Free will skepticism is a position that either doubts or explicitly denies the existence of free will. In contrast, some proponents of free will—particularly compatibilists—affirm its existence by appealing to the concept of "agency." They argue that if individuals act with agency, then, even if determinism is true and their actions lack alternative possibilities or sourcehood, they still possess the freedom necessary for moral responsibility.
However, free will skepticism does not necessarily focus on agency. If a form of free will skepticism can meet the compatibilist criteria for agency while still remaining valid, it would present a significant philosophical challenge. In this presentation, I will examine Galen Strawson’s 'Basic Argument' as an example of free will skepticism and consider the question: "Is free will skepticism incompatible with agency?" I will explore how agency can be satisfied within free will skepticism and whether, despite this, it can still raise fundamental doubts about our freedom and moral responsibility. Such an inquiry, I believe, can help avoid the issue of talking past one another in free will debates, fostering a more productive discussion.
Thursday July 9, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm AEST Steele-262
