In this presentation, I critically evaluate the popular use of slippery slope arguments (SSAs) by opponents of Voluntary Assisted Dying (VAD). I begin by evaluating different forms of SSA. I then identify recurrent methodological deficiencies appearing in SSAs opposing VAD, such as speculative causal chains of events, conflation of logical possibility with empirical probability, selective engagement with jurisdictional evidence, and the application of an asymmetric burden of proof that treats hypothetical future harms as certain or very likely, while down-playing, and sometimes even ignoring, the proven immediate suffering of VAD patients. Drawing on case studies from the philosophical literature, and legislative debates from jurisdictions where VAD has been permitted, I demonstrate that slippage toward the negative consequences predicted by opponents of VAD either have not occurred or have occurred in ways reflective of deliberative democratic debate, and clinical review. Further, I argue that the rhetorical force of SSAs, used in debates about VAD, often effectively conceals deeply held theological commitments (such as the sanctity of life) that advocates are reluctant to defend directly. I conclude by advocating for ways to distinguish legitimate SSAs from fallacious ones.
