This paper examines whether Analects 14.31 supports the view that trust ought to function as a default normative stance. Through a comparative analysis of interpretations by Du Haitao, Lv Mingxuan, and Liu Xuehan, the study identifies three competing models of Confucian trust: default obligation, virtue-conditioned posture, and cultivation-based achievement. It argues that Analects 14.31 does not prescribe unconditional trust but instead embeds trust within a virtue-ethical framework that prioritizes moral discernment (xian jue) and sustained self-cultivation (gongfu). Drawing on this structure, the paper offers a Confucian critique of contemporary trust theories, especially those advocating structural or voluntarist models. In doing so, it proposes a virtue-based alternative rooted in agent-sensitive ethical responsiveness.
Wednesday July 8, 2026 12:00pm - 12:55pm AEST Steele-206
