A widely accepted view about the badness of death is the Deprivation Account (DA), according to which death is bad for the person who dies because it deprives them of future goods. A natural idea for DA proponents is that we should lament our death if and only if, and to the extent that, it is bad for us—a view called the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption (NBNL). However, Travis Timmerman has recently argued that DA proponents should reject NBNL. This paper has two aims. First, I argue, pace Timmerman, that DA is compatible with NBNL. Second, I explore what follows if both DA and NBNL are true. I shall tentatively defend the claim that, given both claims, we should not lament our death in most actual cases. My defense relies on the observation that we normally lack sufficiently good reasons to believe that our death is bad for us. In most actual cases, we have only a very limited amount of information about what our own circumstances would be like in the remote future had we not died.
