern states that special consideration must be given to the wellbeing of those who undertake substantial risks for the benefit of others. We make sense of the substantial risk of moral concern lab technicians face by drawing on Rawls’ notion of imperfect procedures of justice. Imperfect procedures of justice are those that aim for just outcomes, but procedures do not guarantee those outcomes. Animal experimentation belongs to this category, as it aims for only ethically permissible experiments to be conducted, yet this is not guaranteed by the procedures that determine which experiments are approved. The risk of moral injury falls heavily on lab technicians as they are charged with undertaking an unethical experiment. Hence, we make sense of the otherwise puzzling intuition that lab technicians have conducted an unethical experiment, yet are owed psychological support.
Tuesday July 7, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am AEST Steele-3293 Staff House Rd, St Lucia QLD 4067, Australia
Communicative-functional accounts of blame are gaining in popularity. Several of these accounts hold that blame plays a significant role in influencing moral norms (e.g. Fricker, 2016). In response, some have raised what I call the ‘might-makes-right’ worry: what if blame pushes us towards bad moral norms? Blame’s often angry, spontaneous, reactive nature might make it seem likely to push us towards accepting oppressive (or otherwise problematic) norms. In this paper I provide some reasons for optimism in the face of this worry. I provide reasons to think that blame generally guides us towards the right moral norms. First, blame’s motivational trajectory—including strong emotions like resentment and guilt—brings unique, underappreciated benefits. Second, insofar as blame empowers agents to influence moral norms, some of blame’s properties naturally distribute this power. This second set of reasons parallels some justifications for democracy in political philosophy, hence the title. Finally, I review the limits of my proposed optimism, pointing out ways that things can still go wrong that warrant vigilance going forward.
Tuesday July 7, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm AEST Steele-3293 Staff House Rd, St Lucia QLD 4067, Australia
Many of us – ordinary people and moral philosophers alike – sound very much like rule-consequentialists. We are willing to revise and refine the rules that we endorse, the institutions that we embrace, the virtues that we espouse, and vices that we deplore; moreover, we believe – quite rightly – in doing so in light of the consequences that such things produce. But of course if we think that consequences are so important, shouldn’t we simply be an act-consequentialists instead? In this paper I will be pointing out the curious sense in which act-consequentialists are deeply untrustworthy; recognising the practical wisdom imbedded in various established rules, practices, institutions, virtues and attitudes; and generally trying to show how to avoid sliding down the notorious slippery slope that can lead to a collapse into act-consequentialism. While it can be tempting to think that moral philosophy is largely concerned with devising an ideal procedure for decision-making, my suggestion is that it should also be focussed – perhaps amongst other things – on articulating a shareable ethos, on the cultivation of certain feelings and emotions, on the development of virtuous and flourishing human beings, and on defending – via consequentialist reasons – the prioritisation of various agent-relative obligations over impartial obligations.
Tuesday July 7, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm AEST GCI-273 HYBRID
In metaethics, it is widely held—following Smith (1994)—that only de re desires (wanting to perform a particular act which happens to be right) are praiseworthy, whereas de dicto desires (wanting to do whatever is right) are fetishistic. In this paper, I argue that moral fetishism extends equally to what I call “right-making-feature desires,” i.e. wanting to perform an act insofar as it instantiates its right-making feature. If either class were exempt, the very notion of fetishism would collapse. Drawing on two parallel thought experiments, I show that both de dicto and right-making-feature motivations sever the agent from the act qua token, thus lacking genuine praiseworthiness. Two implications follow. First, proponents of the right-making features view of moral worth cannot appeal to fetishism to support their view, since right-making-feature desires are themselves fetishistic. Second, deontic buck-passing accounts fail to explain our intuition about moral fetishism, because right-making-feature desires already respond to the genuine reason for action yet remain unworthy of praise. By refining the taxonomy of moral motivation, this analysis constrains viable accounts of moral worth.
Tuesday July 7, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm AEST Steele-3293 Staff House Rd, St Lucia QLD 4067, Australia
A concept widely employed in legal and political contexts, ‘legitimacy’ can seem less applicable to everyday human activities. I argue this is a profound mistake. Many of the same factors that drive recourse to legitimacy in legal and political contexts also apply in—and fundamentally shape—everyday interpersonal, relational and organisational life. These factors include moral pluralism, epistemic fallibilism, policy ambiguity, collective action challenges, the significance of established expectations and social norms, and worries about moral authority. Moreover, many of the same devices that work at the political level to deliver legitimacy—procedural fairness, deliberative justice, due process, transparency, tolerance, consent, pro tem decisions—can be (and often are) used mutatis mutandis to achieve acceptance in interpersonal, relational and organisational contexts. Being blind to the significance of legitimacy in ordinary life sets the stage for serious moral mistakes, in particular, mistakes driven by a lack of reciprocal respect for others as ethical and epistemic agents.
Tuesday July 7, 2026 3:00pm - 3:55pm AEST Steele-3293 Staff House Rd, St Lucia QLD 4067, Australia
