AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

Can empirical psychology—qua scientific discipline—incorporate objective moral truth? That is, are appeals to objective moral truth scientifically acceptable, viable, and legitimate—i.e., are they scientifically adequate? I consider this question through an examination of a particular case, namely, whether objective moral error is a viable scientific kind. I first examine objective moral errors per comprehensive moral theories proffered as the objective moral truth (“Objective CMT”). Importantly, I show that moral philosophical adequacy is not necessarily sufficient for scientific adequacy. I conclude that—currently—such objective moral errors are scientifically inadequate because, lacking a CMT well-established as the objective moral truth, condoning such errors yields the untenable result of different researchers using incompatible standards-of-moral-correctness that generate incommensurable versions of the kind. I reject two potential partners-in-guilt. Finally, I examine objective moral errors that contravene specific moral principles proffered as objective moral truths. I argue that because of the strength of metaethical skepticism within a scientific context, coupled with the availability of viable alternatives to objective moral truths—namely, standards-of-interest—all potential objective moral errors, as well as all appeals to objective moral truth, are scientifically inadequate and incompatible with empirical psychology (qua science).