In this talk, I argue that holding conflicting sets of norms does not constitute a pathological breakdown of group agency. Prominent accounts of group agency assume a demanding coherence condition: groups are taken to require a unified point of view, where persistent internal contradiction is treated as a breakdown of agency (List & Pettit 2011; Collins 2019). Yet in ordinary practice, groups are still regarded as agents despite incoherence and ongoing conflict causing tensions for views that emphasize coherence as central to agency attribution. I argue that existing theories overlook a key phenomenon: internal interference. Once interference originating from within the group is taken seriously, these accounts lack the resources to explain how contradictory groups can continue to act as agents and how to distribute responsibility. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, it examines group-level programming, including List and Pettit’s idea of “arranging things non-causally” (2011). Second, drawing on Rachar’s distinction (2024), it analyzes implicit programming as norms that guide behavior without explicit endorsement and may constitute a group’s effective program. Third, it highlights that recent responsibility-focused approaches (de Haan & Collins 2024) neglect internally generated interference. This reveals a structural gap in current accounts.
