BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
X-WR-CALNAME:aap2026conference
X-WR-CALDESC:Event Calendar
METHOD:PUBLISH
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
PRODID:-//Sched.com AAP 2026 CONFERENCE//EN
X-WR-TIMEZONE:UTC
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260705T000000Z
DTEND:20260705T050000Z
SUMMARY:2025 WINTER SCHOOL
DESCRIPTION:The AAP Winter school is an opportunity for students of philosophy\, including high school students\, to hear from professional philosophers and those working in areas of philosophical interest including critical thinking\, writing\, and public reasoning. &nbsp\;Workshops are interactive and informative and there is no cost to attend.&nbsp\;\n\nOrganised by the AAP Undergraduate Committee\, the Philosophy Winter School is a one day event held simultaneously with the AAP Conference and in the same location.\nSenior school students studying philosophy who are interested in studying philosophy at university and undergraduate philosophy students are welcome to attend at no cost.\nUndergraduates who are not members of the AAP are encouraged to join the Association. Further information about AAP Membership HERE\naap.org.au/Winterschool-2025
CATEGORIES:WINTER SCHOOL
LOCATION:Abel Smith Lecture Theatre\, St Lucia QLD 4072\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:84e2d6fdc95df1d28a920b768b507ffd
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/84e2d6fdc95df1d28a920b768b507ffd
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260705T043000Z
DTEND:20260705T080000Z
SUMMARY:Check-in Desk Day 1
DESCRIPTION:Conference Check-in desk open.
CATEGORIES:
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:deb40cb76f73d8d8aa6d54c52d3f425c
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/deb40cb76f73d8d8aa6d54c52d3f425c
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260705T060000Z
DTEND:20260705T063000Z
SUMMARY:Conference Welcome
DESCRIPTION:Welcome to the 2025 AAP Conference and Presentation of AAP Prize winners - Annette Baier Prize and Innovation in Inclusive Curricula Prize.
CATEGORIES:KEYNOTE
LOCATION:Steele-206-HYBRID\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:d4d55fd87687a46a82211a63709eaa10
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/d4d55fd87687a46a82211a63709eaa10
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260705T063000Z
DTEND:20260705T080000Z
SUMMARY:Not Knowing Not Knowing
DESCRIPTION:Gettierism (as I call it) has been part of epistemology since 1963 – often actively investigated and refined\, at times ignored\, yet always agreed to be correct in its most basic claim. Which claim is that? Gettierists take for granted that Edmund Gettier disproved knowledge’s definability as an epistemically well-justified true belief. He did so with two tales\, each about an epistemic agent Smith\, who – we readily agree – had a well justified true belief that failed to be knowledge: we know that Smith did not know. We do so\, even when not agreeing with each other on why he did so.\nOr might we fail to have even such minimal knowledge of Smith’s not knowing? That basic Gettieristic view of his epistemic plight has long functioned as a methodologically foundational element within philosophical attempts to uncover knowing’s nature. But should it do so? This paper approaches that question from two directions. And the stakes are surprisingly high. What epistemological knowledge\, if any\, has underwritten philosophy’s Gettieristic attempts to describe knowledge’s nature fully and fairly?\nI begin by constructing a meta-Gettier tale. The moral of it is simple: we should be able to think of ourselves and other epistemologists as afflicted – given the past few decades of post-Gettier aporia – in much the same way as\, supposedly\, Smith was afflicted within the first of those 1963 tales. If Smith was Gettiered\, then so are those epistemologists – that multitude – who regard him as being so: if he fails to know\, so do they. Their failure is meta-epistemic\, though: they fail to know that he fails to know.\n\nThen I explain one way in which that meta-epistemic failure arises. Epistemologists fall foul of a simple Platonic moral when striving to explain how Smith (or anyone else\, when Gettiered in like manner) fails to know. I draw partly upon the idea of what Rachel Barney calls Platonic qua predication. My explanation will not depend on hearkening back to Plato. But should the fact that it can be formulated in such ancient terms be chastening for any resolutely contemporary epistemologist who maintains that some\, even if slight\, genuine progress in understanding knowledge’s nature was made by Gettier?\nWhere do those failures leave Gettierism? Ungrounded? Unexplained? Non-explanatory? Perhaps so. Should we grieve for that potential loss? I hope not. Might it encourage us to explore fresh ways of conceiving of knowing’s nature? Could we do this while no longer holding ourselves answerable to Gettierism’s being correct in its most basic claim? I hope so.
CATEGORIES:KEYNOTE
LOCATION:Steele-206-HYBRID\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:3f4ef672b19421e9da562f8ecc9862fd
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/3f4ef672b19421e9da562f8ecc9862fd
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260705T080000Z
DTEND:20260705T100000Z
SUMMARY:Opening Reception
DESCRIPTION:Opening Reception for all attendees following the Presidential Address.\n\naap.org.au/Social-Events-2025\n\n\n
CATEGORIES:SOCIAL EVENTS
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:ca8c3ce620fa2bc025b46bfa3456faf7
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/ca8c3ce620fa2bc025b46bfa3456faf7
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260705T223000Z
DTEND:20260705T230000Z
SUMMARY:Check-in Desk Day 2
DESCRIPTION:Check-in Desk open.
CATEGORIES:
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:7df92008e308bf46c1652a0ac725c1ca
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/7df92008e308bf46c1652a0ac725c1ca
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260705T230000Z
DTEND:20260706T002500Z
SUMMARY:Metaphysical Identity: Time for an Australian Philosophy?
DESCRIPTION:Colonialism is a thousand years old\, starting from the Crusades (1100-1300) when Christian Europe tried to take the Holy Land from Muslim rule. Despite failing those wars\, European colonialism came to dominate other countries further afield and has continued in different forms to the present day.\n\nThe ancient Aboriginal system came from a long-term experiment in human order making. The activity of order-making requires elements that come under the general heading of social\, political\, and spiritual design. The elements are Coherence\, Proportionality\, and Predictability (CPP)\, which emerged out of the creation\, life process\, reflection\, and development of two collective life experiences - relationalism and survivalism. Through CPP\, the development of the Metaphysical Identity begins.\n\nRegional consensus-based decision making was based on a deliberate process of creating a collective\, civilisational culture i.e.\, metaphysical identity\, whereby members of a group begin to understand the multiplicity of beings\, values\, obligations and duties\, particularly through the concept of beginning\, that explains the existence of the universe – The Dreaming.\n\nAll the learned requirements of maturity\, of being mature adults emerge out of relationalism and reflectivity\, further\, we\, the autonomous beings learn that land looks after us\, it grows us up\, we look after land\, this leads to a reciprocal\, relational connection underpinned by a conscience. The first instance of what an Australian metaphysical identity is and further\, could be.\n\nBeing a metaphysical identity\, that is\, being fully\, completely and reflectively human or proper humanness\, is a skill that must be learned\, i.e.\, acquiring a proficiency in being an ethical human being with a functioning conscience. The difficulty of acquiring and maintaining this skill is that it’s a choice of the autonomous being. Learning and maintaining autonomous regard and the stewardship system helps in strengthening and stabilising community.\n\nWhat if Australia had its own philosophy? If Australia began exploring what its metaphysical identity could be\, then\, maybe\, a philosophy will emerge too.
CATEGORIES:KEYNOTE
LOCATION:Steele-206-HYBRID\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:4d1ebada0812893895b92ace71ee3d90
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/4d1ebada0812893895b92ace71ee3d90
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T003000Z
DTEND:20260706T005500Z
SUMMARY:Morning Break
DESCRIPTION:Morning Break
CATEGORIES:BREAKS
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:ad7ee708a7404b1b22ef47c71767c52c
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/ad7ee708a7404b1b22ef47c71767c52c
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T010000Z
DTEND:20260706T015500Z
SUMMARY:Rene Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy in Focus
DESCRIPTION:The aim of Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy is to discover the first principles of human knowledge\, that is\, what must be known before anything else can be known. If we are to understand this work\, it is important to understand the methodology he employs. Descartes does not reveal the method utilized in the Meditations in this work\, nor in any of his other books.\n\nIt is only in the Replies to the Second Set of Objections that he explains the method he utilizes in this work - he calls this method ‘analysis’\; ‘synthesis’ is the method of mathematics. I explain the method of ‘analysis’ contra ‘synthesis’\, and the employment of ‘analysis’ in leading the mind to the first principles of human knowledge. Examples are provided by focusing on Descartes’ analytic proofs of his existence as a thinking thing (second meditation)\, and that God is his creator (third meditation). In neither case is the analytic proof inferential. Further\, if no inference is involved in gaining knowledge of God\, then the charge of circular reasoning (raised by Arnauld and others) is without merit. Finally\, I show the importance of meditation for Descartes in arriving at the first principles of human knowledge."
CATEGORIES:ASEMP
LOCATION:GCI-275 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:c45b19fea74ebe2879233ffc448b790e
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/c45b19fea74ebe2879233ffc448b790e
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T010000Z
DTEND:20260706T015500Z
SUMMARY:Bullshit Universities: The Future of Automated Education
DESCRIPTION:The advent of ChatGPT\, and the subsequent rapid improvement in the performance of what has become known as Generative AI\, has led to many pundits declaring that AI will revolutionize education\, as well as work\, in the future. In this paper\, we argue that enthusiasm for the use of AI in tertiary education is misplaced. A proper understanding of the nature of the outputs of AI suggests that it would be profoundly misguided to replace human teachers with AI\, while the history of automation in other settings suggests that it is naïve to think that AI can be developed to assist human teachers without replacing them. The dream that AI could teach students effectively neglects the importance of ‘learning how’ in order to ‘learn that’\, that teachers are also role models\, and the social nature of education. To the extent that students need to learn how to use AI\, they should do so in specialized study skills units. Rather than creating a market for dodgy educational AI by lowering their ambitions about what they can offer\, universities should invest in smaller class sizes and teachers who are passionate about their disciplines. To flourish in the future\, just as much as they do today\, societies will need people who have learned to think and not—or not just—intelligent machines.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-314\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:3bfb1f5b7d0b8c826697ef4a03d401b8
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/3bfb1f5b7d0b8c826697ef4a03d401b8
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T010000Z
DTEND:20260706T015500Z
SUMMARY:When Axiomatics is Preferable to Semantics
DESCRIPTION:Philosophical logicians often develop a language and a semantics to represent and study a body of philosophically interesting sentences whose truth conditions are ontologically puzzling. Examples include: possible world semantics\, situation semantics\, impossible world semantics\, Routley star semantics\, possibility semantics\, etc. The philosophical action takes place in the semantics\, which includes set- and model-theoretic constructions and so assumes mathematics. By contrast\, in object theory (OT)\, the philosophical work is carried out in an axiom and proof system that assumes no mathematics. The system is couched in 2nd-order quantified modal logic (with complex terms)\, extended with one new primitive. Existence and identity (for both individuals and relations) are defined and three axioms for abstract objects are stated. The system then allows one to prove in the object language what others stipulate in the semantics\, without assuming any mathematics. In particular\, one may to define and prove the basic principles governing possible worlds (Kripke)\, situations (Barwise/Perry)\, Routley-starred situations\, impossible worlds (a la Nolan)\, and (Humberstone) possibilities. Though there are other examples as well\, these may be of special interest for this conference.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-237\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:bcf3c3227d326a777f0c641fb8b13f49
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/bcf3c3227d326a777f0c641fb8b13f49
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T010000Z
DTEND:20260706T015500Z
SUMMARY:Emptying the Void
DESCRIPTION:What is empty space? Philosophers in the tradition stemming from Newton\, through say Bertrand Russell down to\, say\, David Lewis\, have thought of empty space as a manifold of things called points\, and a region of space as empty if no material thing is located at any of the points in that region. These points possess locations and stand in spatial relations to one another\; that is\, they are things that possess properties and relations (rather than being properties or relations in themselves). There is a rival tradition (stemming from Leibniz) that dispenses with any such things as ‘points of space’ and countenances only material things and properties or relations among them. We will discuss a third option: a property theory of space. Spaces in general (including for instance ‘colour space’) are manifolds of properties\; and location space is a manifold of locational properties. This way of thinking opens the possibility of a true void\, a region consisting of locations that are not occupied by anything at all—not even by ‘points.’
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:Steele-206\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:f4014092a68dade744684724d837f6bc
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/f4014092a68dade744684724d837f6bc
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T010000Z
DTEND:20260706T015500Z
SUMMARY:Can LLMs Contribute to Philosophical Progress?
DESCRIPTION:Does philosophy make progress? Although it may seem obvious that it does\, there are sceptics—both within the discipline and beyond it—who question this. In response to such doubts\, Stoljar (2017) argues that we are entitled to a “reasonable optimism” about philosophy’s capacity to advance. Stoljar notes that there are recurring patterns or types of philosophical problems that we have solved—such as boundary problems and constitutive problems—that indicate progress. Moreover\, as philosophical subfields evolve\, new questions and positions emerge—and that\, in itself\, can be seen as a form of progress. Philosophers may progress their fields by extending earlier arguments\, refining existing views\, or make what Kelley (2024) calls “philosophical moves.” For example\, one might adopt a pluralist position in one field after observing it in another. Given that these moves\, or styles of inquiry\, could plausibly be learned and applied through pattern recognition\, a question arises: could Large Language Models (LLMs)\, which excel at such tasks\, contribute to philosophical progress? In this paper\, I argue they may be able to\, by looking at issues from the self-knowledge literature. I also consider some of the ethical implications of LLM use in philosophy\, including questions around authorship\, privacy\, and their environmental impact.
CATEGORIES:OTHER
LOCATION:Steele-320\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:f9d52415410e7bad770ec07c3bd2d4e6
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/f9d52415410e7bad770ec07c3bd2d4e6
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T010000Z
DTEND:20260706T015500Z
SUMMARY:Beyond Biology
DESCRIPTION:This paper interrogates the intricate distinction between human beings and persons by re-evaluating John Locke’s framework of personal identity. Whereas human beings are defined by biological continuity\, persons\, according to Locke\, are constituted by psychological continuity—principally the continuity of memory and self-awareness. Locke’s theory posits that a person remains identical over time by virtue of an unbroken chain of conscious experiences\, even when the physical body persists despite episodes of amnesia or altered consciousness. This perspective challenges the reduction of personhood to mere biological persistence\, arguing instead for a dynamic conception of identity anchored in reflective awareness and moral responsibility. Nonetheless\, the theory faces formidable challenges: the phenomenon of false memory\, the episodic disruptions seen in severe amnesia\, and the complexities introduced by conditions such as dissociative identity disorder. These issues raise critical questions about the stability and unity of psychological continuity. Ultimately\, while Locke’s approach advances a compelling alternative to substance-based theories\, it also underscores the need for further refinement to fully capture the multifaceted nature of personal identity.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:c67b544dd74247030db77316fb96a930
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/c67b544dd74247030db77316fb96a930
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T010000Z
DTEND:20260706T015500Z
SUMMARY:The Stance-Dependence of Arguments for Scientific Realism
DESCRIPTION:The idea that scientific realism and anti-realism are\, or are closely related to\, epistemic stances (clusters of values\, attitudes\, goals and commitments)\, has grown in popularity following the work of van Fraassen\, Chakravartty and others. Yet the dream of discovering a decisive stance-independent argument for scientific realism as a thesis – an argument that is\, or should be\, rationally compelling for anyone\, whatever their prior philosophical commitments\, who is willing to consider the arguments and evidence in an impartial way – dies hard\, as recent attempts in this direction by Eronen\, Strevens and others have shown. In this paper I argue these attempts all fail. All arguments for scientific realism as a thesis presuppose the realist stance. I also suggest that\, paradoxically\, arguments for versions of scientific anti-realism may also presuppose the realist stance\, inasmuch as they assume that the specific realist thesis in question is on the table as a genuine option\, even if it is ultimately rejected. For those who reject the realist stance\, such realist theses are not even live options\, so arguments against them are beside the point.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
LOCATION:GCI-273 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:569c3a847f6ff408cf78fc7dbc815fc3
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/569c3a847f6ff408cf78fc7dbc815fc3
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T010000Z
DTEND:20260706T015500Z
SUMMARY:The Exclusionary Force of Authoritative Commands
DESCRIPTION:A (legitimate) authoritative command provides its subject with a reason for action. Many also think it provides its subject with a peremptory reason to refrain from acting for certain kinds of countervailing reasons. When a father tells his daughter to go to bed\, the consideration that she “doesn’t feel like it” is not only insufficiently weighty to challenge her father’s command\, but is also a reason that ought to be excluded.\n\nThe capacity of commands to exclude competing reasons has received extensive discussion\, most famously by Raz (1986). Less has been said of the nature this exclusion. How is the father’s command supposed to impact upon his daughter’s deliberation? What kind of weight does this exclusionary reason carry for its subject?\n\nI propose that a command’s exclusionary force is a property that modulates in robustness. Some commands carry a more robust exclusionary force\, in the sense that they continue to be relevant and retain exclusionary force across a wider range of circumstances\, while other commands carry a more fragile exclusionary force\, relevant over a narrower range of cases. This interpretation helps illuminate how authoritative directives can be both binding and non-absolute.
CATEGORIES:POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-315\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:ff0c43a83b91b4be129bcd2b3289c6b3
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/ff0c43a83b91b4be129bcd2b3289c6b3
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T010000Z
DTEND:20260706T015500Z
SUMMARY:Expanding Norms of Epistemic Deference in Standpoint Epistemology
DESCRIPTION:Epistemic deference (ED) is the practical and rational appeal to another agent as an epistemic authority\, whose authority stems from pre-established legitimate expertise\, experience\, access to relevant evidence\, and dependable systems of knowledge. However\, within standpoint epistemology\, there is a pushback against this norm. Olufemi Taiwo voices this resistance. &nbsp\;In this paper\, I critically examine Taiwo’s account of ED\, which is characterised by conferring conversational authority and attentional goods to individuals based on superficial social identity markers to represent the marginalised. Accordingly\, I &nbsp\;argue that there is a fundamental definitional difference between Taiwo’s account of ED and how it is accounted for in epistemology. Based on this distinction\, I contend that the failures attributed to Taiwo’s account — namely\, that ED leads to epistemic complacency and the reinforcement of oppressive systems — are not inherent flaws of ED as an epistemic norm. Rather\, they stem from Taiwo’s conceptualisation. I conclude by considering ED beyond elite spaces\, demonstrating that it is indispensable so long as epistemically privileged standpoint is rooted in experience-based knowledge.
CATEGORIES:SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY
LOCATION:Steele-262\, 3 Staff House Rd\, University of Queensland\, St Lucia QLD 4067
SEQUENCE:0
UID:cac76711eca4a11fbace499a83b969d2
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/cac76711eca4a11fbace499a83b969d2
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T020000Z
DTEND:20260706T025500Z
SUMMARY:AI Agents\, Responsibility\, and Explanability
DESCRIPTION:There has been a recent proliferation of “AI Agents”: systems or programs that can operate in an increasingly autonomous manner. These systems raise an important question: do improvements in the capabilities of autonomous systems change the requirements for how we hold such systems – or their operators or designers – responsible for their outputs? Responsibility can be fruitfully connected to explainability – having the ability to explain an outcome helps in determining who\, or what\, should be held responsible for that outcome.\n\nMy talk will highlight how increasingly agentic systems pose challenges for pre-existing criteria for explainability. Specifically\, I will examine how the increasing agentic features of algorithmic systems complicates the explanatory picture\, and how different accounts of artificial agency can help to clarify these added complexities. I will conclude by considering how we should better understand the role of explanation in relation to increasingly complex explanatory contexts involving AI agents.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-314\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:234f57010a2d4d435f67e4c7369ab985
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/234f57010a2d4d435f67e4c7369ab985
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T020000Z
DTEND:20260706T025500Z
SUMMARY:Is Functionalism Inconsistent?
