An agent makes an epistemic trade-off when she forms a belief, that is prima facie irrational, to achieve some larger epistemic good (such as the attainment of a more valuable belief). Most epistemologists contend that trade-offs are impermissible; however, I argue that examples of permissible trade-offs can be found in a recognizable phenomenon in social epistemology: the adoption of unique belief-formation norms by agents in epistemic roles (e.g., scientists, reporters, etc.). On my view, these norms are authoritative since they help the agents who occupy these roles transmit specialized knowledge to the public. And just like ethical role norms, epistemic role norms often conflict with the norms that govern typical agents. Agents in these roles are thus permitted to form prima facie irrational beliefs so that others can achieve a larger epistemic good (the acquisition of specialized knowledge), which fits the definition of a trade-off. As an example, I analyze mid-century belief-formation norms that instructed anthropologists to irrationally disbelieve any moral claim about the practices of other cultures. These norms led to the adoption of irrational morally relativistic beliefs; however, they were a necessary step to ending the Eurocentric biases that led early anthropologists to adopt implausible theories.
