“First-person authority” refers, roughly, to the deference that we owe one another’s self-ascriptions of mental states in ordinary contexts. What justifies this deference? Here I argue for a pluralistic answer. I argue, first, that the hearer of a self-ascription is justified in deferring to the speaker in part because the speaker expresses her attitude to the hearerby self-ascribing it, and in part because the hearer inferentially determines the content of the attitude expressed by the speaker. I argue, second, that the hearer is justified in deferring to the self-ascriptions of young children because those children thereby express their mental states, whereas the hearer is justified in deferring to at least some self-ascriptions of older people because hearers recognize that more mature cognizers have the authority to self-determine at least some of their mental states through reflective reasoning. I argue, third, that an agent’s justification to regard her own self-ascription as first-person authoritative differs from the justification that others have to regard her self-ascription as such, and that this makes a difference for navigating contexts where one’s first-person authority is challenged.
Tuesday July 7, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am AEST GCI-275 HYBRID
Skeptical invariantists say that “know” refers to a very demanding epistemic relation – call it “absolute knowledge.” Standard invariantists say that “know” refers to a much less demanding epistemic relation – call it “standard knowledge.” Suppose that standard invariantists are right. Suppose also that standard knowledge (i) helps to causally explain behavior and (ii) sets one important kind of normative bar for assertions and actions, just as many standard invariantists think. Does this mean that absolute knowledge is of little epistemological interest? I think not. I will suggest that even given these assumptions, absolute knowledge would still (iii) play a different but powerful role in causally explaining behavior and (iv) set another important kind of normative bar for assertions and actions.
Tuesday July 7, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm AEST GCI-275 HYBRID
