AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

Communicative-functional accounts of blame are gaining in popularity. Several of these accounts hold that blame plays a significant role in influencing moral norms (e.g. Fricker, 2016). In response, some have raised what I call the ‘might-makes-right’ worry: what if blame pushes us towards bad moral norms? Blame’s often angry, spontaneous, reactive nature might make it seem likely to push us towards accepting oppressive (or otherwise problematic) norms.
In this paper I provide some reasons for optimism in the face of this worry. I provide reasons to think that blame generally guides us towards the right moral norms. First, blame’s motivational trajectory—including strong emotions like resentment and guilt—brings unique, underappreciated benefits. Second, insofar as blame empowers agents to influence moral norms, some of blame’s properties naturally distribute this power. This second set of reasons parallels some justifications for democracy in political philosophy, hence the title. Finally, I review the limits of my proposed optimism, pointing out ways that things can still go wrong that warrant vigilance going forward.