DESCRIPTION:Can a theorem of pure mathematics definitively refute a philosophical view? According to one popular argument\, the answer is yes. The theorem in question comes from model theory\, and the philosophical view is functionalism: one of the\nmost popular and well-studied views in the philosophy of mind. According to this argument\, functionalism is logically inconsistent\, and Beth’s definability theorem demonstrates this by showing that functionalism collapses into reductionism - exactly what functionalists purport to deny.\n\nIn this paper\, we examine whether the argument really is as devastating as its proponents have claimed. Unfortunately for those hoping to refute functionalism in this way\, we show that the argument fails for reasons both logical and philosophical. We conclude that at best\, it simply fails to challenge any actually held functionalist views\, and at worst\, relies upon an equivocation concerning the relevant notion of definability in order to derive its conclusion.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-237\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:7455eff54aa8de470909b8cbcea7291f
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/7455eff54aa8de470909b8cbcea7291f
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T020000Z
DTEND:20260706T025500Z
SUMMARY:In Defence of Classical Phenomenology
DESCRIPTION:The field of phenomenology is still undergoing healthy development over a hundred years since Edmund Husserl published Ideas. In this paper I explore how the emerging field of critical phenomenology both separates itself from and actively integrates classical phenomenological concepts. More specifically\, I analyse how Husserl’s method lingers in contemporary critical approaches. Original concepts such as the natural attitude and the eidetic reduction remain central for current scholars\, such as Gail Weiss and Sara Heinämaa\, but are critiqued by others\, such as Lisa Guenther and Johanna Oksala. By rethinking phenomenology though existentialism and Foucault\, for example\, current scholarship more broadly contextualises the phenomenological project. Indeed\, the inclusion of historical\, sociological\, and anthropological discourses is fundamental to a materially grounded critical phenomenology. I argue that a well constructed critical phenomenology can remain faithful to Husserl while providing us with a sufficient critique of broader power structures to deliver a more holistic insight into personal experience. I discuss how ‘post-phenomenologists’ engage with Husserl’s work to ask whether the original tools ought to be discarded\, or if they possess a certain power that helps us understand more about sexed\, racialized\, disabled\, and classed experience.
CATEGORIES:HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:GCI-273 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:ad41dc1df39a84ddc0490678af56e2f8
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/ad41dc1df39a84ddc0490678af56e2f8
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T020000Z
DTEND:20260706T025500Z
SUMMARY:Making Sense of Temporary Memberlessness
DESCRIPTION:Social metaphysicians have largely neglected to address what happens when a group loses all of its members. While Hanschmann (2023) argues that social groups can never be memberless\, I argue that social entities like clubs\, bands and sports teams can be temporarily memberless. Epstein (2015) points out that we have good reasons to accept that entities like the U.S. Supreme Court may persist\, in some form\, when they lose all their members for a short time and regain new members at a later date. I suggest that there are two plausible ways to account for temporary memberlessness: 1. We could say that social groups can persist without members or\, 2. We could say that something persists through a period of memberlessness\, but that it is not a social group. The second option may be attractive to those who endorse the social integrate model of social groups\, which distinguishes between social groups as member-having entities and institutions more broadly. I argue that the best approach is to treat the property of 'being a social group' as a temporary property that institutions can have.
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:Steele-206\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:b70f727c9db6ed0f0502a582f6036fa9
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/b70f727c9db6ed0f0502a582f6036fa9
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T020000Z
DTEND:20260706T025500Z
SUMMARY:Philosophy for Middle Management: A Field Guide for Field Philosophy
DESCRIPTION:This is a story of opportunities for field philosophy. Not a paper in the standard sense\, more a travelogue of places that philosophers could venture and lend a hand.\n\nMiddle managers in the public sector face more philosophical challenges than you might realise. They interface between abstract policy and tangible implementation plans\, they decide how the state meets the street\, they filter and frame information for policy-making\, they decide what matters and how it matters. They may be the enabler or the barrier to hostile actions like ‘robodebt’.\n\nA few philosophers are already working on these challenges. Nancy Cartwright has been working with practitioners on a theory of evidence for evidence-based policy\, Anna Alexandrova has worked with social services to co-design concepts of wellbeing with the people who use the service.\n\nThere are many ways that Australian philosophers could contribute to better thinking in the public sector through collaboration with middle managers.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY IN THE DIASPORA
LOCATION:Steele-309\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:7534592cf51782f86d1bb10715d1eb4f
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/7534592cf51782f86d1bb10715d1eb4f
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T020000Z
DTEND:20260706T025500Z
SUMMARY:Telling Our Dreams
DESCRIPTION:The concept of narrative is widespread in the literature on dreams\, spanning the humanities\, psychology\, and cognitive science. Yet\, this term and its associated conceptual aspects often remain undefined and insufficiently investigated. Although several works have examined the putative narrative character of dreams by drawing on narratology\, literature theory\, and semiotics\, there has been virtually no investigation of how preconceptions about the resemblance between fictional narratives and retrospective dream reports have shaped the philosophical debate on dreams and dreaming. This paper aims to address this gap. We argue that there is a pervasive tendency to metonymically assimilate fictional narratives first to dream reports and then to dreams themselves. As a result\, features and devices typically associated with literary fiction are frequently used as a significant conceptual framework to understand dreams and the processes underlying their formation\, encoding\, and retrieval. To illuminate this tendency\, we focus on two central categories in the philosophy of dreaming: authorship and composition. These categories often structure debates concerning the ontology and epistemology of dreams. By examining relevant cases in which these categories are employed to support divergent theoretical positions\, we argue that similar accounts often rest on a shared—yet frequently unacknowledged—assumption: that dreams exhibit a narrative structure and that dreaming is\, at its core\, a process of narrative construction.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:7f1549f6ff88a64b7acc33db30095119
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/7f1549f6ff88a64b7acc33db30095119
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T020000Z
DTEND:20260706T025500Z
SUMMARY:Demeriting Labels and the Reproduction of Social Hierarchy
DESCRIPTION:In this paper\, I argue that there is a general class of label that purports to track problematic behaviours\, beliefs\, motives\, or vices. I call these demeriting labels. Some examples are “liar”\, “racist”\, “tattletale”\, “creep”\, “virtue signaller”\, “snowflake”\, and “slob”. When someone is labelled\, lead to social sanctions\, tarnish their character\, and block them from making conversational moves.\n\nWhile demeriting labels sometimes have appropriate uses\, they can be weaponised to misassign demerits to people innocent of wrongdoing. I worry that this makes demeriting labels particularly effective for the reproduction of social hierarchy\, especially given that demeriting labels do not stick to all people with equal ease. For example\, dominantly situated people can sometimes get away with bad behaviour because their social position grants them a Teflon coating that makes it harder to get demeriting labels to stick. At the same time\, demeriting labels often stick to marginalised people far too easily. Similarly\, labels like “slut”\, “snowflake”\, and “DEI hire” misrepresent something as problematic\, but for certain audiences\, they have considerable sticking power. This allows demeriting labels to function as the strong arm of prejudiced ideologies\, which is I argue that why they demand our attention.
CATEGORIES:POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-315\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:837668cda4ff10ac964dba25243eea01
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/837668cda4ff10ac964dba25243eea01
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T020000Z
DTEND:20260706T025500Z
SUMMARY:Knowing Others Through Virtual Embodiment
DESCRIPTION:What\, if anything\, can we come to know about other people through virtual embodiment? Critics of virtual reality (VR) which virtually embodies users as marginalised persons argue such experiences inevitably misrepresent marginalised lives\, encourage epistemic overconfidence in users\, and reduce complex social identities to decontextualised simulations. While these concerns are valid\, I argue that they do not exhaust the epistemic possibilities of VR. Drawing on empirical studies and philosophical analysis\, I present a positive account of what we can come to know about others through VR-mediated perspective-taking.\n\nFocusing on a subclass of prosocial behaviour-promoting virtual reality\, I argue that certain VR experiences can confer propositional\, practical\, and what I call grounded inferential knowledge of marginalised experiences. Grounded inferential knowledge refers to a user's ability to learn about their own affective and bodily responses to virtual harms\, and to correctly infer—on that basis—how those same harms might feel to others in real life. While VR cannot give us direct access to others’ experiences\, it can function as a scaffold for more accurate\, situated\, and reflective understanding of shared human vulnerabilities. By reframing the epistemic stakes of virtual embodiment\, this account offers a more nuanced framework for evaluating the promise and limits of VR as an ethical and educational tool.
CATEGORIES:SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY
LOCATION:Steele-262\, 3 Staff House Rd\, University of Queensland\, St Lucia QLD 4067
SEQUENCE:0
UID:2a777cb67e3508b7c89d41e2f66f807b
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/2a777cb67e3508b7c89d41e2f66f807b
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T030000Z
DTEND:20260706T035500Z
SUMMARY:Lunch
DESCRIPTION:Lunch Break\n\n
CATEGORIES:BREAKS
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:be8d467b056c5cb62ee966a6624f6967
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/be8d467b056c5cb62ee966a6624f6967
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T040000Z
DTEND:20260706T045500Z
SUMMARY:Beyond Promises\, Before Ethical Life
DESCRIPTION:This paper seeks to develop an account of what it means to think ethically and to therefore be able to criticise certain forms of life\, practices\, and institutional arrangements by taking the particular case of the promissory relations undergirding modern social and economic relations as a privileged case. By drawing on the Humean problematic of the “is-ought” and Anscombe’s denunciation of “modern moral philosophy” with respect to the question of generating ethical obligations for promissory relations\, I offer a Hegelian-Aristotelian account of “ethical life” which demonstrates the necessity of incorporating any account of promissory relations within a more holistic conception of oneself\, the world\, and others. In so doing\, I draw upon a series of thinkers in the Hegelian tradition in dialogue with Hume and Anscombe in order to draw out the intersubjectively constituted normative structure of certain social forms which may appear natural or non-normative and which take the contract or promise as their form\, such as the debt or wage-labour contract\, in order to situate them within a broader conception of ethical life\, and\, where this ethical life is threatened\, to be able to criticise and overcome them.\n\nIn particular\, I seek to show how our relations to others in modern global capitalism cannot be reduced to “simple promises” but rather represent a unique form of domination which reorients orthodox ethical interpretations. Through Rödl’s account of self-comprehension\, the limits of the promissory model are demonstrated through the universal\, reflective moment contained in thinking self-comprehensively whilst participating in these relations. I then turn to Taylor’s understanding of positive freedom as the basis of any ethical critique\, by which we can recognise affronts to freedom insofar as they prevent us from realising certain value-laden ends. Drawing on McDowell\, Pippin\, and Stern\, I show how an Aristotelian ethical naturalism situates the Kantian demand for self-legislation within Hegel’s account of freedom and ethical life which relies upon a form of collective self-understanding grounded in what it means to live a free life within which any analysis of such promissory or contractual relations must be situated.
CATEGORIES:CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:GCI-275 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:292441732fd105a429660ebdb081a1f3
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/292441732fd105a429660ebdb081a1f3
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T040000Z
DTEND:20260706T045500Z
SUMMARY:Reason-Responsiveness Theories Cannot Survive the Attack of Situationism
DESCRIPTION:Reason-Responsiveness Theories of Moral Responsibility (RRT) posits that the control necessary for moral responsibility depends on an agent's sensitivity to reasons. However\, Situationist experiments present evidence that situational factors\, rather than reasons\, predominantly shape behavior. This paper contends that RRT cannot adequately address these challenges. After critiquing two common yet failed defenses—namely\, the rarity of situational influences and the view that situational factors qualify as reasons—I discuss about RRT's usage of the Aristotelian Ethical Method (AEM)\, which suffers from selective application and epistemic overconfidence in attributing reason-responsiveness. Moreover\, even when reason-responsiveness is capable to be captured by non-ideal cognizer\, it remains irrelevant to the causal explanation of actions in situationist scenarios as a modal property. Finally\, RRT falls short of meeting the Authority Demand\, as it provides no authoritatively normative reason by its failure to justify a moral fact of the grounding relation between reason-responsiveness and moral responsibility.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-314\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:509255f3a40f78ad6dbd69c668b953b3
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/509255f3a40f78ad6dbd69c668b953b3
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T040000Z
DTEND:20260706T045500Z
SUMMARY:The Krohn-Rhodes Theorem for the Mathematically Apathetic Philosopher
DESCRIPTION:The Krohn-Rhodes theorem\, the cornerstone of algebraic automata theory\, has fallen into relative obscurity. That's not a huge surprise: &nbsp\;most presentations of the theorem are mathematically forbidding\, the payoff is not obvious\, &nbsp\;and relatively few philosophers (or mathematicians\, for that matter) &nbsp\;care about semigroup theory. However\, several recent articles have suggested that the Krohn-Rhodes is useful for understanding hierarchically organised complex systems\, gene regulatory networks\, and Large Language Models\, all things that philosophers do care about. I will present an accessible introduction to the Krohn-Rhodes theorem\, focusing on its use in the cascaded decomposition of finite-state automata. I also gesture at a simple proof. Time permitting\, I will then outline Eilenberg’s holonomy decomposition---the most common procedure for generating cascaded decompositions---and connect this back to the theorem's use in understanding complex systems.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-237\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:aed21e9295003e770128bbceb747c52b
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/aed21e9295003e770128bbceb747c52b
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T040000Z
DTEND:20260706T045500Z
SUMMARY:Impossible Worlds and What They Cannot Explain
DESCRIPTION:Recently\, a group of philosophers\, often dubbed 'impossible-worldists' have embraced impossible-worldism—a view that accepts impossible worlds into their ontological category. According to impossible-worldists\, by accepting impossible worlds\, many hyperintensional phenomena which possible world frameworks cannot address can be accounted for. For example\, it is claimed that impossible worlds can account for the hyperintensional phenomena of propositions\, doxastic states\, counterpossibles\, and truth in impossible fiction. However\, this paper presents an argument against impossible-worldism. I will argue that there is a dilemma for impossible-worldism\; impossible-worldists will either beg the question on determining which kinds of impossible worlds they accept or will neglect &nbsp\;specific cases of problems they claim to account for. Specifically\, the impossible world framework inherits the same problem from the possible world framework when it deals with impossible objects which are not constituted by possible objects\, when these impossible objects are referred to by proper names.
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:Steele-206\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:d1f51f34ce5392fe8150ab3a33be8419
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/d1f51f34ce5392fe8150ab3a33be8419
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T040000Z
DTEND:20260706T042500Z
SUMMARY:Nurturing Critical Thinking and Ethics
DESCRIPTION:The Centre for Critical Thinking and Ethics\, Newington College has spearheaded a K-12 strategic approach to sharpening student’s critical thinking skills. Drawing from the Philosophy in Schools / P4C / and Teaching for Thinking pedagogical approaches\, our initiative is spelled out in some detail in Jensen et al (2024). Due to (i) the detached nature of our sharable resources (ii) our growing suite of interschool events\, and (iii) our professional learning programs\, benefits of this initiative are felt both inside and outside the classrooms of Newington College\, across Australia and indeed around the globe. This presentation will showcase aspects of our work\, with particular focus on the classroom resources we have created to support student thinking\, extending initial findings presented in Jensen & Giles (2023). As we are focused on the scalability and adjustability of our approach\, we invite collaboration with other educators and researchers to work together toward refining practices in this critical area.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY IN THE DIASPORA
LOCATION:Steele-309\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:7a1927edf56ed7b569dfa7bb8ec028d9
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/7a1927edf56ed7b569dfa7bb8ec028d9
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T040000Z
DTEND:20260706T045500Z
SUMMARY:The Brain Does Not Give Rise to Consciousness
DESCRIPTION:One of the great mysteries that characterizes our time is the hard problem of consciousness. How is it that physical things like brains give rise to subjective experience? The problem continues to remain stubbornly unresolved despite decades of intense research\, and this has motivated some of us to turn a critical eye back on the assumptions embedded within the question itself. One worry is that framing the hard problem using the “gives rise” locution implicitly assumes dualism by smuggling in a separation between the brain and consciousness\, putting physicalism at a dialectical disadvantage as a result. I offer a more sustained analysis of this longstanding dispute than has hitherto been provided and conclude that physicalists should indeed abandon the gives rise framing of the problem of consciousness. However\, another (and more substantial) worry is that the longer the hard problem remains intractable\, the more reason we have for thinking its most foundational assumption is faulty. Namely\, the denial that consciousness is fundamental.\n&nbsp\;
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:119522e07b7a9cba8ca7e3a298d600bf
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/119522e07b7a9cba8ca7e3a298d600bf
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T040000Z
DTEND:20260706T045500Z
SUMMARY:Distributing the Costs and Benefits of Children
DESCRIPTION:Some ‘responsibility-sensitive' theorists of justice have argued that because parents are responsible for the existence of children\, only they are responsible for the costs of those children. Others have argued that because children are akin to public goods\, the costs of children should be socialised between parents and non-parents.\nI argue that both analyses are incomplete.\nTo focus only on costs neglects that I should receive the benefits that flow from my choices. The relevant benefit of having children is demographic renewal\, ergo parents should receive the benefits of demographic renewal to the exclusion of non-parents. However\, because demographic renewal is embedded in children\, it presents itself as a non-excludable public good\, motivating the argument for cost socialisation.\nBut this is not a necessary conclusion.\nI argue that a case for directing to parents the hypothetical market price of demographic renewal can be made by reference to Ronald Dworkin's theory of distributive justice\, Equality of Resources.\nIn my talk\, I explain how Dworkin's principle of abstraction grounds fertility rate targeting as a price discovery mechanism\, why a state might choose various forms of parental compensation\, and why cost socialisation is appropriate only between parents.
CATEGORIES:POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-315\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:70f354b6d2d0b13c4713dcfcb05f7149
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/70f354b6d2d0b13c4713dcfcb05f7149
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T040000Z
DTEND:20260706T045500Z
SUMMARY:Human-in-the-feedback-loop
DESCRIPTION:Generative AI language models are increasingly being positioned as epistemic tools\, used to aid enquiry and generally help us find things out. However\, they suffer from certain flaws which both limit their usefulness as epistemic tools and risk causing epistemic harm. While AI bias and hallucinations have been written about as being epistemically harmful\, an underexplored trait is that of sycophancy. Sycophantic AI models produce outputs which match user beliefs over truthful ones. This draws parallels with other forms of algorithmic feed-back loops and epistemic bubbles which can limit the user's ability to see beyond their own perspective and to acquire knowledge. The trait of sycophancy in AI has been attributed to stages in the training process where models learn from human feedback to reflect user preferences. This work further sketches a possible application of vice epistemology to language models. It does so\, not by giving agency to these models\, but by looking at whether aggregating human preferences in the training process can manifest a kind of collective epistemic vice. I will ask whether epistemically harmful character traits\, arising from collective training process\, can meaningfully qualify as (non-agential) epistemic vices of AI.
