AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

You might endorse one of the following positions regarding the number of correct logics: either there are no correct logics (logical nihilism), one correct logic (logical monism) or there are multiple correct logics (logical pluralism). While not technically wrong, this taxonomy is too coarse-grained. This tripartite split skirts a number of important distinctions that in fact lead to significantly diverging views, concerning for example the generality of logical laws and what it means for a logic to be ‘correct’. Many of these views have been defended, more or less, throughout the logical literature. However, few writers have taken it upon themselves to taxonomize the positions in a way that highlights the interesting choice points and where they lead. In this talk I attempt to do just that. Rather than argue for a certain view, my aim is to illuminate the commitments involved in endorsing any one position. I will end by considering a potential issue that arises when the logical pluralist is held to this higher demand for precision.