Recently, a group of philosophers, often dubbed 'impossible-worldists' have embraced impossible-worldism—a view that accepts impossible worlds into their ontological category. According to impossible-worldists, by accepting impossible worlds, many hyperintensional phenomena which possible world frameworks cannot address can be accounted for. For example, it is claimed that impossible worlds can account for the hyperintensional phenomena of propositions, doxastic states, counterpossibles, and truth in impossible fiction. However, this paper presents an argument against impossible-worldism. I will argue that there is a dilemma for impossible-worldism; impossible-worldists will either beg the question on determining which kinds of impossible worlds they accept or will neglect specific cases of problems they claim to account for. Specifically, the impossible world framework inherits the same problem from the possible world framework when it deals with impossible objects which are not constituted by possible objects, when these impossible objects are referred to by proper names.
Monday July 6, 2026 2:00pm - 2:55pm AEST Steele-206
