There has been concern that B-series eternalism could imply fatalism about future objects and events. That is, if B-series eternalism is true, then propositions concerning our future should not be considered differently from those concerning our past; they must have a definite truth value. This was exemplified by Russell’s account of Cambridge change. If a poker is hot at t1 and cold at t2, it will always be so. If all future propositions are true or false, our free will is threatened. In a similar fashion, van Inwagen’s direct argument threatens moral responsibility if determinism is true. This paper offers a construction of eternalist fatalism in a similar fashion, utilising the same structure of Van Inwagen’s argument. I will start by introducing the B-series and eternalism, before explaining the direct argument and resistances to its validity. I will then formulate a similar argument for fatalism using eternalism, overcoming the charge that the B-series does not entail necessary future truths, therefore it does not imply fatalism. I shall conclude with the conditional that if eternalism is true, fatalism is true, whilst remaining neutral on whether this should be used in a modus ponens or a modus tollens.
