Moral psychology has developed increasingly sophisticated tools for measuring moral judges: their values, ideological styles, and responses to sacrificial dilemmas. It has also developed substantial resources for constructing and validating moral stimuli. What remains underdeveloped is a framework for describing the moral structure of the scenarios being judged. This matters because case-level moral judgment is best understood as a person × situation phenomenon: to study that interaction, judge-side measures must be paired with scenario-side descriptions. I propose a provisional scenario-side framework that organises moral scenarios around three higher-order dimensions — Orientation, Cost, and Moral Authorship — which can later be decomposed into more specific coding questions. These dimensions ask, respectively, who or what the act is for, what is harmed, risked, sacrificed, or imposed, and whether, and how, the morally salient outcome is attributable to an agent. I defend these axes through a contrast-case argument: if a framework cannot distinguish cases that differ only in Orientation, Cost, or Moral Authorship, then it describes moral scenarios too coarsely. The proposed framework does not determine which acts are right or wrong; its task is prior, preserving the structural distinctions on which such verdicts depend.
