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Tuesday July 7, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST
An inferentialist semantics — one that claims that the meaning of a judgement is determined by its role in reasoning — faces the problem of how to account for the seemingly noninferential transition from the perceptual to the conceptual. Robert Brandom characterises his response to this problem as ‘strong inferentialism’, claiming that in certain contexts the meaning of a judgement can be determined noninferentially, such as when a perceptual judgement is formed in response to an observation. Brandom contrasts strong inferentialism with ‘hyperinferentialism’ which has no role for these kinds of noninferential transitions. This would entail that perceptual judgements are somehow premises and conclusions of inferences, which Brandom argues would be a more consistent though ultimately unsustainable position. However, that perceptual experiences are premises and conclusions of inferences is a central claim of the recently developed active inference framework in neuroscience. Moreover, the semiotics that Charles Sanders Peirce developed late in his life can be understood as hyperinferentialist. In this paper, I argue for a reading of Peirce that emphasises the ways in which he anticipates the insights of active inference. In turn, this reading gives a naturalistically plausible account of how an inferentialist can accommodate perceptual judgements.

Speakers
JM

Joe Melling

PhD Candidate, Monash University
I am a PhD candidate at the Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies (M3CS). My research focuses on the philosophy of predictive processing and active inference theories.  My current work engages with the classical pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce to argue for... Read More →
Tuesday July 7, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am NZST
MSB1.05

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