CATEGORIES:SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY
LOCATION:Steele-262\, 3 Staff House Rd\, University of Queensland\, St Lucia QLD 4067
SEQUENCE:0
UID:15e58867a4a69d0d830315d0a8f2d76f
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/15e58867a4a69d0d830315d0a8f2d76f
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T043000Z
DTEND:20260706T045500Z
SUMMARY:The Role of Philosophers in the Age of AI
DESCRIPTION:Philosophers have long shaped foundational thinking\, public discourse\, and education. But the past three decades have seen seismic shifts in how we teach and learn—through digital platforms\, short-form content\, and increasingly personalized experiences. Now\, AI presents both a profound challenge and a powerful opportunity. Tools like large language models simulate reasoning but lack true critical thought\, risking cognitive offloading and diminishing the reflective practices central to philosophy.\n\nMeanwhile\, a cultural hunger for meaning is being met not by rigorous inquiry\, but by ideologues and influencers offering simplistic answers in viral formats. The problem isn’t just that figures like Andrew Tate or Jordan Petersen exist—it’s that there isn’t enough compelling\, accessible alternatives.\n\nI argue that philosophers must reimagine their role—not abandoning depth\, but adapting communication for new mediums. Through public engagement\, curricular reform\, and fostering dialogue beyond algorithmic echo chambers\, we can reclaim space for critical thinking in an age of noise.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY IN THE DIASPORA
LOCATION:Steele-309\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:085411482d47f92ddef9277c717dad89
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/085411482d47f92ddef9277c717dad89
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T050000Z
DTEND:20260706T055500Z
SUMMARY:Kant and the Radical Point of Analogy
DESCRIPTION:This paper develops a conceptualisation of analogy in the history of philosophical methodology as a pharmakon – a force that is both destructive and creative (Derrida\, 2004\, pp. 75-76). In so doing\, it examines an exemplar of analogical methodology by interrogating the potentiality of the radical imagination in the analogical thinking of Immanuel Kant. By focussing on Kant\, I am attempting to broaden the understanding of a particular tradition within philosophical methodology he revolutionised\, particular in the Critique of the Theory of Judgment (1790)\, where analogical thinking becomes the basis of the radical collapse of otherwise distinct domains\, such as beauty and morality\, human and non-human animal. The claims I will make about the revolutionary force of Kant’s theory of analogy\, underpinned by the function of the imagination\, may appear to verge on the heterodox. While it is true that Kant appeared to adhere to a closed architectonic or grand system (A832/B860)\, abandoning the uncertainty of the tensional void represented by the force of the imagination which underpins analogical thinking\, I will suggest that Kant also represents a destabilising force that\, as Jane Kneller has traced\, had a significant influence on the re-intrication of poetry and philosophy in the work of the German Romantic tradition.
CATEGORIES:CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:GCI-275 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:84ed1b1ec7a5800a8bec04a6f823d455
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/84ed1b1ec7a5800a8bec04a6f823d455
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T050000Z
DTEND:20260706T055500Z
SUMMARY:The Zhuangzi's Political Methods and the Wisdom of Crowds
DESCRIPTION:Daoist political discourse offers a tantalising vision of leaders who are somehow effective without being oppressive. But is there any way for it to work in practice? Inspired by the lesser-known outer and miscellaneous chapters of the Zhuangzi\, I argue that a strand of Daoist political thought prefigured some aspects of what we now call the “wisdom of crowds” phenomenon\, including the non-obvious insights that crowds can be collectively wise\, that diversity is valuable\, and that too much reliance on expertise or authority can be problematic. This prefiguration is not merely a matter of historical curiosity: the Zhuangzi’s discussions of leadership offer helpful and relevant observations about how to be an effective aggregator of the crowd’s wisdom in situations where quantitative methods are not an option. Zhuangzian political methods are also potentially more compatible with Western liberal democracy than Confucian ones. Finally\, a “wisdom of crowds” understanding of Zhuangzian political advice also makes sense of several difficult puzzles in Zhuangzi interpretation\, such as the apparent arbitrariness of Ziporyn’s wild-card perspectivalism and the text’s seemingly contradictory lessons regarding the uses of the useless.
CATEGORIES:EASTERN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-320\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:42233473869bc25fba5249936b044288
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/42233473869bc25fba5249936b044288
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T050000Z
DTEND:20260706T055500Z
SUMMARY:Caring for Country... With Robots?
DESCRIPTION:Agricultural robots and artificial intelligence (AI) are increasingly promoted for their environmental virtues. In Australia\, the idea that agriculture needs to be less environmentally destructive and attend to ongoing colonial harms\, is increasingly expressed in terms of ‘caring for Country’. Although this concept draws on Indigenous ideas of kinship\, it is being adopted by white agriculturalists seeking to be more environmentally attentive and sensitive to Indigenous justice issues. In this paper\, we ask whether\, and if so how\, robots and AI can contribute to caring for Country. We examine issues that those who seek to be more sensitive to relationships with the environment and Indigenous justice must consider in the context of decisions about AI and robots. We argue that while not without promise in some respects\, robots and AI seem likely to exacerbate the logics of settler-colonial agriculture in ways that call into question their capacity to contribute to an ethic of caring for Country.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-314\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:96978f971c912c10dda84f05687f6326
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/96978f971c912c10dda84f05687f6326
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T050000Z
DTEND:20260706T055500Z
SUMMARY:SAM Space: A Coordinate Geometry for Logic
DESCRIPTION:Spatial reasoning is already used in logic\, from intuitive visual aids like Venn diagrams\, to formal structures such as networks\, lattices\, and trees.\n\nSAM Space proposes a new system: an analytic geometry for logic. Just as Cartesian coordinates allow algebraic equations to be rendered as points\, planes\, functions and vectors\, SAM Space seeks to do the same for logical and philosophical concepts.\n\nThe framework is grounded in three dimensions—Subject\, Attribute\, and Mode—analogous to axes in a coordinate system. A central concept is the Logos Line\, akin to the number line in mathematics\, representing the totality of what can be said or known.\n\nThe long-term goal is to enable precise mathematical modelling of philosophical concepts and systems.\n\nThis presentation outlines the foundational ideas of SAM Space. The work is exploratory rather than technical. It does not assume knowledge of advanced logic\, formal proofs\, or heavy notation. A working grasp of high school mathematics and introductory logic (e.g.\, truth tables and predicate logic) will suffice.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-237\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:dcc81c7cf9df81061cd469955b44f979
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/dcc81c7cf9df81061cd469955b44f979
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T050000Z
DTEND:20260706T055500Z
SUMMARY:Symbolic Forms in Cassirer and Merleau-Ponty
DESCRIPTION:This paper articulates some points of contact between Ernst Cassirer and Maurice Merleau-Ponty\, by analysing the influence of Cassirer’s masterwork\, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms\, on Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. There are two concepts developed in Cassirer’s late philosophy of culture\, that are of particular importance for understanding its influence on Merleau-Ponty’s thought – ‘symbolic form’ and ‘symbolic pregnance’. Symbolic forms may be broadly understood as contexts of meaning within which certain cultural formations take shape. Symbolic pregnance refers to the containment of a symbolic form within any given cultural formation – the two concepts of symbolic form and symbolic pregnance are thus intimately related. Seeing how these concepts play out in the unique context of Merleau-Ponty’s thought allows us to gain some level of clarity on the nature of Merleau-Ponty’s relationship to the Neo-Kantian approach championed by Ernst Cassirer\, and thus to Kantianism more generally.
CATEGORIES:HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:GCI-273 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:48ba839847a5c92470df8d5dcd0e02fb
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/48ba839847a5c92470df8d5dcd0e02fb
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T050000Z
DTEND:20260706T055500Z
SUMMARY:Naturalizing the Philosophy of Time with the Help of Cognitive Science
DESCRIPTION:I begin by asking what naturalising the philosophy of time should look like. I develop an account of it\, drawing on work by Steven French and Alvin Goldman\, whereby the philosophy of time needs to be continuous with scientific findings about the nature of time and about the human cognitive apparatus. I develop an argument against relying on intuitions in the philosophy of time\, as these can be better explained by appealing to psychology and cognitive science than by taking them to be veridical. Finally\, I introduce the predictive processing framework\, according to which the content of our perceptual experiences is a function of both how the world is independently of us\, and of a contribution made by the perceiver herself. I use this framework to argue that temporal intuitions about passage and presentness are better explained as the result of features of our internal model of the world\, generated by the predictive processing framework\, rather than features of the world itself.
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:Steele-206\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:85d30e8763b3b089e098919e17b412ab
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/85d30e8763b3b089e098919e17b412ab
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T050000Z
DTEND:20260706T052500Z
SUMMARY:Dialogue\, Justice\, and the Classroom
DESCRIPTION:In an age dominated by algorithms\, disinformation\, and increasing political polarisation\, the role of the classroom in fostering democratic habits of thought is more critical than ever. Drawing on Connell’s work and a critical feminist lens\, this presentation argues that without a conscious effort to challenge patriarchy\, imperialism\, and capitalist structures\, schools risk reproducing them. \n\nSocial justice research in education reinforces the valuable role of teachers using dialogic pedagogical approaches as a transformative approach in schools. This session aims to explore how embedding dialogic pedagogies enables students to interrogate fake news\, question inherited assumptions and engage meaningfully in respectful disagreement. Grounded in a commitment to democracy\, classrooms should become spaces where students learn not what to think\, but how to think. Practical classroom examples will illustrate how these concepts are enacted with students\, offering a provocation for educators to reflect on how their pedagogy shapes the world. By using classroom dialogue as a tool for empowerment\, teachers create a culture to help students question injustice\, challenge dominant narratives\, and actively participate in building a fairer and more inclusive world.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY IN THE DIASPORA
LOCATION:Steele-309\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:a9c30e818923ec862f053a348c5460e4
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/a9c30e818923ec862f053a348c5460e4
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T050000Z
DTEND:20260706T055500Z
SUMMARY:De Re Reference and Perceptual Belief
DESCRIPTION:Prima facie\, perception makes us directly aware of particular objects and property-instances\, and enables us to make knowledgeable de re reference to them. Call this the strong referential character of experience. Explaining strong referential character of experience is a desideratum for all theories of perception\, and some naive realists argue that they give the best explanation of the strong referential character of experience: we refer to particular objects and property-instances because they constitute our experience. Against naive realists\, I defend a a dual-component theory\, which states that to perceive x as F is to be aware of sensory qualities and to have a belief that x is F. I motivate two more implications. First\, the strong referential character that naive realists posit is not a completely true datum: we do make knowledgeable de re references\, but it's not in virtue of being directly aware of particular objects and property-instances. Second\, our intuitions about how perception influences further cognition and action seem to be better honoured by positing perceptual beliefs or belief-like states\, and as such\, dual-component views deserve more attention.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:f09b783ff9c8a0d729a792ac5fd9f92a
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/f09b783ff9c8a0d729a792ac5fd9f92a
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T050000Z
DTEND:20260706T055500Z
SUMMARY:Kantian Provisional Right in the Anthropocene
DESCRIPTION:In the Metaphysics of Morals\, Kant argues that there is only one innate right: the right to be free from determination by another’s will. There and in his late political essays\, Kant argues that the fact that human beings reside on the watery spherical surface of the earth (globus terraqueus) provides a rare instance of material fact conditioning right. As Jakob Huber has recently argued\, innate right to be free of arbitrary determination combines with the material fact of the limited and interconnected nature of the planet’s surface to produce what Huber calls “a right to be somewhere” (Huber\, Kant’s Grounded Cosmopolitanism). In this essay I follow Huber’s focus on the physical conditions constraining the exercise of Kantian right\, but I focus on the circumstances of the Anthropocene as even more demanding than the globus terraqueus. Humanity under Anthropocene conditions constrains the freedom of future generations to make choices about their own interactions\, in much the same way that the would-be intergenerationally tyrannical church synod criticised by Kant in “What is Enlightenment?” sought to constrain the freedom of future generations to inquire into the truth of their religious commitments. I argue that humanity’s new circumstances make Kant’s account of provisional right much more widely relevant than has previously been recognised\, because the intergenerational equivalent of the civil condition is unavailable.
CATEGORIES:POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-315\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:efa677e6cf94eaaae32a61803f0aaf2e
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/efa677e6cf94eaaae32a61803f0aaf2e
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T050000Z
DTEND:20260706T055500Z
SUMMARY:Empathy Machines
DESCRIPTION:Can virtual reality help us to “walk in the shoes” of other people? Optimists claim that VR is the “ultimate empathy machine”\, a way for those who have never been to war\, or lived in solitary confinement\, to know what it is like to have these experiences from the comfort of their living room. Pessimists hold that it is absurd and dangerous to think that VR could be a way of acquiring this kind of ‘what it is like’ knowledge. In this paper I develop a position which can accommodate the important insights of the pessimist’s critique\, whilst also allowing us to agree with (a qualified version of) the optimist’s claim that VR can help us to acquire ‘what it is like’ knowledge. This position is based on recent work I have done showing how ‘what it is like’ knowledge comes in different grades and degrees.
CATEGORIES:SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY
LOCATION:Steele-262\, 3 Staff House Rd\, University of Queensland\, St Lucia QLD 4067
SEQUENCE:0
UID:19003f3ed53c2d5e7832152c0b56447a
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/19003f3ed53c2d5e7832152c0b56447a
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T060000Z
DTEND:20260706T062500Z
SUMMARY:Afternoon Break
DESCRIPTION:
CATEGORIES:BREAKS
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:0cde473376ad804a2ea0997aeee253f7
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/0cde473376ad804a2ea0997aeee253f7
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T063000Z
DTEND:20260706T072500Z
SUMMARY:Bad Food and Immoral Tastes
DESCRIPTION:Why wouldn’t you eat a person? One simple answer for many of us is that cannibalism is morally wrong. Another\, perhaps more honest answer\, is that it would be gross. In this paper\, I show how this disgust response can be rationally related to moral judgements and evaluation. Although disgust and moral judgement are clearly correlated\, most modern handlings of disgust treat the truth (or some nearby sense of accuracy/applicability) or falsity of ‘it’s disgusting’ (at least in the sense that applies to food) as being conceptually and essentially unrelated to the truth of any moral evaluation. Any moral judgement that springs from our disgust\, then\, is simply mistaking a non-moral response for something more meaningful. This paper gives an alternative account. By looking at what aspects of food ‘that’s disgusting’ evaluates\, I argue that evaluations of tastes and textures can involve moral – and morally relevant – evaluations.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-314\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:7d5876d1e6cd415ee8f8cf8152346ed7
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/7d5876d1e6cd415ee8f8cf8152346ed7
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T063000Z
DTEND:20260706T072500Z
SUMMARY:What Does Optimism about Human-AI Friendship Entail
DESCRIPTION:There are multiple vectors along which one can be more or less pessimistic about the prospects for human-AI friendship. I could be optimistic about the purely technological aspects of AI friends\, believing that they will soon be able to do some non-trivial percentage of the things the AI companies claim they can already do. I could be optimistic about the affordances of these AI friends for human relationships and experiences. I could be optimistic about the implementation\, or the regulation\, of such AI. Here\, I examine and taxonomize these possibilities.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-206\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:08f59e1ffbe581c4fc5084a1bf212d2c
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/08f59e1ffbe581c4fc5084a1bf212d2c
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T063000Z
DTEND:20260706T072500Z
SUMMARY:Reasoning\, Normativity and Logical Pluralism
DESCRIPTION:Some norms of reasoning tell us certain inferences are forbidden – for example\, Bumbling Bruce goes wrong in reasoning to the conclusion that 𝑝 when his sole reasons are that he accepts 𝑝 → 𝑞 and 𝑞. Some tell us that certain inferences are mandatory – for example\, Stunned Sharon goes wrong when she remains in suspension about 𝑞 when she is fully aware that 𝑝 and 𝑝 → 𝑞 are and remain among her reasons\, and there are no cognitive or pragmatic reasons that 𝑞 might not be credible for her. (There are parallel norms that tell us that certain (non-)inferences are permissible.)\n\nLogical Pluralism (at least the Canberra subspecies) is the view that many relations between sets of sentences and sentences satisfy the core platitudes governing ‘logical consequence’. These platitudes are generally taken to include formality\, topic-neutrality\, necessary truth-preservingness\, and the capacity to play a role in norms of right reasoning. Logic itself is not normative\, but it plays a role in regulating the inference of those who recognise its presence – providing reasons to infer. The norms might tell us that it is (intuitionistically) impermissible to reason to 𝑝 from ¬¬𝑝\, when the truth of the latter is one's only reason for accepting 𝑝\, and that it is classically mandatory to to reason to 𝑝 from ¬¬𝑝\, when one has the cognitive capacity to consider and accept 𝑝 and one has no reason against accepting it. Given that one needs to regulate one's doxastic behaviour\, some way of aggregating these norms seems both mandatory and impossible.\n\nIn this talk\, I will elaborate on this and related puzzles\, and work through some (pluralist and non-pluralist) options in response.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-237\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:46b0f9add0e6c9c8fb79f49a55a7fb01
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/46b0f9add0e6c9c8fb79f49a55a7fb01
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T063000Z
DTEND:20260706T072500Z
SUMMARY:Philosophy Moves: Cultivating Move-Mindedness
DESCRIPTION:After years of reading philosophy\, one is likely to pick up on several of the same or similar ‘moves’ made in distinct domains. Familiarity with the tropes of philosophy brings about an awareness of notable dialectical structures of which one can ‘copy-paste’ the form sans content. Move-literacy can uncover novel approaches to ongoing philosophical debates. A novel response to a problem in epistemology may inspire a similar response in moral philosophy\; a clever distinction made in metaphysics may help one make a similar move in aesthetics\; the way claims are organized in a literature review from the philosophy of science may be usefully imported into a discussion in the philosophy of religion.\nIn this talk\, I want to further contribute to identifying moves and add to the repository of them. But I also aim - in the spirit of Alan Hájek - to promote active and ongoing engagement with one’s inventory of moves as a worthwhile heuristic. Maintaining move-mindedness facilitates an engagement with moves that goes beyond our familiarity with moves as they are commonly individuated. Some parts of moves make for useful ‘mini moves’ – often discovered when mere components or aspects of a full move prove apt or inspirational (or conversely\, deserving of critique). Additionally\, some approximations of moves may be more (or less) suitable than their canonical neighbor moves in some contexts. Lastly\, I will discuss some pitfalls of being overly rigid when making use of move-minded methods.
CATEGORIES:OTHER
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:b05e0356d37e5d5af9933fe43710879b
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/b05e0356d37e5d5af9933fe43710879b
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T063000Z
DTEND:20260706T065500Z
SUMMARY:What it Takes to Become a 'Thinking School'?
