Loading…
Wednesday July 8, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST
There is an ongoing debate in the philosophy of conspiracy theories between “particularists” and their “generalists” critics. Particularists express concern that the label “conspiracy theory” is used to dismiss theories prematurely. In response, generalists often frame their position as merely indicating a defeasible “prima facie skepticism” toward conspiracy theories, that is, a view about what to think about a conspiracy theory prior to considering its particular merits. Keith Harris, for example, argues for this type of generalist attitude regarding “counter-authority” conspiracy theories. We argue that this framing of generalism is misleading because it is considerably weaker than it presents itself as being. It can’t be this weak and also justify the dismissive attitude that generalists encourage, as Harris does explicitly. Indeed, an analysis of Harris’s own distinction between “Strong Particularism” and “Weak Particularism” can help us see that generalists accounts cannot be both true and telling. For true versions are not telling, and telling versions are not true. 
Speakers
avatar for M R. X. Dentith

M R. X. Dentith

Beijing Normal University
M R. X. Dentith is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the International Center for Philosophy at Beijing Normal University at Zhuhai. Their chief research interests concern the epistemic analysis of conspiracy theories, rumours, fake news, and the epistemology of secrecy. In 2014... Read More →
CP

Charles Pigden

Ōtākou Whakaihu Waka | University of Otago

Wednesday July 8, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm NZST
MSB1.21

Log in to save this to your schedule, view media, leave feedback and see who's attending!

Share Modal

Share this link via

Or copy link