Can omissions be causal relata in event causation? Event-causal exclusionism answers this question negatively, whereas event-causal inclusionism answers it affirmatively. In this paper, I argue against event-causal exclusionism. In particular, I distinguish two versions of exclusionism. The first denies that omissions are events, while the second grants that omissions are events but denies that they can be causal relata. I argue that neither version is successful.
My argument proceeds by defending the following simple thought. If omissions are events, and if the effects of omissions counterfactually depend on those omission events, then some omissions are causes, and hence some omissions are causal relata. I first formulate this anti-exclusionism argument and then examine how each version of exclusionism attempts to resist it.
I argue that the first version fails because it does not provide a satisfactory reason for denying that omissions are events. The second version fares no better. I examine several arguments for excluding omissions from the causal relata of event causation and argue that none of them succeeds. If these arguments fail, then there is no principled reason to deny that omissions can be causal relata.
I conclude that event-causal exclusionism should be rejected. Once omissions are admitted as events, and given a counterfactual theory of causation, we have good reason to accept that at least some omissions are genuine causal relata.
