This paper explores the debate between transmissive and generative views of testimony. According to the generation view, testimony can generate knowledge even when neither the testifier nor the testimonial chain previously possessed that knowledge. While this view has been extensively developed since Lackey’s seminal work, Wright (2016) argues that the central issue in the transmissive/generative dispute concerns justification rather than knowledge, particularly propositional justification. However, a corresponding generation view of testimonial justification remains underdeveloped. A parallel debate has emerged in the epistemology of memory. Although generative accounts of memorial knowledge were initially proposed by Lackey (2005) in a manner analogous to generative accounts of testimony, subsequent discussions have focused primarily on whether memory preserves or generates propositional justification since Senor (2007). These works have produced increasingly fine-grained accounts of the preservative/generative distinction. I argue that these developments in the epistemology of memory can illuminate the testimonial case. Drawing on Miyazono and Tooming’s (2025) analysis of the preservative/generative distinction, I reassess existing generative accounts of testimony and develop a more precise framework for understanding when testimony transmits justification and when it generates it. This framework clarifies the structure of the transmissive/generative debate and provides resources for responding to Wright’s challenge.
