This paper explores the debate between transmissive and generative views of testimony. According to the generation view, testimony can generate knowledge even when neither the testifier nor the testimonial chain previously possessed that knowledge. While this view has been extensively developed since Lackey’s seminal work, Wright (2016) argues that the central issue in the transmissive/generative dispute concerns justification rather than knowledge, particularly propositional justification. However, a corresponding generation view of testimonial justification remains underdeveloped. A parallel debate has emerged in the epistemology of memory. Although generative accounts of memorial knowledge were initially proposed by Lackey (2005) in a manner analogous to generative accounts of testimony, subsequent discussions have focused primarily on whether memory preserves or generates propositional justification since Senor (2007). These works have produced increasingly fine-grained accounts of the preservative/generative distinction. I argue that these developments in the epistemology of memory can illuminate the testimonial case. Drawing on Miyazono and Tooming’s (2025) analysis of the preservative/generative distinction, I reassess existing generative accounts of testimony and develop a more precise framework for understanding when testimony transmits justification and when it generates it. This framework clarifies the structure of the transmissive/generative debate and provides resources for responding to Wright’s challenge.
In discussions of social epistemology, Jennifer Lackey (2021) argues that ‘a significant percentage of a group’s operative members who believe that p’ is a necessary condition for ‘a group believes that p.’ Meanwhile, with respect to group evidence, she maintains that, in certain cases, evidence possessed by a minority of members can constitute group evidence. However, in ordinary thought, there is an intuition about evidence according to which only propositions that a subject takes to be true can serve as that subject’s evidence. This intuition is also widely endorsed in philosophical discussions of evidence by scholars such as Jessica Brown (2022). In response, this paper formulates a requirement on evidence based on this intuition and uses it to argue that Jennifer Lackey’s position in social epistemology is internally inconsistent.
Can practical reasons ever override epistemic reasons for belief — and if so, how should the two be weighed against each other? Existing accounts of how to weigh epistemic and practical reasons face serious problems: the combinational problem of how to combine permissive and prohibitive balancing, accusations of being ad hoc, and the inability to provide usable advice. Additionally, existing arguments for privileging one type of reason over the other are vulnerable to intuitive counterexamples. This talk will outline the problems faced in the existing literature and argue for a position that cuts through the existing debate: epistemic reasons carry genuine normative authority, but are always weaker than practical reasons. This position handles the aforementioned counterexamples and avoids the problems of existing weighing accounts. I conclude by addressing Hannon and Woodard's (2026) argument that social coordination provides a practical reason to always follow the epistemic norm, arguing that this does not hold in all cases.
