AAP 2026 CONFERENCE

The idea that scientific realism and anti-realism are, or are closely related to, epistemic stances (clusters of values, attitudes, goals and commitments), has grown in popularity following the work of van Fraassen, Chakravartty and others. Yet the dream of discovering a decisive stance-independent argument for scientific realism as a thesis – an argument that is, or should be, rationally compelling for anyone, whatever their prior philosophical commitments, who is willing to consider the arguments and evidence in an impartial way – dies hard, as recent attempts in this direction by Eronen, Strevens and others have shown. In this paper I argue these attempts all fail. All arguments for scientific realism as a thesis presuppose the realist stance. I also suggest that, paradoxically, arguments for versions of scientific anti-realism may also presuppose the realist stance, inasmuch as they assume that the specific realist thesis in question is on the table as a genuine option, even if it is ultimately rejected. For those who reject the realist stance, such realist theses are not even live options, so arguments against them are beside the point.