AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

Prima facie, perception makes us directly aware of particular objects and property-instances, and enables us to make knowledgeable de re reference to them. Call this the strong referential character of experience. Explaining strong referential character of experience is a desideratum for all theories of perception, and some naive realists argue that they give the best explanation of the strong referential character of experience: we refer to particular objects and property-instances because they constitute our experience. Against naive realists, I defend a a dual-component theory, which states that to perceive x as F is to be aware of sensory qualities and to have a belief that x is F. I motivate two more implications. First, the strong referential character that naive realists posit is not a completely true datum: we do make knowledgeable de re references, but it's not in virtue of being directly aware of particular objects and property-instances. Second, our intuitions about how perception influences further cognition and action seem to be better honoured by positing perceptual beliefs or belief-like states, and as such, dual-component views deserve more attention.