Scholarly accounts of Hobbes’s theory of passions focus on fear of death and glory. Honour is often conflated with glory. I argue that honour is not a passion but a power. Honouring is a natural attribute that recognises another's higher value (power). Honour is always a relative term that varies with the standing of the parties and the context. If one is honoured too highly, this is flattery. If too lowly, then one is dishonoured.
Given the ubiquity of flattery and miserliness, how do we know true honour? While not explicit, Hobbes suggests that self-knowledge measures honours proffered and being dispassionate assists since passions reduce power. The constraints on honour are clearer. Most significant is Hobbes’s principle of equality. In the seventeenth century, honour was closely aligned to social status: one should act honourably within one’s social rank. Hobbes sweeps rank aside, insisting we are equal as members of a species. If inequality does exist, we should treat others as equals in the interest of peace. Honour, then, demands modesty in the name of equality and acceptance of impermanence in context and status. Though modest, honour can be valued more highly than life itself, as in war and duels. Used wisely, it is a powerful tool for the sovereign.
Thursday July 9, 2026 11:00am - 11:55am AEST Steele-206