DESCRIPTION:Park Ridge State High School has embarked on a journey to become a centre of excellence in the teaching and learning of critical thinking. Teaming up with the University of Queensland Critical Thinking Project\, a project that blends insights from Philosophy and Education to provide a unique\, pedagogical approach to teaching critical thinking in the classroom.\n\nPark Ridge SHS teachers are rethinking what classroom practice looks like. First and foremost\, this involves a shift in focus in the classroom from knowledge transmission to students’ cognitive and metacognitive development. Secondly\, it involves students owning and driving the inquiry process. Thirdly\, it involves students and teachers sharing a common metalanguage around thinking and argumentation that helps students understand the cognitive tasks teachers are asking them to perform.\n\nThis kind of pedagogical transformation takes time and space for teaching staff and has required investing in extensive professional learning and mentoring. Creating a thinking school requires a cultural shift within the school so that it can remain focused on the important work—teaching and learning. Teachers are actively co-designing research projects that focus on what teaching for thinking looks like in the classroom\, results from this research feed back into the teacher’s pedagogical development through a sequence of action research cycles.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY IN THE DIASPORA
LOCATION:Steele-309\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:e9ef0601014c57351359d75ec95b6569
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/e9ef0601014c57351359d75ec95b6569
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T063000Z
DTEND:20260706T072500Z
SUMMARY:Machine Speech: The Very Idea
DESCRIPTION:Do LLM-based systems such as ChatGPT speak?\n&nbsp\;\nWe have two aims in this paper: (1) to taxonimise the literature on machine speech\, (2) to evaluate whether the question of machine speech is worth asking.\n&nbsp\;\nFirstly\, we suggest that responses fall into two camps: superficialists and&nbsp\;deepists.\n&nbsp\;\nSuperficialists think that we can discern whether a machine speaks by considering its outward properties. Any system rightly viewed under the intentional stance (Dennett 1989)\, or 'meets all the a priori constraints' on the concept of speaking (Chalmers 2023) thereby counts as speaking.\n&nbsp\;\nConversely\, deepists think we should look “under the hood” to details like algorithms and computational processes. Deepists may think that speaking requires intentionality\, which requires 'internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains' (Seale 1980)\, or that current LLM-based systems are mere stochastic parrots (Bender and Koller 2020).\n&nbsp\;\nWe then argue that the question of machine speech is not worth asking. Our guide is Turing\, who thinks that the question of machine intelligence is "too meaningless to deserve discussion" (1950:442). We concur: despite progress in our understanding of meaning and communication\, these key notions are still too undetermined. What we should ask\, instead\, is how to go on using ‘speaks’.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
LOCATION:GCI-275 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:28752637427bb87ccf43140738373e78
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/28752637427bb87ccf43140738373e78
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T063000Z
DTEND:20260706T072500Z
SUMMARY:Hume's Necessity Found
DESCRIPTION:This paper argues that the strongest form of causal necessity\, which David Hume advanced as unjustified\, does in fact exist. It is found\, paradoxically\, in the relation between causal omissions and their effects. I also propose a reformulation of the ‘c causes e iff…’ analysis into a new analysis that best accounts for causal necessity. In brief\, when any causal factor\, intrinsic to a causal system\, is omitted\, a change necessarily occurs.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
LOCATION:Steele-320\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:97ac2490a9e5a79868b2c460b3916528
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/97ac2490a9e5a79868b2c460b3916528
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T063000Z
DTEND:20260706T072500Z
SUMMARY:Performativity of the Right to Appear and Resistance Effects--from Butler and Arendt's Reflections
DESCRIPTION:In recent years\, global demonstrations and social movements such as Black Lives Matter have mobilized diverse people to contest systemic discrimination\, inequality\, and genocide. Judith Butler has analyzed these modes of resistance and posits that performative resistance takes effect in assemblies formed when multiple individuals convene in public spaces\, such as squares and streets. In other words\, when individuals from diverse backgrounds come together\, there are performative oppositions to the status quo of discrimination and inequality. This paper will analyse the performative effects of the assembly Butler discusses\, focusing on the ‘right to appear’. The ‘right to appear’\, variously described by Butler\, may be seen as the right to appear in the public/political space and in relation to others. Butler's concept of the right to appear can be understood as combining two perspectives. First\, it draws upon Arendt's analysis of the public sphere. Second\, it is informed by Arendt's concept of 'the right to have rights'. Butler speaks of a mixture of these two perspectives\, referring to Arendt but partly disagreeing with her. This paper aims to highlight the features of the right to appear by comparing Arendt's argument with Butler's analysis.
CATEGORIES:POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-315\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:558518d5979843fad3352c9453f16d10
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/558518d5979843fad3352c9453f16d10
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T063000Z
DTEND:20260706T072500Z
SUMMARY:Social Marking and the Grounds of Generative AI Bias
DESCRIPTION:I introduce an analytical framework for the fine-grained study of generative AI bias\, applying the notion of social marking. When we say that a feature is socially marked\, we mean that it stands out as unusual or noteworthy within a given social context\, and that it prompts special treatment\, for good or ill. I propose that much of the homogeneity of generative AI outputs results from the AI systems codifying that certain demographics and their features are marked\, and in response to marked features AI systems will change the demographics it portrays\, sometimes radically so. As a result\, these systems will over-represent non-marked\, dominant groups in the absence of certain features\, and over-represent marked\, non-dominant groups in the presence of such features. There are positive and negative forms of bias that result. The positive bias\, where AI systems have stereotypical outputs\, has attracted the most attention. But the negative bias is also noteworthy: some demographics are typically left out of depictions unless there is some marked feature in play\, meaning that these systems selectively omit non-dominant groups in contexts where they should be visible.
CATEGORIES:SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY
LOCATION:Steele-262\, 3 Staff House Rd\, University of Queensland\, St Lucia QLD 4067
SEQUENCE:0
UID:59539bd24ff1c3d4f1afce3d5997449e
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/59539bd24ff1c3d4f1afce3d5997449e
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T070000Z
DTEND:20260706T072500Z
SUMMARY:Young Boys Big Questions: Philosophy for the First Time
DESCRIPTION:This paper explores the voices and lived experiences of young boys aged between 12-13 who participated in the University of Qld’s Philosothon for the first time. The Philosothon was a structured philosophical inquiry that engaged students from several local and urban Qld high schools in collaborative dialogue around critical thinking. This small study centres on the boys’ perspectives so that we can better understand how young people experience philosophical thinking in a formal\, dialogic setting. Through video vignettes and live presentations\, students will afford their own reflections and moments of challenge\, initial skepticism and shifts in thinking during and after the event. Their voices reveal emerging confidence in reasoning\, collaboration and intellectual curiosity. Rather than focusing on the outcome of the competition\, this paper explores the process of philosophical engagement as experienced by the boys themselves. Their experiences provide compelling insights into their intersections with inquiry and perspectives of collaboration in a setting outside of their schooling milieu. This paper contributes to a broader discussion on how philosophical events can create spaces of belonging\, collaboration and meaning making\, particularly for those new to the discipline. The project affirms the value of listening to young people and honouring their voices when participating in philosophical inquiry.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY IN THE DIASPORA
LOCATION:Steele-309\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:0c72b679625e67cbbd7920ec630f58c6
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/0c72b679625e67cbbd7920ec630f58c6
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T080000Z
DTEND:20260706T093000Z
SUMMARY:Philosophy in the Diaspora: The role of philosophy in helping to navigate the complexities of modern life
DESCRIPTION:Philosophy in the Diaspora:&nbsp\;The role of philosophy in helping to navigate the complexities of modern life\n\nAn illuminating public panel event as part of the Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference\, where we explore the enduring relevance of philosophy in contemporary contexts. Philosophy in the Diaspora examines how philosophical methods and knowledge shapes and responses to urgent questions in areas as diverse as medicine\, police leadership\, education\, and social justice.\nThis discussion brings together thinkers and practitioners from diverse backgrounds to unpack philosophy’s role in navigating ethical challenges\, policy decisions\, and societal transformations. The conversation extends beyond academic inquiry—public participation is encouraged through an interactive Q&A session\, fostering a vibrant exchange of ideas.\nJoin us as we explore how philosophy continues to move\, adapt\, and thrive across different landscapes. Your voice in the discussion matters. Come ready to think\, challenge\, and engage!\n
CATEGORIES:PANEL
LOCATION:Abel Smith Lecture Theatre\, St Lucia QLD 4072\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:9e5cb0a056a274e503832ba2e2c0363d
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/9e5cb0a056a274e503832ba2e2c0363d
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T103000Z
DTEND:20260706T112500Z
SUMMARY:Politics in Academia
DESCRIPTION:Should university campuses be politically neutral? In this paper I focus mainly on whether professors can or should express political views in class. Its main contribution is to distinguish between absolutist arguments\, often thought by proponents to apply universally to all institutions and contexts\, and more nuanced context-dependent considerations. I argue that while there are lessons to be learned from each\, the absolutist arguments fail. While this means that things are\, and there may not be a one size fit all ideal prescription (Schliesser\, 2024)\, the paper describes a plethora of considerations that should be considered when devising policies. &nbsp\;\nThe paper examines three absolutist arguments\, one against neutrality and two in favor. The first is that neutrality is impossible\, it is a myth that serves those in power\, and therefore professors should not be neutral (Dea\, n.d.\; Giroux\, 2020\, p. 210) . The second is that when professors use their social status and role in classrooms to express their political opinions\, it is an abuse of power. The third is that professors\, when talking as professors\, should talk only about their areas of expertise and research (Fish\, 2008). When they express their political views\, they are not doing so.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:ONLINE ONLY\, University of Queensland
SEQUENCE:0
UID:d53ecea9eeae57a3a0da08a68eeaf452
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/d53ecea9eeae57a3a0da08a68eeaf452
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T113000Z
DTEND:20260706T122500Z
SUMMARY:The Interconnecting Features in Spinoza's Immanent Ontology
DESCRIPTION:Baruch Spinoza is profound and insightful. He conceives the world from a geometrical standpoint\, and his geometric method is demonstrative in imitation of Euclidean geometry. He believes that the same principles that govern the universe also govern the nature of things. In the universe\, the conclusions of geometry necessarily follow their axioms. In the same way\, the ethical and physical things follow from the nature of things. To this effect\, he introduces some definitions from which he deduces a systematic structure whose parts are logically connected. Thus\, he developed his theory by deductive reasoning.\n\nHis entire theory can be summed up in substance\, attributes and modes. These are three parts of the universe and the fundamental structures of his entire thought. Substance is the framework of all reality. Attributes are the primary expressions of the substance\, either in a bodily form or a conceptual form. The modes are the particular modifications of the substance.\n\nThis paper discusses the five interconnecting features in Spinoza's immanent ontology: substance monism\, univocity of attributes\, the status of modes\, immanent causality and relational ethics. It argues that these interconnecting features comprehensively formulate Spinoza’s concept of substance.
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:ONLINE ONLY\, University of Queensland
SEQUENCE:0
UID:f09dcaeb837c99659d5307ee193f0712
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/f09dcaeb837c99659d5307ee193f0712
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T123000Z
DTEND:20260706T132500Z
SUMMARY:Descartes on Scepticism\, Habits\, Freedom\, and the Self
DESCRIPTION:This enquiry is motivated by two interrelated aims\, at the core of which are two fundamental questions that troubled Descartes: ‘is a new metaphysics possible?’ and ‘is a free\, autonomous enquirer possible?’. The search for a new metaphysics is not independent of but requires the attainability of freedom\, transforming the self as locus of authority and autonomy. The attainability of both is predicated on Descartes’ constructive conception of scepticism\, which is completely different from what is considered as ‘Cartesian scepticism’.\n\nMy first aim is to shed light on the ways in which Descartes’ response to scepticism has metaphysical and moral implications\, and on his order of reasoning\, which is indispensable to his metaphysical turn and ontological shift away from Scholasticism.\n\nThe second is to explore the connection between scepticism\, habits\, and freedom\, as against misattributions to Descartes’ undertaking. Doubt requires reason and freedom. Without freedom from prejudicial intellectual habits and prevailing Principles\, Descartes’ enquiry would not get off the ground. This triad of notions has far-reaching consequences for our philosophical concerns\, yet it has gone unnoticed in the vast literature on scepticism.\nA sceptical enquirer is a searcher after truth. Descartes’ concern is not primarily the external world\, but truth.
CATEGORIES:HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:ONLINE ONLY\, University of Queensland
SEQUENCE:0
UID:37eda845a78910f1aa9d1717ed5900b0
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/37eda845a78910f1aa9d1717ed5900b0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T223000Z
DTEND:20260706T230000Z
SUMMARY:Check-in Desk Day 3
DESCRIPTION:Check-in Desk open.
CATEGORIES:
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:cab97db7b522b1f20e42309a539438b2
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/cab97db7b522b1f20e42309a539438b2
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260706T230000Z
DTEND:20260707T002500Z
SUMMARY:Is Method political? Empiricism\, Scientism\, and Normative Critiques of Methodological Practice in Political Philosophy
DESCRIPTION:What role should empirical methods play in political philosophy? What might be the merits of employing social science methods to address the fundamental questions political philosophers explore\, such as what makes the state politically legitimate or what is the nature of a good society? A useful point of comparison here is political science. Although political science and political philosophy are closely adjacent disciplines\, political scientists typically make far greater use of empirical methods. Moreover\, many political scientists are highly critical of what they see as the unacceptable aprioristic methods employed by great deal of contemporary political philosophy. Such criticisms are\, however\, highly contentious and contested. Many political philosophers are opposed\, on primarily normative political grounds\, to such moves that they regard as embodying the methodological vice of “scientism”. What should we think? Might there be specifically political reasons for rejecting some methodological practices? Might there also be straightforward philosophical grounds for objecting to strong empiricist programs of reform? In this talk\, I shall begin by considering the disagreement between the Vienna Circle and the Frankfurt School on whether philosophy should model itself on the natural sciences before providing a defence of the thought that when investigating the normative questions that lie at the heart of political philosophy\, non-empirical philosophical speculation has a significant role to play. In the final section\, I shall briefly outline some reasons why this methodological stance matters politically.
CATEGORIES:KEYNOTE
LOCATION:Steele-206-HYBRID\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:f0449ea9e186b345a6ee4290cc48e1b9
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/f0449ea9e186b345a6ee4290cc48e1b9
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T003000Z
DTEND:20260707T005500Z
SUMMARY:Morning Break
DESCRIPTION:
CATEGORIES:BREAKS
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:b47750db148d152f21ea16090ed22ba1
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/b47750db148d152f21ea16090ed22ba1
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T010000Z
DTEND:20260707T015500Z
SUMMARY:First-Person Authority is Pluralistically Justified
DESCRIPTION:“First-person authority” refers\, roughly\, to the deference that we owe one another’s self-ascriptions of mental states in ordinary contexts. What justifies this deference? Here I argue for a pluralistic answer. I argue\, first\, that the hearer of a self-ascription is justified in deferring to the speaker&nbsp\;in part&nbsp\;because the speaker&nbsp\;expresses&nbsp\;her&nbsp\;attitude&nbsp\;to the hearer&nbsp\;by self-ascribing it\, and&nbsp\;in part because the hearer&nbsp\;inferentially determines the&nbsp\;content of the attitude expressed by the speaker. I argue\, second\, that the hearer is justified in deferring to the self-ascriptions of young children because those children thereby express their mental states\, whereas the hearer is justified in deferring to at least some self-ascriptions of older people because hearers recognize that more mature cognizers have the authority to self-determine at least some of their mental states through reflective reasoning. I argue\, third\, that an agent’s justification to regard&nbsp\;her own&nbsp\;self-ascription as first-person authoritative differs from the justification that others have to regard her self-ascription as such\, and that this makes a difference for navigating contexts where one’s first-person authority is challenged.
CATEGORIES:EPISTEMOLOGY
LOCATION:GCI-275 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:8ee2707402a98f7e35085e12614d0d06
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/8ee2707402a98f7e35085e12614d0d06
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T010000Z
DTEND:20260707T015500Z
SUMMARY:On Cultivating Responsible Reciprocity in Classrooms: Educational Implications of Kantian Constructivism
DESCRIPTION:Kantian constructivism (KC) highlights the sociopolitical dimension of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy. While there is extensive literature on KC\, its educational implications remain understudied. In this paper\, I posit the cultivation of responsible reciprocity (RR) among teachers and students in classrooms as the foremost educational implication of KC. By focusing on Kant’s On Education (2003) and Critique of the Power of Judgment (2000)\, and Christine Korsgaard’s Creating the Kingdom of Ends (1996)\, I clarify why the cultivation of RR is the foremost educational implication of KC and how RR can be manifest in classrooms. I underpin the sociopolitical dimension of Kant’s idea of Kingdom of Ends in the context of education by highlighting Korsgaard’s notion of RR vis-à-vis Kant’s three rules for thinking: think for oneself\, think in the place of every other\, and think universally. I argue that education institutions must recognize that people can think for themselves and with each other and that such institutions must provide spaces where people can realize their capacity for thinking. I conclude that settings as small – but as fundamental – as classrooms must empower teachers and students not only to think for oneself but also to think with each other\, and ultimately\, cultivate RR.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:GCI-273 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:bfa48b37adc4bf423f833a53243a1291
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/bfa48b37adc4bf423f833a53243a1291
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T010000Z
DTEND:20260707T015500Z
SUMMARY:The Duty to Provide Moral Repair to Lab Technicians
DESCRIPTION:Animal laboratory technicians (henceforth lab technicians) are at risk of sustaining moral injuries when complicit in unethical experiments. Prima facie\, it would be puzzling to offer the perpetrator of an unethical experiment psychological support in the form of moral repair. However\, we argue that lab technicians are owed moral repair as a special case of our proposed duty of special concern. The duty of special concern states that special consideration must be given to the wellbeing of those who undertake substantial risks for the benefit of others. We make sense of the substantial risk of moral concern lab technicians face by drawing on Rawls’ notion of imperfect procedures of justice. Imperfect procedures of justice are those that aim for just outcomes\, but procedures do not guarantee those outcomes. Animal experimentation belongs to this category\, as it aims for only ethically permissible experiments to be conducted\, yet this is not guaranteed by the procedures that determine which experiments are approved. The risk of moral injury falls heavily on lab technicians as they are charged with undertaking an unethical experiment. Hence\, we make sense of the otherwise puzzling intuition that lab technicians have conducted an unethical experiment\, yet are owed psychological support.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:2cce65bb39e016dd59172def348e3283
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/2cce65bb39e016dd59172def348e3283
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T010000Z
DTEND:20260707T015500Z
SUMMARY:Autonomy and Gendering in Childhood
DESCRIPTION:Supporting the development of children’s autonomy is widely recognized as a fundamental good. Despite this\, social practices that reflect and reinforce patriarchal gender norms are ubiquitous. These norms\, however\, curtail the development and exercise of children’s autonomy by constraining their opportunities along gendered lines and promoting falsehoods about ‘natural’ identity expression. In recognition of these limitations\, many parents across the political spectrum are pushing back against patriarchal gender norms in their parenting approaches. One particular model that aims to fully embrace a progressive parenting methodology is the “gender-open” model of parenting (GOP). Broadly\, the GOP methodology involves withholding disclosure of a child’s biological sex as assigned at birth from public knowledge. With the necessary support\, this approach aims to encourage children to choose their own gender in their own time. Advocates of this model claim that adopting the GOP ensures a child’s autonomy in self-expression. However\, despite these claims\, none of the advocates clearly articulates how the model promotes children’s autonomy. My aim in this paper is to demonstrate how the GOP protects and promotes children’s autonomy in robust ways\, making a strong case for its adoption.
