We extend trust to those we deem trustworthy. Trustworthiness involves both a competence component and a motivation component. Insofar as we aim to trust only those who are trustworthy, we have reason not to extend our trust when the target is either incompetent or not properly motivated. However, of these two ways that trust can be violated, the latter tends to elicit much stronger reactive attitudes: here we speak of resentment and betrayal, modulated perhaps by whether the violation of trust was out of ill will (when we think they weren't truthful) or insufficient care and attentiveness. In this paper I explore whether the desire to avoid situations that might elicit these stronger reactive attitudes -- especially those having to do with being deemed untruthful -- may have a significant effect on our epistemic lives. I venture that this desire may partly explain our tribalistic tendencies and our tendency to seek out and remain in epistemic bubbles. If this is correct, it might also explain why generating fear – in particular, fear that others do not share our values – is one of the most effective ways to sow the seeds of polarization.
