The boundary problem is a component of the hard problem of consciousness. Whereas the binding problem is concerned with what unifies different experiential components (e.g. sights and sounds) within a co-conscious whole, the boundary problem is concerned with what puts an end to unification—what prevents my experience from ‘spilling over’ and incorporating your experience, say. Many inventive solutions to the boundary problem have been offered, e.g. phenomenal bonding relations in panpsychism, and topological segmentations in EM-field theories of consciousness. But, whatever their merits, there hasn't been much serious questioning as to whether experience does, in fact, have boundaries. I’d like to advance a deflationary account which denies boundaries. I take analogous views in the metaphysics of time and personal identity as precedents. One upshot of this account is to dissolve the boundary problem, making the hard problem a bit easier in that respect.