CATEGORIES:FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-206\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:2d87d450066428d293c2cda02b472604
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/2d87d450066428d293c2cda02b472604
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T010000Z
DTEND:20260707T015500Z
SUMMARY:Reopening the Dutch Book
DESCRIPTION:Probabilism is the thesis that the degrees of belief of rational agents behave like mathematical probabilities. There are quite different lines of argument for probabilism in the literature\, including dutch book arguments\, arguments based on representation theorems (which concern the representation of preference orderings by assignments of numerical utilities and degrees of belief) and epistemic utility (in particular\, accuracy) arguments. This paper focusses on the dutch book line of argument. My aim is to develop a better version of the argument that avoids problems faced by previous versions -- and then show that it still fails to establish probabilism. The upshot is that ultimately the dutch book line of argument is not a viable route to probabilism -- but does lead nonetheless to a weaker yet still substantive conclusion.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-315\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:2d5197eb87080cacf79b879304304918
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/2d5197eb87080cacf79b879304304918
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T010000Z
DTEND:20260707T015500Z
SUMMARY:Unsung Virtues
DESCRIPTION:Presentism is often seen as the simplest most intuitive ontology of time\, yet direct comparisons between presentism and eternalism based on simplicity are limited. Philosophical consensus holds that presentism is quantitatively parsimonious but qualitatively identical to eternalism. Presentists also risk introducing qualitative and scientific/structural extravagance in addressing standard objections.\n\nThis paper defends presentism on all fronts – quantitative\, qualitative\, and structural. I\, first\, examine arguments extolling quantitative parsimony as incidentally virtuous but not inherently virtuous. I propose\, instead\, a ‘Principle of Sufficient Explanation\,’ where inclusion of any explanans must be justified\, undermining the traditional quantitative-qualitative asymmetry.\n\nI\, then\, argue accepting qualitative equivalence between presentism and eternalism concedes the latter’s truth. Instead\, presentists should assert that non-present objects are fundamentally different from present ones by undermining space-time analogies and accusing eternalists of inexcuably gerrymandering qualitative categories. Furthermore\, I bypass any extravagance introduced by presentist solutions to semantic objections\, defending a novel justification of ‘ontological cheating’ grounding truth not in being but in what statements are 'about'.\n\nFinally\, I address objections from special relativity\, arguing that any structural bloat introduced by presentism in this regard is either subject to uncertain future empirical investigation\, justified metaphysically\, or simply a descriptive theoretical artefact.
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:Steele-237\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:380beb0a7ac755778531f8c802993919
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/380beb0a7ac755778531f8c802993919
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T010000Z
DTEND:20260707T015500Z
SUMMARY:Izydora Dąmbska and Maria Kokoszyńska on Truth
DESCRIPTION:Izydora Dąmbska and Maria Kokoszyńska may be listed among the most accomplished philosophers of twentieth century philosophy. Despite this\, their work has been largely underappreciated\, especially by truth-theorists working in the Anglo-American analytic tradition. I seek to rectify this injustice by showing how their ideas represent an important innovation in truth-theory. Izydora Dąmbska has argued that the concept of truth does not boil down to a choice between different theories of truth\, i.e.\, correspondence\, coherence\, or pragmatic. Her reason for holding this position is that linguistic concepts\, such as truth\, cannot escape the confines of language. For Dąmbska\, the concept of truth cannot be primitive since it is inextricable from language. We must\, she says\, return to the “epistemological issue of the definition of truth” (2015\, p. 146). Maria Kokoszyńska’s two-fold attack against truth relativism\, which is an amplification and formalisation of Twardowski’s argument in “On So-Called Relative Truth” (1901)\, serves as an epistemological foundation for a theory of truth. Using Kokoszyńska’s argument from illusion and argument for a principle of charity\, I show how Dąmbska and Kokoszyńska’s work suggest a way forward for functionalism about truth.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
LOCATION:Steele-314\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:e55d47de13b9115b1ca6bebde7ed5c1a
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/e55d47de13b9115b1ca6bebde7ed5c1a
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T010000Z
DTEND:20260707T015500Z
SUMMARY:Proportionality Contextualized
DESCRIPTION:I propose a contextualized conception of proportionality\, which requires bringing the concrete context of answering/raising a particular causal inference question into the picture when assessing proportionality. So\, the new formula is this: a cause-variable C is proportional to an effect-variable E relative to a given context T. This conception is bolstered by a brief exposition of recent scientific practice in causal feature learning. Moreover\, it gets further support by showing how it readily and elegantly resolves a threat posed by Franklin-Hall (2016).
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
LOCATION:Steele-320\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:73607894c10131754d405534b0733a44
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/73607894c10131754d405534b0733a44
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T020000Z
DTEND:20260707T025500Z
SUMMARY:Absolute Knowledge
DESCRIPTION:Skeptical invariantists say that “know” refers to a very demanding epistemic relation – call it “absolute knowledge.” Standard invariantists say that “know” refers to a much less demanding epistemic relation – call it “standard knowledge.” Suppose that standard invariantists are right. Suppose also that standard knowledge (i) helps to causally explain behavior and (ii) sets one important kind of normative bar for assertions and actions\, just as many standard invariantists think. Does this mean that absolute knowledge is of little epistemological interest? I think not. I will suggest that even given these assumptions\, absolute knowledge would still (iii) play a different but powerful role in causally explaining behavior and (iv) set another important kind of normative bar for assertions and actions.
CATEGORIES:EPISTEMOLOGY
LOCATION:GCI-275 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:60a40473f7573ef633e9a64484ab6b2f
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/60a40473f7573ef633e9a64484ab6b2f
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T020000Z
DTEND:20260707T025500Z
SUMMARY:Blame's Democratic Virtues
DESCRIPTION:Communicative-functional accounts of blame are gaining in popularity. Several of these accounts hold that blame plays a significant role in influencing moral norms (e.g. Fricker\, 2016). In response\, some have raised what I call the ‘might-makes-right’ worry: what if blame pushes us towards bad moral norms? Blame’s often angry\, spontaneous\, reactive nature might make it seem likely to push us towards accepting oppressive (or otherwise problematic) norms.\nIn this paper I provide some reasons for optimism in the face of this worry. I provide reasons to think that blame generally guides us towards the right moral norms. First\, blame’s motivational trajectory—including strong emotions like resentment and guilt—brings unique\, underappreciated benefits. Second\, insofar as blame empowers agents to influence moral norms\, some of blame’s properties naturally distribute this power. This second set of reasons parallels some justifications for democracy in political philosophy\, hence the title. Finally\, I review the limits of my proposed optimism\, pointing out ways that things can still go wrong that warrant vigilance going forward.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:5fcb4600fe9e3aa9d372dc730f642278
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/5fcb4600fe9e3aa9d372dc730f642278
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T020000Z
DTEND:20260707T025500Z
SUMMARY:Consequentialist Considerations\, and What Moral Philosophy is For
DESCRIPTION:Many of us – ordinary people and moral philosophers alike – sound very much like rule-consequentialists. We are willing to revise and refine the rules that we endorse\, the institutions that we embrace\, the virtues that we espouse\, and vices that we deplore\; moreover\, we believe – quite rightly – in doing so in light of the consequences that such things produce. But of course if we think that consequences are so important\, shouldn’t we simply be an act-consequentialists instead? In this paper I will be pointing out the curious sense in which act-consequentialists are deeply untrustworthy\; recognising the practical wisdom imbedded in various established rules\, practices\, institutions\, virtues and attitudes\; and generally trying to show how to avoid sliding down the notorious slippery slope that can lead to a collapse into act-consequentialism. While it can be tempting to think that moral philosophy is largely concerned with devising an ideal procedure for decision-making\, my suggestion is that it should also be focussed – perhaps amongst other things – on articulating a shareable ethos\, on the cultivation of certain feelings and emotions\, on the development of virtuous and flourishing human beings\, and on defending – via consequentialist reasons – the prioritisation of various agent-relative obligations over impartial obligations.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:GCI-273 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:2cf39f7f5cdcf7b0d0a285b132551f9c
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/2cf39f7f5cdcf7b0d0a285b132551f9c
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T020000Z
DTEND:20260707T025500Z
SUMMARY:Distrust-Based Oppressive Double Binds
DESCRIPTION:Oppressive double binds are those situations where\, due to oppressive forces\, no matter what choice the oppressed person makes\, they contribute to their own oppression. Present and historical patterns of discrimination often give rise to dilemmas around distrust which I argue can best be described as distrust-based oppressive double binds.\n\nOn one hand\, for members of oppressed groups\, it often seems that distrusting others is justified\, because unjustified trust can be harmful. On the other hand\, however\, persistent distrust of others is also burdensome for the person who is distrusting. This means that\, whether the distrusting person acts on their distrust or chooses to rely on the distrusted person anyway\, they open themselves up to unjust burdens or harms and contribute in some small way to their own oppression.\n\nAfter establishing this concept\, I argue that viewing certain common patterns of distrust among oppressed groups through this lens allows members of oppressed groups to better understand and resist their oppression\, illustrates one of the mechanisms through which justified distrust can lead to unjustified distrust\, and helps us understand how we can reduce some forms of distrust and when we should focus on others becoming more trustworthy instead.
CATEGORIES:FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-206\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:934d25688d97780a07ec4917f06a74b0
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/934d25688d97780a07ec4917f06a74b0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T020000Z
DTEND:20260707T025500Z
SUMMARY:Curry's Paradox Forever: A Critical Re-evaluation
DESCRIPTION:It has long been observed that many bad logical results—especially Curry's paradox—rely on a rule called contraction. Logics without contraction thus point in a more promising direction. But it has also been observed\, for almost as long\, that paradoxes are very resilient\; each step down the non-contractive path neutralises one variant of the paradox only for a new\, more terrible one to appear. After sketching the basics\, I will review a few of these successive problems\, including some very recent. Does this story show we been running around putting out fires\, instead of getting to grips with what is really going on? Or are we closing in on the true source of the problem\, approaching an Ultimate Curry? The goal is to get a higher-level view.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-315\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:71bdedf7274e7a6da3997531c99c5988
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/71bdedf7274e7a6da3997531c99c5988
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T020000Z
DTEND:20260707T025500Z
SUMMARY:Bachelard's Critique of Bergson
DESCRIPTION:Much of my recent research has centred on the polemic between Henri Bergson and Gaston Bachelard. In particular\, I have focused on the notions of continuity and discontinuity within the two philosopher’s work. I have found that recent Bergsonian scholarship has\, at times\, dismissed Bachelard uncharitably. I ask\, however\, whether such a hasty dismissal of Bachelard is necessary\, let alone justified. My argument is that Bachelard understood Bergson’s work at a depth greater than what he is often credited\, and therefore\, he provides a critique that warrants a deeper level of engagement from Bergsonians in return. My aim here is not to discredit Bergson so much as it is to develop an interpretation of Bergson that has sincerely engaged with Bachelard’s novel and insightful critique.\n\nBoth philosophers present compelling philosophies of temporality that\, at the very least\, generate an interesting polemic. At most however\, I have found that a sincere engagement with the tension found in their opposition has led to a deeper appreciation of both. Personally\, I have not concluded my research and my ultimate position on the matter remains indefinite. That being said\, I am certain that Bergsonian scholars will benefit from an encounter with Bachelard’s critique.
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:Steele-237\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:a9b518c315ae5c03572ed50c0b4266e1
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/a9b518c315ae5c03572ed50c0b4266e1
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T020000Z
DTEND:20260707T025500Z
SUMMARY:Cooperating in truth and deception: the case of Would I Lie to You?
DESCRIPTION:According to Grice’s Cooperative Principle (CP) and maxim of Quality\, it is rational to presume our interlocutors are being truthful\, or at least\, are trying to be truthful during conversation. However\, I argue that presuming the truthfulness of an interlocutor\, i.e the maxim of Quality holds\, is not necessary for the CP to be operative. More generally\, I argue that the CP and Grice’s conversational maxims come apart\; a common misunderstanding is to take the conversational maxims as part of what it means to be cooperative\, but Grice’s maxims are only generated by specifying the goal of conversation as the maximal exchange of information in conjunction with the CP. The second aim of my paper is to analyse a conversational context where the goal is not the maximal exchange of information: the British comedy panel show Would I Lie to You?\, where panellists are "cross-examined" and tasked to deceive each other. I argue that it is rational to presume that one’s interlocutor is both trying to deceive and trying to be truthful in the show’s context\, as part of what it means to uphold cooperativity.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
LOCATION:Steele-314\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:81087eabc5d81695784236458a7bd256
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/81087eabc5d81695784236458a7bd256
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T020000Z
DTEND:20260707T025500Z
SUMMARY:Criticality: how Dennett’s ‘practical free will’ can be improved.
DESCRIPTION:Daniel Dennett was a compatibilist. He attempted to carve some elbow room for freedom of decision-making by inserting some indeterminism in his ‘practical free will’ model. The purpose of inserting indeterminism in decision-making processes was to break the causal chain of hard determinism and to provide a source for novelty not already implicit in past events. This would explain creativity and also allow for indeterminism required for free will. However\, he falls short of allowing indeterminism to break the causal chain and accepting that free will could reconnect it with novel links. The ‘practical free will’\, he says\, ‘installs indeterminism in the right place for the libertarian\, if there is a right place at all’. This cautious acceptance of indeterminism in causal chains did not succeed\, because it was randomness that he was inserting\, not indeterminism of well-defined alternatives. I will demonstrate a form of indeterminism based on the instability and criticality of some physical states\, which offers well-defined alternatives in the physical world at the classical (not quantum) level. This form of indeterminism fits perfectly into causal chains and opens the door to reconciling libertarian free will with the physicalism of the world more elegantly than Dennett's model.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
LOCATION:Steele-262\, 3 Staff House Rd\, University of Queensland\, St Lucia QLD 4067
SEQUENCE:0
UID:86820c788db928bc989272d839af789b
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/86820c788db928bc989272d839af789b
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T020000Z
DTEND:20260707T025500Z
SUMMARY:Compulsory Trusts as a Model for Consumer Data Ownership
DESCRIPTION:My PhD research has been focussed on addressing the problems associated with what Sarah Myers West terms ""data capitalism"" through experiments in the two forms of political economy endorsed by John Rawls – Property-Owning Democracy or a Liberal Socialism. This paper will focus on the solution I offer for the licensing rights over what I term ‘consumer data\,’ a solution\, I contend\, which will provide citizens with an experiment in Property-Owning Democracy\n\nI will first offer a definition of ‘consumer data’ and Property-Owning Democracy. I will then detail my proposal for a system of compulsory trusts which manage the licensing rights over consumer data. Finally\, I will consider some of the major issues that may arise from the scheme\, and some potential objections to the scheme.
CATEGORIES:POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-309\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:18fefdbc38d20fd1e3b1ce0e6041d5cf
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/18fefdbc38d20fd1e3b1ce0e6041d5cf
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T030000Z
DTEND:20260707T035500Z
SUMMARY:Lunch
DESCRIPTION:Lunch Break&nbsp\;
CATEGORIES:BREAKS
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:e94cdd30cfdeaa1760d3cecb86348d73
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/e94cdd30cfdeaa1760d3cecb86348d73
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T040000Z
DTEND:20260707T045500Z
SUMMARY:Moral Fetishism and Right-Making-Features Desires
DESCRIPTION:In metaethics\, it is widely held—following Smith (1994)—that only de re desires (wanting to perform a particular act which happens to be right) are praiseworthy\, whereas de dicto desires (wanting to do whatever is right) are fetishistic. In this paper\, I argue that moral fetishism extends equally to what I call “right-making-feature desires\,” i.e. wanting to perform an act insofar as it instantiates its right-making feature. If either class were exempt\, the very notion of fetishism would collapse. Drawing on two parallel thought experiments\, I show that both de dicto and right-making-feature motivations sever the agent from the act qua token\, thus lacking genuine praiseworthiness. Two implications follow. First\, proponents of the right-making features view of moral worth cannot appeal to fetishism to support their view\, since right-making-feature desires are themselves fetishistic. Second\, deontic buck-passing accounts fail to explain our intuition about moral fetishism\, because right-making-feature desires already respond to the genuine reason for action yet remain unworthy of praise. By refining the taxonomy of moral motivation\, this analysis constrains viable accounts of moral worth.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:d1a167a3652b034ca713933d9d970d70
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/d1a167a3652b034ca713933d9d970d70
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T040000Z
DTEND:20260707T045500Z
SUMMARY:"How to Make Gravy" Or\, Making Sense of Blended-Family Bereavement
DESCRIPTION:Bereavement is part of the human condition\, and so it is unsurprising to find an array of generic social scripts which operate to scaffold interactions with the bereaved. They are generic in that we will all lose parents and friends\, and many of us will lose siblings\, partners\, or children. Each script supposes a gravity of loss that in turn translates to a ‘space’ for grieving and delimits requirements in caring for the bereaved. But human relationships are complex and exceed these generic formulations. There are more ways to ‘relate’ to others outside a bionormative schema\, yet we lack widely disseminated and embedded social scripts to work through the impact of these poorly recognised losses. In this paper\, I analyse my own bereavement journey since the sudden death of my ex-step-father in 2013. I explore the impact and implications of grieving without a social script to guide me (and those around me)\, the meaning-making journey I have embarked upon to process this loss\, and the central place that ‘recognition’ has occupied therein. In addition to demonstrating a need for more nuanced social scripts to deal with varied forms of bereavement\, I critique the ongoing social centring of bio- and cis-hetero-normative familial relationships in life which is a precursor to misjudging the depth of blended-family (and chosen-family) loss.
CATEGORIES:FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-206\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:f9d5aa685edcffd6ce05d9d976e9387f
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/f9d5aa685edcffd6ce05d9d976e9387f
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T040000Z
DTEND:20260707T045500Z
SUMMARY:Towards a Taxonomy of Logical Positions
DESCRIPTION:You might endorse one of the following positions regarding the number of correct logics: either there are no correct logics (logical nihilism)\, one correct logic (logical monism) or there are multiple correct logics (logical pluralism). While not technically wrong\, this taxonomy is too coarse-grained. This tripartite split skirts a number of important distinctions that in fact lead to significantly diverging views\, concerning for example the generality of logical laws and what it means for a logic to be ‘correct’. Many of these views have been defended\, more or less\, throughout the logical literature. However\, few writers have taken it upon themselves to taxonomize the positions in a way that highlights the interesting choice points and where they lead. In this talk I attempt to do just that. Rather than argue for a certain view\, my aim is to illuminate the commitments involved in endorsing any one position. I will end by considering a potential issue that arises when the logical pluralist is held to this higher demand for precision.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-315\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:b1bfb7c5f8797097f00e116cd9c1a675
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/b1bfb7c5f8797097f00e116cd9c1a675
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T040000Z
DTEND:20260707T045500Z
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Makes No Progress (and that's a Good Thing)
DESCRIPTION:Science makes progress in a way that metaphysics seems not to. From Locke\, Hume\, and Kant through logical positivists and deconstructionists and down to (for example) David Lewis\, Amy Thomasson\, Mark Balaguer\, John Heil and hundreds of others\, philosophers have written engagingly about "progress" in philosophy. Some have concluded that it is time to give up even trying to answer metaphysical questions. I will suggest that Balaguer is right to think that it is prudent to rely on only a very "thin" metaphysics for practical purposes\; but also that Heil is right in maintaining that giving up on metaphysics is not an option. I will also try to give a more positive spin to the whole business. There is a reason why answers to metaphysical questions cannot be proved correct\; and there are also reasons why this is a good thing\, and why this provides a reason for doing metaphysics rather than abandoning it.
