Why are we moral equals, given how different we are? I begin by reviewing what it means to reject fundamental moral equality and endorse moral hierarchy. I argue that the hierarchical challenge is more pressing than egalitarians concede, and that merited hierarchy is more attractive than egalitarians admit. Then I consider the solution of proposing a 'range property' or threshold degree of some morally relevant capacity (generally moral agency, personal autonomy, or something similar). I argue that existing accounts cannot motivate the relevance of the threshold, and are thus driven to accept scalar moral status in proportion to one's possession of the relevant capacity. Next I consider the ‘decisionistic’ defence of basic equality, which argues that moral equality is a fundamental commitment, motivated by the evils of denying it. This approach has two flaws. First, it offers a contingent, non-ideal objection to moral hierarchy, which concedes crucial ground that egalitarians generally want to defend. Second, that it is fatally vague: it fails to sufficiently specify what we thereby commit to. Finally, I propose an alternative approach, which locates the basis of equality in the badness of social alienation. I consider some objections.
