AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

This paper focusses on the problem of doxastic normativity in Hume i.e., on what basis does Hume approve of some methods of belief-formation over others, given his radically sceptical conclusions about the possibility of justified belief? Without an answer to this question, Hume seems left with no basis for discriminating between better and worse belief-forming methods, but clearly he seems to think he can.

I review a variety of existing approaches to the problem, including approaches based on irresistibility, stability, liveliness, practical or moral desirability and love of truth. I argue that, while many of these proposals identify factors which play important roles in Hume’s approved belief-forming methods, none of them is sufficient to characterise the basis on which Hume discriminates between such methods.

I put forward a proposal according to which Hume discriminates between belief-forming methods based on their “apparent reliability” in predicting and controlling events and argue that the proposed criterion avoids the problems identified with existing approaches. I also compare this proposal to other reliability-based proposals in the literature, arguing that the sceptical nature of the proposed criterion distinguishes it from those proposals in a way that is more consistent with Hume’s sceptical philosophy.

Finally, I identify the source of normativity for the criterion as the ability to anticipate and control events, which contributes in its turn to the practical benefits accruing from the` successful execution of our designs. On this account, the normativity of Hume’s belief-forming criterion is ultimately derived from its contribution to practical success, but its particular role in contributing to that success results in its own particular form of “relative normativity”– belief-forming mechanisms are judged good or bad according to their apparent reliability in anticipating and controlling events.