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:GCI-273 - In Person\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:dc449eb3bb1253acb1ae9bd27cbbbe8d
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/dc449eb3bb1253acb1ae9bd27cbbbe8d
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T040000Z
DTEND:20260707T045500Z
SUMMARY:A New Defense of Old-School Conceptual Analysis
DESCRIPTION:Traditional conceptual analysis aims at reaching reductive definitions of properties or relations (e.g. goodness) by investigating the conceptual meanings of natural language terms (e.g. 'good'). This project stands largely in disrepute today following the development of semantic externalism ("meaning ain't in the head") and the popular appeal of the Millian view that the meaning of a referring term is just its reference. I propose a way of reconciling traditional (non-Canberra) conceptual analysis with Millianism specifically for property-predicating terms like 'good'\, drawing on the ideology that the mark of the mental is intentionality (Brentano). Our concept of a thing (or its cognitive significance) just is an individuating property of that thing. In the case of entity- or substance-referring terms like 'Aristotle' and 'water'\, our concept must be distinct from the meaning or reference. But in the case of property-predicating terms like 'good' there is another\, direct option: our concept may just be the property itself. In this case\, conceptual analysis is metaphysical reduction.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
LOCATION:Steele-314\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:8742685e7161d13f18de1e017e9c8a67
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/8742685e7161d13f18de1e017e9c8a67
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T040000Z
DTEND:20260707T045500Z
SUMMARY:A Galilean Physicalist Account of Ineffability
DESCRIPTION:Ineffability is widely regarded as one of the key features of subjective phenomenal experience by both physicalists and non-physicalists. The idea is that such experience\, often conceptualized in terms of qualia\, is not expressible in terms of public language\, and thus scientific investigation can only target the objective\, public aspects of the world and not such subjective aspects. Physicalists typically employ accounts under the umbrella term “phenomenal concept strategy” to explain this ineffability\; yet\, the resulting idea about the relationship between phenomenal and theoretical concepts appears incomplete\, as it leads to the implausible consequence that phenomenal information is completely isolated and practically useless. Here\, I propose a new account of phenomenal ineffability and phenomenal concepts that clarifies these issues while offering a deflationary reconstruction. Drawing on the Enlightenment distinction between primary\, secondary\, and tertiary qualities in a non-literal way\, this account explains why certain phenomenal concepts remain untranslatable into theoretical concepts\, and vice versa.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
LOCATION:Steele-262\, 3 Staff House Rd\, University of Queensland\, St Lucia QLD 4067
SEQUENCE:0
UID:f0b3c86e2ffad5287ba348c1cf797fab
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/f0b3c86e2ffad5287ba348c1cf797fab
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T040000Z
DTEND:20260707T045500Z
SUMMARY:Assessing the Bayesian Picture of Scientific Advice
DESCRIPTION:Richard Jeffrey (1956) famously articulated an internal critique to the argument from inductive risk (AIR) and offered an alternative picture of scientific advice\, which we call “the Bayesian picture of scientific advice” (BPSA) with two essential commitments: scientists should only communicate their subjective probabilities (vs. outright beliefs) in hypotheses and doing so upholds a political division of labour (i.e.\, scientists bring the epistemic input\; policy-makers bring the evaluative judgments).\n\nWe argue that communicating credences doesn’t deliver the division of labour—the idea that such a prize is secured in the Bayesian picture is an artifact of the idealizations behind the debate around the AIR. Basically: scientists’ role in policy advice goes well beyond reporting credences (or outright beliefs for that matter) for a hypotheses previously specified by policy makers. Scientists are necessarily involved in the framing of policy (decision) problems\, i.e.\, in the curation of the policy actions\, the states-of-nature\, and outcomes that are worth considering. (They are even needed to come up with utility numbers!) This is easy to see when looking at well-studied cases of scientific advice such as large-scale environmental assessments—we focus on the IPCC reports in the talk—but the point generalizes.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
LOCATION:Steele-320\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:b00708f37d57492b498eeaa0d833699e
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/b00708f37d57492b498eeaa0d833699e
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T050000Z
DTEND:20260707T055500Z
SUMMARY:Moral Authority and Ethical Expertise: Towards a Meaningful Distinction
DESCRIPTION:There is a longstanding debate within applied ethics about the possibility of ethical expertise. Peter Singer and Paulina Sliwa\, among others\, have argued that the content-knowledge of moral philosophers gives them ethical expertise and thereby moral authority. &nbsp\;Bernard Williams\, Raimond Gaita and others\, in contrast\, contend that moral authority is not derived from content-knowledge and that there is no such thing as an ethical expert. However\, in this debate the concept of “moral authority” is often left underexamined. It is sometimes assumed as a synonymous with ethical expert or an as attribute that the expert has by virtue of being an expert. This paper examines what moral authority is and argues that maintaining a distinction between expertise and authority is not only important for understanding what ethics is but is useful for setting the parameters for what applied ethics and ethicists do. &nbsp\;
CATEGORIES:BIOETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-314\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:01f40e4eab8b6cf7f0cb361af6621ea3
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/01f40e4eab8b6cf7f0cb361af6621ea3
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T050000Z
DTEND:20260707T055500Z
SUMMARY:Indigenous and Non-Western Feminist Storywork that Responds to Liberal Feminism
DESCRIPTION:This paper is a philosophical examination of two narratives devised to invite social change (‘storyworks’\; Archibald 2008). The first recounts key episodes of the life of Helen Vai’i Gorogo\, a Doura woman from Papua New Guinea who experienced forced marriage and domestic violence before achieving community leadership. The second retraces Bhanu Bhatia and her sister-in-law’s shared exile from India to Australia. According to an interpretation derived from liberal feminism\, both narratives depict how gender\, kinship\, and neoliberalism can conspire to reinforce patriarchal structures that exclude girls and women from the networks of social power. However\, drawing on works published by Archibald (2008)\, Simpson (2017)\, Moreton-Robinson (2000\, 2015)\, Shiva and Mies (2014)\, and Sreekumar (2022)\, we deploy autoethnographic and Indigenous epistemologies that challenge the reductionism of the liberal-feminist interpretation. The paper critiques liberal (non-Indigenous) feminism for (i) its inability to account for the moral and emotional creativity of the protagonists and (ii) its own historical complicity with colonialism. In centring philosophical examination on lived experiences\, the paper highlights storywork as a transformative philosophical methodology for reimagining justice and belonging in the struggle experienced by Indigenous and non-Western women.
CATEGORIES:ENABLING DIVERSE KNOWLEDGES
LOCATION:GCI-273 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:8cf8dfbe170836f34a093d6990d7c7dd
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/8cf8dfbe170836f34a093d6990d7c7dd
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T050000Z
DTEND:20260707T055500Z
SUMMARY:Enough with Ethics! Legitimacy's Centrality in Everyday Human Life
DESCRIPTION:A concept widely employed in legal and political contexts\, ‘legitimacy’ can seem less applicable to everyday human activities. I argue this is a profound mistake. Many of the same factors that drive recourse to legitimacy in legal and political contexts also apply in—and fundamentally shape—everyday interpersonal\, relational and organisational life. These factors include moral pluralism\, epistemic fallibilism\, policy ambiguity\, collective action challenges\, the significance of established expectations and social norms\, and worries about moral authority. Moreover\, many of the same devices that work at the political level to deliver legitimacy—procedural fairness\, deliberative justice\, due process\, transparency\, tolerance\, consent\, pro tem decisions—can be (and often are) used mutatis mutandis to achieve acceptance in interpersonal\, relational and organisational contexts. Being blind to the significance of legitimacy in ordinary life sets the stage for serious moral mistakes\, in particular\, mistakes driven by a lack of reciprocal respect for others as ethical and epistemic agents.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:abd04d141188d6af6382d993cd29ffa4
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/abd04d141188d6af6382d993cd29ffa4
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T050000Z
DTEND:20260707T055500Z
SUMMARY:Logic for Virtual Worlds
DESCRIPTION:In the second half of ``Two Dogmas"\, Quine argued that there could be empirical grounds to revise logic - at least in principle. Since then the most (though still not very) popular proposal for what those empirical grounds might actually be has involved quantum mechanics. Still\, most logicians seem to think that quantum mechanics does not give us good enough reason for revision. This paper considers and evaluates an alternative proposal for what those grounds might look like and the logic they would support: perhaps the experiences acquired in virtual reality give us reason to adopt an assessment-sensitive logic.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:GCI-275 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:b90ab89cd292906dffcb75cacc2c6747
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/b90ab89cd292906dffcb75cacc2c6747
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T050000Z
DTEND:20260707T055500Z
SUMMARY:The Anatomy of Privacy
DESCRIPTION:In our current digital technological age\, it is said that our privacy matters more than ever. But despite no shortage of scholarly attention to the topic\, we lack a comprehensive theory of what privacy is\, why it matters\, and when it matters. Privacy scholars are not shy about this state of affairs\; in their view\, our understanding of privacy is ""in disarray""\, ""intractably vague""\, ""a quagmire""\, and so on.\n\nIn this talk\, I argue that the difficulty of understanding privacy lies in how information flows --- personal or otherwise --- generate complex interactions in social settings. Using formal methods from complexity theory\, I present a model of privacy in terms networked flows of normatively relevant personal information. This model brings basic questions of privacy into clearer focus. We see that privacy\, understood as normatively appropriate personal information flows\, matter because of how they affect people's abilities in ways that are normatively relevant. Importantly\, we see that these abilities interact in ways that cannot be reduced to pairwise interactions\, thus creating a problem of what I call Normative Complexity.\n\nFrom this vantage point\, the challenge of understanding privacy becomes tractable\, though formidable. A comprehensive theory must allow us to describe how flows of personal information modulate the abilities of people interacting in a given setting. It should provide a way to normatively assess such patterns of personal information flow. And it should help guide us in arranging our social norms\, technologies\, and environments in terms of their privacy implications. The account I offer provides a foundation for this more comprehensive and systematic approach to understanding what privacy is\, why it matters\, and how it matters --- indeed\, it seems\, more than ever.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-315\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:fbd2a6cdd4f9a897294226b17e05297b
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/fbd2a6cdd4f9a897294226b17e05297b
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T050000Z
DTEND:20260707T055500Z
SUMMARY:Chances Are...
DESCRIPTION:Various philosophers have thought that the propensity interpretation of probability faces fatal objections. They include: “Propensities are mysterious.” “We don’t know how propensities behave.” “We do know that they don’t obey the probability calculus.” “Propensities are not Humean supervenient.” And “propensities do not vindicate the Principal Principle” (Lewis’s bridge principle between chances and rational credences).\n\nI will revive the propensity interpretation. In a slogan: chances measure graded dispositions. More carefully\, conditional chances measure graded dispositions to produce given outcomes\, conditional on specifications of physical situations. Comparative dispositions are entirely familiar. My wine glass is more fragile than my beer mug\; salt is more soluble than plastic. And I argue that we can get from comparative dispositions to numerical propensities that obey the probability calculus\, answering all of the objections above (and more). Reports of the death of the propensity interpretation have been greatly exaggerated.
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:Steele-237\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:ff1ce06360d8c01f941e74b924ee680b
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/ff1ce06360d8c01f941e74b924ee680b
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T050000Z
DTEND:20260707T055500Z
SUMMARY:Philosophers\, Autistics\, and Three-Year Olds
DESCRIPTION:In the Sally-Anne false belief task (Wimmer & Perner 1983)\, autistics and three year-olds ascribe beliefs to others based on their own knowledge of the truth rather than on the other person's justified beliefs. This phenomenon is known as the "reality bias" or "curse of knowledge." I suggest that several famous philosophical puzzles arise from the same intuition\, that is the theorist's knowledge of how the world really is (eg Gettier). For Donnellan (1974) the semantics of language may only be given from the "outside" by the "omniscient observer of history" and Kripke's puzzle cases of naming arise from "ignorance and error" on the part of a subect. Burge (1988) says “We take up a perspective on ourselves from the outside” and Kaplan (2012) says that the theorist “surveys another’s thought” from a point of view “independent of whether the subject’s thought corresponds to reality.” That is\, philosophers make the same mistake that children grow out of by the age of four. Chomsky (1962) warns “Reliance on the reader’s intelligence is so commonplace that its significance may be easily overlooked” and Fodor suggests “The question is not what is obvious to the theorist\; the question is what follows from the theory.”
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
LOCATION:Steele-262\, 3 Staff House Rd\, University of Queensland\, St Lucia QLD 4067
SEQUENCE:0
UID:9e4994c12f11cbca19610c69f99b4729
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/9e4994c12f11cbca19610c69f99b4729
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T050000Z
DTEND:20260707T055500Z
SUMMARY:Animal Consciousness: Inventing the Ill Defined
DESCRIPTION:The distribution question about animal consciousness concerns which animal species are conscious. Philosophers and scientists alike have been hung up on the idea that we must first define consciousness if this question is to be answered. Examples in the history of science suggest\, however\, that this may put the conceptual cart before the empirical horse. Inspired by Hasok Chang's work on inventing temperature\, I will argue that answering the distribution question requires the invention of better measures before a good enough theory to support a consensus definition can be developed. To this end\, I will extend the ""signature approach"" to comparative animal cognition\, developed by Alex Taylor\, Amalia Bastos\, Rachael Brown and myself. The signature approach applied to comparative studies of animal consciousness shares some affinities with ""marker"" approaches to animal consciousness offered recently by philosophers including Jonathan Birch\, Kristin Andrews\, and Albert Newen. But whereas marker approaches seek to build dimensional profiles of different species according to the degree to which they display various capacities thought to be related to consciousness\, the signature approach is better suited to developing reliable measures that support detailed comparisons of the processes underlying these capacities\, and ultimately better theories.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
LOCATION:Steele-320\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:11ac22a51d5f9316ee0ed8396eae2b5b
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/11ac22a51d5f9316ee0ed8396eae2b5b
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T060000Z
DTEND:20260707T062500Z
SUMMARY:Afternoon Break
DESCRIPTION:
CATEGORIES:BREAKS
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:6a342ca7358a5b5cba6cf32e893702c8
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/6a342ca7358a5b5cba6cf32e893702c8
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T063000Z
DTEND:20260707T075500Z
SUMMARY:Grasping at GA_Ps
DESCRIPTION:Few philosophers nowadays doubt the existence and significance of a persistent ‘explanatory gap’ in our understanding of the nature of conscious experiences and their &nbsp\;relation to the material world. Contemporary concerns about the explanatory gap have &nbsp\;their roots in Saul Kripke’s 1972 argument against the mind–brain identity theory: if&nbsp\;a is &nbsp\;identical with&nbsp\;b\, then there is no world at which&nbsp\;a fails to be identical with&nbsp\;b\; as &nbsp\;Descartes showed\, however\, it is conceivable for minds to exist in the absence of &nbsp\;material bodies\; so\, Kripke concluded\, minds cannot be identified with material bodies or their parts. In 1983 Joseph Levine argued that\, although Kripke’s original argument &nbsp\;falls short of establishing that minds are distinct from material bodies\, the argument has &nbsp\;an epistemological counterpart. The disparate character of conscious qualities and &nbsp\;qualities of material bodies creates an impeneratrable barrier to our understanding how &nbsp\;the mental could be identified with the physical. This\, and other\, expressly &nbsp\;epistemological arguments have subsequently been deployed in the service of the &nbsp\;metaphysical thesis originally defended by Kripke: the mental cannot be identified with &nbsp\;the material. This paper critically examines the widely invoked practice of drawing &nbsp\;metaphysical conclusions from epistemological premises.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;
CATEGORIES:KEYNOTE
LOCATION:Steele-206-HYBRID\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:57ce61c9b562b7be573e221f2cf141a8
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/57ce61c9b562b7be573e221f2cf141a8
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T113000Z
DTEND:20260707T122500Z
SUMMARY:Solving the Semantic Challenge for Non-Realist Cognitivism
DESCRIPTION:Abstract from our paper published in Synthese (2025): Recently\, non-realist cognitivism has been charged with failing to meet various semantic challenges. According to one such challenge\, the non-realist cognitivist must provide a non-trivial account of the meaning and truth conditions of moral claims. In this paper\, we discuss the various strategies proposed to overcome this challenge. Our aim is to propose a new semantics\, a Meinongian referential semantics that is based on truthmaker theory. The consequences of our proposal are two-fold. First\, it alleviates objections raised against previous Meinongian semantic approaches. Second\, adopting the novel semantics highlights the great theoretical flexibility of non-realist cognitivism.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
LOCATION:ONLINE ONLY\, University of Queensland
SEQUENCE:0
UID:ccb4a28fa6661bc2894672d5f15916be
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/ccb4a28fa6661bc2894672d5f15916be
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T133000Z
DTEND:20260707T142500Z
SUMMARY:Love or Abuse? Chiung Yao Novels as Hermeneutical Resources
DESCRIPTION:Romantic culture has long been a topic in gender studies when it comes to analysis of socialization and social construction of gender. It has been critiqued as leading to normalization of abuse and harassment of women and consequent silencing of women enduring IPV (Intimate Partner Violence) (Radway 1991). In Chinese context\, romantic fictions and multi-media adaption of the stories have impacted readership in the last 50 years (or longer) (Liu 2008)\, among them Chiung Yao contributed 40 years of active writing. Since 1962\, Chiung Yao’s stories have been made into more than 100 TV series and films. However\, her impact is undertheorized compared to female writers in her era.\n\nFeminist epistemologists theorize the inability to communicate one’s critical social experience as hermeneutical injustice and made further inquiry into the collective hermeneutical resources (Berenstain 2020\; Clanchy 2023\; Dular 2023\; Falbo 2022\; Fricker 2007\; Mason 2011\; Medina 2012\, 2013\, 2017\; Mills 2013\; Jenkins 2017\, 2021\; Simion 2019). I argue that Chiung Yao’s romances\, among other stories\, constitute an important part of Chinese romantic culture and serve as hermeneutical resources when people draw concepts about love. The endorsement of IPV exhibited in her plots induces hermeneutical injustice of her readers\, who fail to express discomfort in a toxic relationship due to normalization of abuse in Chiung Yao’s description of love. This paper contributes to the vivid discussion of hermeneutical injustice\, IPV\, toxic relationships and intersectional feminism.
CATEGORIES:FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:ONLINE ONLY\, University of Queensland
SEQUENCE:0
UID:e11f291a7561958492eb7fab12f37940
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/e11f291a7561958492eb7fab12f37940
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T190000Z
DTEND:20260707T195500Z
SUMMARY:Debunking Identity
DESCRIPTION:Debunking arguments aim to show that our beliefs do not track the world\, by identifying a certain etiology that confers negative epistemic status to our beliefs. For instance\, we believe that murder is wrong. Debunker comes in by stating that we have such a belief because we evolved to belief that murder is wrong given that it is maladaptive. Since that is the case\, our moral beliefs do not stand for moral facts. In this paper I aim to put forward a novel type of debunking arguments—the one that pertains to identity. Roughly\, I claim that we have intuitions about what makes objects different from other objects and that such intuitions can be debunked. The first intuition—the unity intuition—states that we think that objects are singular if they have enough unity. The second intuition—the spatial boundary intuition—states that we think that objects are singular up to the point where they meet unoccupied space. The claim is that\, analogously to a moral case\, we evolved to have such intuitions which makes them epistemically problematic. If it weren’t for evolution\, we wouldn’t think that objects are singular\, nor we would have intuitions about what makes them singular. The upshot is that we have a reason to suspend or reduce credence to our beliefs about identity.
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:ONLINE ONLY\, University of Queensland
SEQUENCE:0
UID:9919333ed46189a7747fa81426f5a850
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/9919333ed46189a7747fa81426f5a850
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T220000Z
DTEND:20260707T225500Z
SUMMARY:Can Empirical Psychology Incorporate Moral Truth?
