AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

Recent work on the philosophy of conspiracy theory in Philosophy has largely consolidated around the thesis of Particularism. Particularists argue that we cannot make broad generalisations about the class of conspiracy theories. Instead, we have to assess particular instances of conspiracy theories on their merits. However, like many emerging consensus positions in philosophy, particularism is not unassailed. Generalists argue that we have reasons to treat conspiracy theories - as a class - as epistemically suspect, and they have found particularism as a thesis to be wanting.
In this paper I examine both how generalists have described particularist positions, as well we how particularists have articulated particularism. I argue that if generalists want to challenge the particularist consensus, then it is going to be important to show that their construals of particularist positions accurately reflect what particularists argue for if they want to then show where particularism asa. thesis falls down. That is, I will ask and then answer the question of what, exactly, generalists need to show in order to both undermine particularism and challenge the particularist consensus.