Panpsychism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is a fundamental feature of reality, gained significant attention in the recent decades as a potentially better alternative to physicalism or substance dualism. However, panpsychism runs into a serious problem—the combination problem—according to which the multiplicity of microphenomenally conscious particles somehow combine into a macrophenomenal consciousness that we have. Very recently, Kadic (2024) proposed a version of panpsychism which he calls monadic panpsychism. This version comes in two main varieties: dynamic version and global version. The former states that microphenomenally conscious particles stand in causal relations such that they make one particle macrophenomenally conscious. The latter states that the same causal process makes all particles conscious. In both cases, macrophenomenal consciousness is explained by avoiding all of the problems that hunt its alternatives. In this paper, I explore monadic panpsychism by raising objections and solving them in its favor. To solve all objections I appeal to the theory of evolution. The first objection is the incredulous stare problem according to which both versions of monadic panpsychism have a low prior probability. I argue that evolution could in principle either produce an organism which contains a single macrophenomenal particle, or an organism which contains a large totality of macrophenomenal particles. Given that to be the case, we should increase our credences about both versions of monadic panpsychism. Also, monadic panpsychism and evolution are similar in a sense that they contain elements of apparent arbitrariness in their theories. The second problem is the selection problem against the dynamic version in particular: why is this particle dominant but not some other one? I respond that evolution could select for a mechanism which randomly chooses particles to be dominant, even though, I admit that there are residual questions that cannot be answered even by evolution. Lastly, I compare two versions of monadic panpsychism in general and I conclude that we should: (i) increase our credences in both versions of monadic panpsychism, and that (ii) we might favor the global version over the dynamic version so far.