DESCRIPTION:Can empirical psychology—qua scientific discipline—incorporate objective moral truth? That is\, are appeals to objective moral truth scientifically acceptable\, viable\, and legitimate—i.e.\, are they scientifically adequate? I consider this question through an examination of a particular case\, namely\, whether objective moral error is a viable scientific kind. I first examine objective moral errors per comprehensive moral theories proffered as the objective moral truth (“Objective CMT”). Importantly\, I show that moral philosophical adequacy is not necessarily sufficient for scientific adequacy. I conclude that—currently—such objective moral errors are scientifically inadequate because\, lacking a CMT well-established as the objective moral truth\, condoning such errors yields the untenable result of different researchers using incompatible standards-of-moral-correctness that generate incommensurable versions of the kind. I reject two potential partners-in-guilt. Finally\, I examine objective moral errors that contravene specific moral principles proffered as objective moral truths. I argue that because of the strength of metaethical skepticism within a scientific context\, coupled with the availability of viable alternatives to objective moral truths—namely\, standards-of-interest—all potential objective moral errors\, as well as all appeals to objective moral truth\, are scientifically inadequate and incompatible with empirical psychology (qua science).
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
LOCATION:ONLINE ONLY\, University of Queensland
SEQUENCE:0
UID:4bfaddd704ebbccf98c26322783b3ba2
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/4bfaddd704ebbccf98c26322783b3ba2
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T223000Z
DTEND:20260707T230000Z
SUMMARY:Check-in Desk Day 4
DESCRIPTION:Check-in Desk open.
CATEGORIES:
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:394fb110d92e1ff8e7309d52df154483
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/394fb110d92e1ff8e7309d52df154483
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260707T230000Z
DTEND:20260708T002500Z
SUMMARY:Philosophy in the Time of Impact
DESCRIPTION:Universities have undergone seismic changes in the past several decades\, both in Australia and internationally. Some of these changes continue to have significant implications for the discipline of philosophy and its place in the contemporary university. I focus on one of these\, namely the impact agenda that emerged in the UK and Australia and has been embedded in research management policies and practice over the past 20 years. This agenda proffers an instrumental understanding of academic research\, which is primarily valued for its capacity to contribute to economic growth\, social cohesion and nation-building. Aligning with this agenda\, an increasing number of philosophers are now involved in research programs that engage with industry organisations\, communities and other stakeholders to address challenges faced by them. I refer to this as 'impact philosophy'.\n\nThrough reflecting on impact philosophy\, I argue that the broader discipline of philosophy faces a dilemma. On the one hand\, if it underestimates and/or rejects the significance of the impact agenda\, it may become irrelevant to the contemporary university\; on the other hand\, if it embraces the impact agenda\, it may lose a sense of itself as a discipline. As a proponent of impact philosophy\, I conclude by highlighting the need to clarify the 'rare and valuable' contribution that philosophy - as philosophy - can make within the time of impact.
CATEGORIES:KEYNOTE
LOCATION:Steele-206-HYBRID\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:8691552f5b0676b78c2aba9d15656a25
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/8691552f5b0676b78c2aba9d15656a25
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T003000Z
DTEND:20260708T005500Z
SUMMARY:Morning Break
DESCRIPTION:Morning Break
CATEGORIES:BREAKS
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:350bc2db8e6dccb676c5a32879e55cec
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/350bc2db8e6dccb676c5a32879e55cec
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T010000Z
DTEND:20260708T015500Z
SUMMARY:Fiction\, Humour and Engaging with the Atypical
DESCRIPTION:This paper responds to research in early child development on children’s ability to distinguish pretending from joking. These are interestingly related activities\, as both engage children with atypical behaviour and speech: stimuli that in some way depart from how things are or should be. The research suggests that in learning to distinguish pretending and joking\, children are learning to adopt quite different relations to norms. I will extrapolate from this suggestion\, considering it as a route into understanding the norms and norm-violations that matter to sustaining a practice of fiction. On the view I am trying out\, the fictional and the humorous do not smoothly and straightforwardly combine (even though it is wonderful to combine them). I will illustrate these claims with some examples of comic fiction that show the fictional and the funny putting norm-related pressure on each other. This discussion will also benefit from reflection on Tom Cochrane’s work on the limitations of humour.
CATEGORIES:AESTHETICS
LOCATION:Steele-320\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:df42f7fd87290190c695267dab6f4684
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/df42f7fd87290190c695267dab6f4684
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T010000Z
DTEND:20260708T015500Z
SUMMARY:Metacognition in Aphantasia
DESCRIPTION:Aphantasia\, where individuals report lacking voluntary conscious visual imagery\, has increasingly captured attention in empirical and philosophical literature. One fascinating aspect of this condition is: empirical findings suggest that aphantasics employ visual strategies to perform tasks—at least in some cases. The discrepancy between subjective reports and objective evidence motivates some researchers to defend the “unconscious” view\, according to which aphantasics use unconscious visual imagery. In this talk\, I will argue for the alternative\, “conscious” view through the lens of metacognition.\n\nWhen it comes to eliciting reliable introspective reports\, consciousness research highlights a distinction between “visibility” measures and “confidence” measures. All studies on aphantasia use the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) to recruit participants. As the VVIQ asks participants to only indicate the “vivacity” of their mental images\, it closely resembles a visibility measure. I contend that in determining whether aphantasics indeed rely on unconscious visual imagery\, we should further investigate their confidence in the accuracy of their imagery-task performance.\n\nFew studies on aphantasia have included confidence ratings. However\, intriguingly\, aphantasics typically exhibit good metacognitive sensitivity. These findings provide supporting evidence that they engage in conscious\, task-relevant visual imagery.
CATEGORIES:COGNITIVE SCIENCE
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:461f2263187eb6a36a7b6ca92d791a39
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/461f2263187eb6a36a7b6ca92d791a39
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T010000Z
DTEND:20260708T015500Z
SUMMARY:The Relationship between Love and Politics in the work of Slavoj Zizek
DESCRIPTION:Slavoj Žižek describes amorous love as a disruptive\, fiercely personal event that involves someone developing a passionate attachment to another person\, so that the loved one becomes a ‘fragile absolute’ that fills out the horizon of the lover’s existence with an infinite purposiveness. This love is inherently individualistic and\, on the surface\, is at odds with a political program of universalism according to which every person matters equally. In this paper\, I will argue that Žižek’s conception of love does have a political dimension that involves a revolutionary group living in fidelity to a political event in a way that affirms the capacity of any subject to live beyond the strictures and interdictions of a particular political order or situation. I provide an account of how Žižek’s idea of love is rooted in his Hegelian rewriting of dialectical materialism\, his adoption of an atheistic reading of Christianity\, and his conception of universality. I will then consider some implications of Žižek’s politics of love in a contemporary context. &nbsp\;
CATEGORIES:CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-315\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:58d3ba6412938910ae6c642e284f17a6
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/58d3ba6412938910ae6c642e284f17a6
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T010000Z
DTEND:20260708T015500Z
SUMMARY:The Buddhist Conception of Anatta and Paul Ricouer's Narrative Self in the Indonesian Youth Pledge of 1928
DESCRIPTION:Buddhist Philosophy offers the concept of anattā\, the principle of no-self that leads people to the always changing present in life. Buddhism believes that everyone needs to have one’s own responsibility to purify one’s life to reach its purification state out of the suffering cyle of saṃsāra. In 2028\, Indonesia will celebrate the 100th birthday as a nation. It was through the Youth Pledge or Sumpah Pemuda in Indonesian\, young Indonesians proclaimed three ideas of one motherland\, one nation\, and a unifying language: Indonesia. They came with this narration as a respond for the colonization practice for 350 years that eventually has brought Indonesia to its proclamation of independence in 1945. In parallel\, Paul Ricœur comes with similar ideas that the concept of self has the unchanging side (idem) and the changing side (ipse). The balance of these sides of self helps people to form a narration of one’s own life to overcome one’s experience in life. By comparing the Buddhist’s concepts of anattā and self-purification with Paul Ricœur’s concept of self-narrative\, we can reflect on the phenomenon of the Indonesian Youth Pledge as a capable self that leads to the purification process through the narrative process of a nation.
CATEGORIES:EASTERN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:GCI-275 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:9e4d4c89ba8c5ba0a240824c141590fc
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/9e4d4c89ba8c5ba0a240824c141590fc
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T010000Z
DTEND:20260708T015500Z
SUMMARY:What Critical Thinking Is
DESCRIPTION:Critical thinking as a modern educational concept arguably began with John Dewey’s How We Think (1910)\, in which he characterized critical thought as reflective\, evaluative and directed consideration of our beliefs. Since then\, academic conceptualisation of critical thinking has been enriched by rapidly expanding contexts and discipline area growth. But this expansion of breadth has not been accompanied by a corresponding increase in the depth of our understanding of critical thinking or how it is to be developed. Nothing manifests this phenomenon more obviously than the broad range of definitions of critical thinking and the lack of consequent agreement about what it is and how it is best taught. This paper offers a solution to this problem that is both inclusive of existing definitions of critical thinking and more actionable than most in terms of its teaching and development. Using an analogy between science and thinking scientifically\, it positions critical thinking as an area of study and thinking critically as a mode of thinking attuned to the quality of inferences.
CATEGORIES:EPISTEMOLOGY
LOCATION:Steele-309\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:9041fdd95ecbaee8197a6f1b8ff9f535
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/9041fdd95ecbaee8197a6f1b8ff9f535
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T010000Z
DTEND:20260708T015500Z
SUMMARY:To Defer\, or Not to Defer? Is that Even a Question?
DESCRIPTION:In this presentation I critically examine some of the moral implications of delaying aggressive climate mitigation in favour of future reliance on carbon dioxide removal technologies to meet internationally agreed climate goals by the end of the century. I argue that delaying emissions reductions violates basic human rights among members of the current generation\, including the right to life\, health\, and subsistence. This adds to a growing list of reasons to favour responses to climate change that include immediate\, deep\, and rapid emissions reductions over responses that do not.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-206\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:8d86b76f8192ad11cd66af16ce313620
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/8d86b76f8192ad11cd66af16ce313620
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T010000Z
DTEND:20260708T015500Z
SUMMARY:Ruddick's "Maternal Thinking" as Boulous Walker's "slow philosophy"
DESCRIPTION:Sara Ruddick’s Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace proposed that the activities involved in mothering children facilitated a distinct mode of thought that she termed ‘maternal thinking’. In this paper\, I examine my experience of becoming a mother and how it influenced my scholarly work. Maternity did not hinder my intellectual life\; I experienced an explosion of intellectual energy that I found was facilitated by my maternity in ways like those theorised by Ruddick. However\, I experienced a simultaneous feeling of becoming invisible to the academy (beyond a network of feminist colleagues)\, which was compounded by my status as an early-career and casually employed academic. Rather than my new role as mother limiting my career\, the constraints of the university seemed to push my maternal self (and its rhythm of inquiry) out of its walls\, and I find myself now remaining a scholar as a mother despite the institution. Here\, I frame my own maternal thinking as ‘slow philosophy’\, following Michelle Boulous Walker’s Slow Philosophy: Reading Against the Institution\, to make sense of this incongruence. I argue that framing maternal thinking as slow philosophy helps further illuminate the marginal position that women occupy in relation to the academy.
CATEGORIES:FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-237\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:f021656f4feb492c179dcb117abc217e
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/f021656f4feb492c179dcb117abc217e
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T010000Z
DTEND:20260708T015500Z
SUMMARY:How Not to Understand Higher-Order Quantification
DESCRIPTION:Over the last ten years\, there has been a turn in metaphysics and logic towards higher-order languages: languages containing higher-order quantifier expressions that quantify into non-subject positions\, such as those of predicates and sentences. As Theodore Sider has recently observed\, this higher-order turn promises a paradigm shift involving “elegant and more accurate modes of expression\, new solutions to old problems\, transformation of problem spaces\, and generation of new questions”. In order to avoid the charge of obscurity\, however\, proponents of this higher-order turn face the challenge of explaining what their higher-order quantifier expressions mean. Andrew Bacon has recently attempted to meet this challenge by appealing to the inferential roles these quantifier expressions are intended to have. In this talk\, I will argue that this attempt fails.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-314\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:fe9f83693c294261e8dbb4a818693ef2
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/fe9f83693c294261e8dbb4a818693ef2
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T010000Z
DTEND:20260708T015500Z
SUMMARY:Parsimony and the Metaphor of Ontological Free Lunches
DESCRIPTION:I explore the metaphor of "nothing-over-and-aboveness" and the ontological "free lunch" as it features in neo-Aristotelian and Quinean approaches to ontology. The main question I consider is how should we cash out such talk. Does it track a metaphysically significant relation\, or does it simply indicate a lack of ontological commitment? For instance\, some metaphysicians\, such as Jonathan Schaffer and Karen Bennett\, have used grounding relations and explanation to argue that their ontologies are more parsimonious. There appear to be a range of relata and relations that may license such talk. For example\, the aforementioned grounding relations\, reduction\, and identity relations\, along with fundamentalia and derivata. I will also consider how the theory virtue of parsimony features in cases from metaphysics as compared to how it features in scientific practice. Finally\, I defend the view that there may be no ontologically innocent entities\, in line with a Quinean approach to ontology.
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:Steele-262\, 3 Staff House Rd\, University of Queensland\, St Lucia QLD 4067
SEQUENCE:0
UID:e46f487f3579882ba26a64144fa9a8e7
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/e46f487f3579882ba26a64144fa9a8e7
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T020000Z
DTEND:20260708T025500Z
SUMMARY:Poetry Prose Philosophy
DESCRIPTION:In reconsidering the Socratic desire to ban poetry from public life\, I set out by reading from some recent poetry. I cite Alain Badiou’s observation that Socrates objects not only that poetry imitates reality. More seriously\, he fears a verisimilitude in poetic expression with which philosophy cannot compete. This objection is updated and used by Koethe\, a contemporary poet philosopher\, against the idea of poetry as a form of thought. Another classical objection to poetry is that it fails to deal in measurable qualities. Philosophy\, however\, is vulnerable to a similar charge. Philosophy and poetry may share a common cause at this point.\n\nIt is self-refuting to claim that all there is to be truly said is contained within fundamental physics. We may proceed in a more promising manner by developing an idea\, à la Badiou\, of the production of truth. An understanding of truth as something we produce does not exclude appraisals of truth and falsity. Rather\, we need an approach to the tensions between poetry\, prose and philosophy that permits us to speak of poetological\, painterly\, theatrical and musical ways of thought. Thus\, in their autonomous forms\, we regard them as ways of saying something about what they deal with.
CATEGORIES:AESTHETICS
LOCATION:Steele-320\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:ced423933cf6a6582317b03dc5a6fe74
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/ced423933cf6a6582317b03dc5a6fe74
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T020000Z
DTEND:20260708T025500Z
SUMMARY:Doxastic Normativity in Hume: A Sceptical Reliabilist Proposal
DESCRIPTION:This paper focusses on the problem of doxastic normativity in Hume i.e.\, on what basis does Hume approve of some methods of belief-formation over others\, given his radically sceptical conclusions about the possibility of justified belief? Without an answer to this question\, Hume seems left with no basis for discriminating between better and worse belief-forming methods\, but clearly he seems to think he can.\n\nI review a variety of existing approaches to the problem\, including approaches based on irresistibility\, stability\, liveliness\, practical or moral desirability and love of truth. I argue that\, while many of these proposals identify factors which play important roles in Hume’s approved belief-forming methods\, none of them is sufficient to characterise the basis on which Hume discriminates between such methods.\n\nI put forward a proposal according to which Hume discriminates between belief-forming methods based on their “apparent reliability” in predicting and controlling events and argue that the proposed criterion avoids the problems identified with existing approaches. I also compare this proposal to other reliability-based proposals in the literature\, arguing that the sceptical nature of the proposed criterion distinguishes it from those proposals in a way that is more consistent with Hume’s sceptical philosophy.\n\nFinally\, I identify the source of normativity for the criterion as the ability to anticipate and control events\, which contributes in its turn to the practical benefits accruing from the` successful execution of our designs. On this account\, the normativity of Hume’s belief-forming criterion is ultimately derived from its contribution to practical success\, but its particular role in contributing to that success results in its own particular form of “relative normativity”– belief-forming mechanisms are judged good or bad according to their apparent reliability in anticipating and controlling events.
CATEGORIES:ASEMP
LOCATION:Steele-309\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:e1fa869aeed3cff3cb2d0bf74a65dd72
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/e1fa869aeed3cff3cb2d0bf74a65dd72
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T020000Z
DTEND:20260708T025500Z
SUMMARY:Desirability Bias
DESCRIPTION:Humans are wishful thinkers: we are more likely to believe the things we want to be true (Windschitl et al.\, 2022). In contemporary psychology this phenomenon is known as desirability bias (Tappin\, Van der Leer & McKay\, 2017) and as a cognitive bias it is relatively understudied. From the perspective of scientific realism\, desirability bias is irrational: reality is largely indifferent to our desires\, but perception seems quite responsive to them. Desirability bias represents a key human cognitive vulnerability and therefore deserves investigation. There are a number of questions to ask of the phenomenon. How strong and robust is it? What moderates it? Can we reduce or enhance it? What might explain it? How does it relate to existing theories and literatures\, such as self-deception\, motivated reasoning and predictive processing? What is its relationship with (the much more famous) confirmation bias? How much certainty do we have about the above answers? I will review some of the literature that is relevant to these questions and discuss how we might go about working towards a satisfactory explanation for desirability bias.
CATEGORIES:COGNITIVE SCIENCE
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:86bc7aab88163f792f8470e5764424a4
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/86bc7aab88163f792f8470e5764424a4
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T020000Z
DTEND:20260708T025500Z
SUMMARY:Digital Scrolling as Slow Death
DESCRIPTION:Scrolling is a material practice of digital consumption\, marked by repetitive\, habitual absorption into digital platforms. Given the ubiquity of scrolling as a phenomenon\, it is interesting that the practice remains largely unexplored in philosophical literature. This paper explores the relation between contemporary precarity and scrolling via the lens of Lauren Berlant’s notion of slow death. I phenomenologically analyse how fear and what Berlant calls ‘crisis ordinariness’ orient subjects toward scrolling as a salve – a mechanism for relieving the overwhelming pressure on their sensorium. In this context\, scrolling can be understood as an attachment which provides for the subject agency in a lateral sense\, a kind of empty space-making via distraction\, which enables subsistence. I further analyse the temporal implications of scrolling: the transformation of time not only into an eternal present\, but a form of dead time. I conclude by briefly considering relevant implications of my analysis for praxis – or\, to put it another way\, how the material practice of scrolling comes to reinforce the same post-Fordist structures which are responsible for the conditions of contemporary precarity in the first place.
CATEGORIES:CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-315\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:db96de773c66bc750f15bdadd9442b3c
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/db96de773c66bc750f15bdadd9442b3c
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T020000Z
DTEND:20260708T025500Z
SUMMARY:No Wei Jose: What Xunzi Teaches Us about Grammarly
DESCRIPTION:While writing aids like Grammarly promise to improve students’ work\, they also marginalise the role played by teachers. To grasp the scope and implications of this problem\, I turn to one of the earliest accounts of the good of learning and teaching we have\, the Xunzi. This early Confucian text identifies two key components of the social value of education\, which services like Grammarly threaten to undermine: the importance of learning proper models\, li (禮)\, for self-expression and of accruing active effort\, wei (為)\, in one’s studies.\n\nWhile Grammarly can correct work to a tolerable standard\, it does not teach proper models\, which risks making students reliant on it not only to express themselves but to understand their work without its help. Moreover\, while Grammarly primarily helps students to capitalise on the effort they do put into their studies by offering them significant shortcuts that again leave them dependent on this software. If AI writing aids risk making students more exploitable like this in turn for an easier time in the classroom\, then we ought to be extremely worried about the genuine possibility that students\, and perhaps even institutions\, will delegate teaching responsibilities to this software.
