Transitional justice is traditionally associated with democratic consolidation, yet this relationship is empirically contingent rather than guaranteed. Canada consolidated democracy without transitional justice, while Chad failed to democratize despite it. Moreover, transitional mechanisms can be double-edged, sometimes reinforcing illiberal regimes rather than dismantling them. These vulnerabilities raise a prior question: how should democracy itself be conceptualized to effectively support transitional justice? This paper compares two interpretations of liberal democracy. The first, grounded in Isaiah Berlin's "freedom as non-interference," proves inadequate because it ignores structural power asymmetries and remains indifferent to regime type, leaving it unable to robustly reject authoritarianism. The second, grounded in Philip Pettit's "freedom as non-domination," offers a more defensible framework. Republican democracy targets arbitrary power and builds institutional safeguards for citizens. Through Pettit's model of contestatory democracy, citizens acquire meaningful capacity to challenge unjust policies and hold power accountable. Nevertheless, overcoming entrenched domination may demand more than formal legalism alone. Institutional rules must be complemented by civic virtue and sustained social dialogue. This republican framework, attentive to both structural inequality and participatory agency, offers a normatively superior path for genuinely advancing transitional justice.
