AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

Epistemic deference (ED) is the practical and rational appeal to another agent as an epistemic authority, whose authority stems from pre-established legitimate expertise, experience, access to relevant evidence, and dependable systems of knowledge. However, within standpoint epistemology, there is a pushback against this norm. Olufemi Taiwo voices this resistance.  In this paper, I critically examine Taiwo’s account of ED, which is characterised by conferring conversational authority and attentional goods to individuals based on superficial social identity markers to represent the marginalised. Accordingly, I  argue that there is a fundamental definitional difference between Taiwo’s account of ED and how it is accounted for in epistemology. Based on this distinction, I contend that the failures attributed to Taiwo’s account — namely, that ED leads to epistemic complacency and the reinforcement of oppressive systems — are not inherent flaws of ED as an epistemic norm. Rather, they stem from Taiwo’s conceptualisation. I conclude by considering ED beyond elite spaces, demonstrating that it is indispensable so long as epistemically privileged standpoint is rooted in experience-based knowledge.