AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) are widely regarded as counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). In response, Widerker (1995), Ginet (1996), and others have advanced the well-known Dilemma Defense: in any FSC, either the agent is not morally responsible, or the agent could have done otherwise. This defense is often thought to depend on a “prior sign”—an indicator of how the agent is likely to act. To address this, Mele and Robb (1998), Hunt (2000), and others have revised FSCs to eliminate the role of such signs. This paper sets that debate aside and argues instead that all standard FSCs face a deeper structural dilemma, one that arises from the very nature of these cases and does not depend on prior signs. As a result, FSCs cannot serve as genuine counterexamples to PAP.