CATEGORIES:EASTERN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:GCI-275 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:921d63a6519706c185ac68a5e978c50b
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/921d63a6519706c185ac68a5e978c50b
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T020000Z
DTEND:20260708T025500Z
SUMMARY:Can Conversational AIs Contribute to Group Understanding?
DESCRIPTION:As the understanding literature continues to evolve\, the notion of group understanding has become increasingly important. With the rise of conversational artificial intelligence (CAI)\, we may say that AI systems can contribute to group knowledge\, but it is an open question as to whether or not they can contribute to group understanding. In what follows\, I argue that CAI agents can be contributing members of group understanding in inflationary cases. In the next section\, I lay out Kenneth Boyd’s (2019) account of deflationary and inflationary group understanding. In section three\, I consider what it means to call a CAI an agent. In section four\, I look at CAI agents in deflationary group understanding cases and conclude that the obstacles are too much to overcome. In section five\, I look at AI agents in inflationary group understanding cases and argue that we can decouple trust relations from group grasping. In section six\, I consider objections to my view.
CATEGORIES:EPISTEMOLOGY
LOCATION:GCI-273 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:32ef8b26ef33891195724a19b810e5db
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/32ef8b26ef33891195724a19b810e5db
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T020000Z
DTEND:20260708T025500Z
SUMMARY:Should Trust be a Default Stance?
DESCRIPTION:This paper examines whether Analects 14.31 supports the view that trust ought to function as a default normative stance. Through a comparative analysis of interpretations by Du Haitao\, Lv Mingxuan\, and Liu Xuehan\, the study identifies three competing models of Confucian trust: default obligation\, virtue-conditioned posture\, and cultivation-based achievement. It argues that Analects 14.31 does not prescribe unconditional trust but instead embeds trust within a virtue-ethical framework that prioritizes moral discernment (xian jue) and sustained self-cultivation (gongfu). Drawing on this structure\, the paper offers a Confucian critique of contemporary trust theories\, especially those advocating structural or voluntarist models. In doing so\, it proposes a virtue-based alternative rooted in agent-sensitive ethical responsiveness.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-206\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:a465bf36cc638defa5aa9217811271ca
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/a465bf36cc638defa5aa9217811271ca
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T020000Z
DTEND:20260708T025500Z
SUMMARY:What Do We Want Sex and Gender to Be?
DESCRIPTION:In a forthcoming paper I critique Holly Lawford-Smith’s recent book Gender Critical Feminism for both the incoherence of its underlying metaphysics of sex and gender\, and the problematic political effects of that metaphysics. In this talk I will first rehearse the crux of that argument\, and then use it to motivate a further question: if bad metaphysics leads to bad politics\, what kind of metaphysics might help bring about a liberatory politics?
CATEGORIES:FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-237\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:7229409135b7c0c8ec54ed7292c7d23a
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/7229409135b7c0c8ec54ed7292c7d23a
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T020000Z
DTEND:20260708T025500Z
SUMMARY:Qualifying the Qualitative Thesis: On the Ambiguity of Conditionals
DESCRIPTION:Consider the following version of the Direct Argument:&nbsp\;\n\n&nbsp\; a. Either the butler or the gardener did it.\n&nbsp\; b. (And it may not be the butler.)\n&nbsp\; c. So\, if the butler didn’t do it\, the gardener did.\n\nAccording to material conditional interpretation of indicative conditionals\, it is easy to explain why this is a great argument: Because it is truth-preserving. However\, many\, if not most\, philosophers deny that the indicative conditional is the material conditional. But if it is not truth-preserving\, then why is this a great argument? To answer this question\, Boylan &amp\; Schultheis (2022) have recently defended the Qualitative Thesis\, which has generally been taken to be a fundamental constraint on indicative conditionals. According to this thesis\, the Direct Argument is knowledge-preserving.\n\nThe Qualitative Thesis: When you leave open A\, the indicative conditional A &gt\; B is knowable if and only if the material conditional A ⊃ B is knowable (Boylan\, 2024).\n\nIn this paper\, I provide a counterexample to the Qualitative Thesis. But instead of just rejecting the Qualitative Thesis\, I defend a qualified version of it that overcomes the problem with the original version by taking into account the ambiguity of conditionals.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-314\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:a2fd0af1055088e6bfecd3c3d6eb5174
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/a2fd0af1055088e6bfecd3c3d6eb5174
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T020000Z
DTEND:20260708T025500Z
SUMMARY:The Causal Structure of Human Historical Inevitability
DESCRIPTION:Was there any event in human history whose occurrence was inevitable? Mainstream theories roughly follow Ben-Menahem’s sensitivity principle\, stating that the necessity/contingency of a historical event depends on its degree of sensitivity to the initial conditions of its occurrence. In contrast\, I propose to account for historical inevitability using the idea of a (metaphysical) causal sufficient condition. It provides a new theoretical framework and an empirical methodology. The obtainment of a set of events within the target event’s initial conditions\, whose types constitute one configuration of the causal sufficient condition(s) of the event type to which the target event belongs\, leads to its inevitable occurrence. That is\, a historical event token occurred inevitably once a configuration of its causal sufficient condition was realised. Section I briefly illustrates the proposed account. Section II elaborates on explicating historical inevitability by causal sufficient and necessary conditions. Section III draws on interventionist counterfactual analysis to delve deeper into the causal and formal aspects of causal sufficient (and necessary) conditions. Section IV explores an empirical methodology especially suitable for studying the inevitable occurrences in human history. It utilises interventionist ideas to explain the formation of hypotheses of causal sufficient and necessary conditions for applicable historical event types.
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:Steele-262\, 3 Staff House Rd\, University of Queensland\, St Lucia QLD 4067
SEQUENCE:0
UID:541cc386252d6116e481d128d6c701d5
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/541cc386252d6116e481d128d6c701d5
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T030000Z
DTEND:20260708T035500Z
SUMMARY:Lunch - Catered
DESCRIPTION:Lunch Break - Catered by FigJam and Co\n\nFigJam and Co is a proud 2nd-Gen Indigenous business. They are descendants of Gunditjamara and Ngarrindjeri mobs from SW Victoria and SE South Australia and acknowledge the elders of the Jagera\, Yuggera and Ugarapul country on which we live\, work\, trade and travel. Since 1995\, their skilled chefs have created naturally delicious catering for corporate events in Southeast Queensland. Each morning before sunrise\, their dedicated team is busy preparing tasty food with fresh Australian ingredients in their Stones Corner kitchen.\n\nThey also manufacture FigJam Collections\, a range of gourmet condiments bursting with real flavours and up to 98% Australian ingredients! They source seasonal ingredients and nutritious superfoods such as Davidson plum\, Tasmanian pepperberry\, lemon myrtle\, old man salt bush\, finger lime\, pigface\, purslane and anise myrtle direct from First Nation peoples\, growers\, producers and farmgate.
CATEGORIES:BREAKS
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:a000a117736123b3fa1527c53cf88e38
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/a000a117736123b3fa1527c53cf88e38
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T030000Z
DTEND:20260708T035500Z
SUMMARY:Women in Philosophy Catch Up
DESCRIPTION:Women in Philosophy Catch Up
CATEGORIES:WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:GCI-273 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:0633b4dbd25b15ba2c4670536e0c4067
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/0633b4dbd25b15ba2c4670536e0c4067
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T040000Z
DTEND:20260708T045500Z
SUMMARY:Philosophy in the Community: Pathways\, Possibilities\, and Challenges
DESCRIPTION:This panel brings together philosophers at different career stages to explore diverse forms of community engagement beyond the traditional academic scope of philosophy. Panellists will discuss their experiences with public philosophy\, board and policy work\, media contributions\, educational partnerships\, and creative collaborations.
The conversation will cover motivations for community involvement\, practical pathways into different types of work\, and the challenges and rewards of translating philosophical expertise for broader audiences. Panellists will share insights about balancing academic and community commitments while building meaningful partnerships outside the university.
Whether you’re curious about public engagement or looking to expand your current outreach\, this session offers practical perspectives on how philosophical training can serve wider social purposes. Audience perspectives on\, and experiences with\, philosophy in the community are very welcome.
CATEGORIES:PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT SESSION
LOCATION:GCI-273 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:ed3492dee9e713c72b932c87289c2da6
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/ed3492dee9e713c72b932c87289c2da6
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T050000Z
DTEND:20260708T055500Z
SUMMARY:Aesthetic Judgments and Two-Dimensional Semantics
DESCRIPTION:Regarding folk intuition about aesthetic normativism\, empirical evidence presents conflicting results: according to Cova and Pain’s (2012) study\, folk intuitions deny the idea that aesthetic judgments are normative. This result undermines Kant’s view that it is common sense that aesthetic judgments are normative. But Andow’s (2022) study reveals more complex findings\, which show that folk intuition\, in some cases\, endorses a normative perspective. Harnessing the two-dimensional semantics\, this paper aims to reconcile this conflict by arguing that the folk account of aesthetic anti-realism is conditional. To support this claim\, a small-scale empirical study was conducted. The results show that people tend to adopt an incompatibilist view in imagined scenarios\, but a compatibilist view in actual-world contexts. Finally\, this paper proposes a conditional reinterpretation of Kant’s “subjective universality”.
CATEGORIES:AESTHETICS
LOCATION:Steele-320\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:1bc6affce82cb1aee3b99987a8655d59
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/1bc6affce82cb1aee3b99987a8655d59
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T050000Z
DTEND:20260708T055500Z
SUMMARY:Can Neuroscience Show Us that We Lack Free Will?
DESCRIPTION:Whether or not we have free will has long been a philosopher’s question\, but in the last 50 years\, neuroscientists have claimed to be able to weigh in on the problem. I begin by reviewing the philosophical landscape of free will\, which is dominated by the question of whether or not determinism is true\, and argue that neuroscience cannot provide evidence for or against the truth of determinism\, so cannot bear on the problem in that respect. I then turn to another way in which neuroscientists have tried to provide evidence that we lack free will\, by drawing on evidence that they interpret as showing that our conscious will is inefficacious. I argue that new ways of thinking about how to interpret that evidence undermines the conclusions that typically had been drawn. I close by considering how this new interpretation of the neural data may bear upon some standard philosophical positions in the free will debate.
CATEGORIES:COGNITIVE SCIENCE
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:6888c037bd0c04741781fa01fd80bb1f
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/6888c037bd0c04741781fa01fd80bb1f
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T050000Z
DTEND:20260708T055500Z
SUMMARY:Eudaimonia as Bridge: From Biological Drives to Civilisational Flourishing
DESCRIPTION:This paper explores whether Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia might be understood not as the highest good\, but as one level within a nested hierarchy of flourishing. I consider the possibility that 'good' functions less as an indefinable property and more as a fundamental orientation—akin to 'north' on a moral compass—that emerges at three interconnected levels: biological continuity\, individual flourishing\, and civilizational advancement.\n\nDrawing primarily on Aristotelian virtue ethics\, I examine how each level might provide necessary conditions for the next while being transformed by what emerges from it. The paper investigates whether this framework could illuminate the relationship between biological nature and ethical life without reducing one to the other. In particular\, I explore how virtues might cascade through these levels\, taking different forms while serving interconnected purposes.\nRather than claiming to resolve long standing metaethical puzzles\, this paper offers a preliminary sketch of how individual eudaimonia might serve as a bridge between biological imperatives and societal flourishing.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-206\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:953bbaa42c6aff6529ff9b0eaf343da4
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/953bbaa42c6aff6529ff9b0eaf343da4
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T050000Z
DTEND:20260708T055500Z
SUMMARY:Regret Aversion: A new consideration for rational choice?
DESCRIPTION:In this paper\, I discuss preferences over gambles that seem intuitively rational\, and that many real-world agents hold\, but that deviate from orthodox normative decision theory. These preferences even deviate from the various less orthodox decision theories designed to accommodate risk aversion. This is because such preferences exhibit not risk aversion\, but instead regret aversion: a preference for one’s chosen option to be more likely to actually turn out better (or perhaps significantly better) than the alternatives. Is regret aversion rational? Plausibly\, yes. Beyond mere intuitions about cases\, I offer two further motivations. The first is that regret aversion is needed to reflect at least some concern for doing what is objectively best\, and it is plausible that such a concern is rational (perhaps even rationally required)\, especially in moral decision-making. The second motivation is that regret aversion correctly diagnoses and treats what’s wrong with so-called ‘fanatical’ verdicts in cases of extremely low probabilities and extremely high stakes. There are also reasons to think regret aversion irrational: it leads to violations of several widely-held and seemingly plausible principles of rationality. Perhaps these violations constitute a decisive objection to regret aversion. Or\, perhaps\, regret aversion constitutes a decisive objection to all normative decision theories so far proposed.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-314\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:5ca3180f0c82390a47b4a5a2b562385d
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/5ca3180f0c82390a47b4a5a2b562385d
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T050000Z
DTEND:20260708T055500Z
SUMMARY:The Universe is the Product of the Unicorns
DESCRIPTION:In classical extensional mereology\, it is provable that if there are no Fs\, then the universe is the general product of the Fs. For example\, if there are no unicorns\, then the universe is the general product of the unicorns. This paper argues that the source of this counterintuitive theorem lies not in classical extensional mereology itself\, but in the classical treatment of restricted existential quantification\, according to which if there are no Fs\, then all Fs are Gs. For example\, if there are no unicorns\, then all unicorns have tentacles. It also argues the problem is not resolved by rejecting universalism or extensionalism\, nor by adopting free or plural logic.
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:Steele-262\, 3 Staff House Rd\, University of Queensland\, St Lucia QLD 4067
SEQUENCE:0
UID:f23824510e6c02606f4be461d38d2dc3
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/f23824510e6c02606f4be461d38d2dc3
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T050000Z
DTEND:20260708T055500Z
SUMMARY:How Pain Fools Everyone
DESCRIPTION:There is a pervasive folk view that feelings such as pain are causes of behaviour. We say we withdrew our hand from the hotplate because it hurt or that we flinched at the needle because it stung. The causal role of pain is widely implicated in theories of learning and decision-making. But what if this commonsense idea that feelings cause behaviour is just wrong? To date\, there is no known mechanism for how subjectively experienced pain directly modulates neural activity and it is hard to see how there could be. Pain cannot open ion channels to generate action potentials. On this basis\, we contend that the real cause of behaviour is neural activity and that feelings of pain have no known causal role. This raises the question of whether pain has any function at all—i.e.\, whether it has causal powers or is merely epiphenomenal. Epiphenomenalism faces the intractable problem of explaining how such an attention-consuming feeling as pain could be epiphenomenal and yet still have survived evolutionary selection. In response\, we infer from the available neuroscientific evidence that the best explanation is that pain has a novel\, non-causal function and that decisions to act are instead caused by an internal decoding process involving threshold detection of accumulated evidence of pain rather than by pain per se. Because pain is necessarily implicated in the best explanation of subsequent decision-making\, we do not conclude that pain is epiphenomenal or functionless even if it has no causal influence over those decisions or actions that issue from those decisions. On this view\, pain functions to mark neural pathways that are the causes of behaviour as salient\, serving as a ground but not a cause of subsequent decision-making and action. This perspective has far-reaching implications for diverse fields including neuropsychiatry\, biopsychosocial modelling\, robotics and brain-computer interfaces.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
LOCATION:Steele-315\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:57b38e52239340e891de5963e96e2c8d
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/57b38e52239340e891de5963e96e2c8d
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T050000Z
DTEND:20260708T055500Z
SUMMARY:Critical Comparison of Shinran and William James's Perspectives on Beliefs
DESCRIPTION:Shinran\, the founder of the Jodo Shinshu sect in Japan\, developed a radical teaching that salvation can be achieved through faith alone. He considered himself a wicked person and presented the complete ‘acceptance of helplessness’ that he could not save himself as the key to salvation. In contrast\, William James emphasized the subjective determination and will of humans in religious faith. He argued that humans can actively choose their own belief\, strengthen their faith and live an ethical life through continuous practice even in uncertain situations. He identified human will as the central condition of faith.\n\nAt first glance\, the soteriology of Shinran and William James on faith seem to be contradictory. The author thinks that Shinran lacks consideration of human subjectivity and the possibility of self-development through continuous practice\, while William James lacks consideration of the relationship with the absolute. In conclusion\, these two perspectives are inter-complementary. And by synthesizing these two religious philosophies\, we can consider how we can establish a balanced relationship between ourselves and the absolute in the midst of human existential crises.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
LOCATION:GCI-275 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:901b44b7feb208ac4472f0dd91c8fad4
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/901b44b7feb208ac4472f0dd91c8fad4
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T060000Z
DTEND:20260708T062500Z
SUMMARY:Afternoon Break
DESCRIPTION:
CATEGORIES:BREAKS
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:aba83ca53d60c3b23e064245ab53aa64
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/aba83ca53d60c3b23e064245ab53aa64
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T063000Z
DTEND:20260708T072500Z
SUMMARY:An Apology for Number: Schiller’s Aesthetic Education and Bolzano on the Beauty of Mathematics
DESCRIPTION:Despite the increasing significance of the notion of aesthetic education to pedagogic theory and aesthetics\, it has yet to be seriously considered in relation to mathematical education. This gap in the literature is all the more pressing given that mathematical modelling and reasoning underpin the technology and sciences required to overcome the climate crisis. Since the German tradition of aesthetics has often associated mathematics with instrumentality\, mathematical beauty has been implicitly considered a contradictio in terminis. By contrast\, in this essay I will argue that Bernard Bolzano’s work—a rare example of a mathematician who writes about aesthetics—opens up the aesthetic dimension of mathematical experience. Moreover\, I will argue that the potential of aesthetic education—both as a response to Plato’s accusation against the poets and as a practical theory of the social function of art—will not be fully realised until the German aesthetic tradition has adequately reckoned with mathematical beauty. Through investigating this previously unexplored dialogue between the sciences and humanities\, I hope to demonstrate the expansive possibilities of this enriched notion of aesthetic education for future scholarship in pedagogy\, aesthetics\, the history of German philosophy\, and the philosophy of mathematics.
CATEGORIES:AESTHETICS
LOCATION:Steele-320\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:d98bb6a87c3d7c16f7682d9bc7ec3442
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/d98bb6a87c3d7c16f7682d9bc7ec3442
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T063000Z
DTEND:20260708T072500Z
SUMMARY:Leibniz's Perspectiva Analogy
DESCRIPTION:Leibniz often uses a mirror analogy to explain his monads. Referring to a monad as a simple substance\, he writes in a typical passage: “each simple substance is a perpetual\, living mirror of the universe” (M 56). Although Leibniz’s mirror analogy is well-known\, it is not well understood. Accordingly\, the goal of my talk is to show how Leibniz’s mirror analogy can shed light on his monadic metaphysics. Unlike other commentators\, my strategy is to draw on Leibniz’s writings on perspectiva because it is now clear that Leibniz had expertise in a branch of mathematics known as perspectiva and that his mirror analogy is based on his work in perspectiva.\n\nMy talk is divided into three parts. First\, I outline a fact that Leibniz learned from perspectiva\, which is that any point on a body can be projected onto a drawing in such a way so as to preserve its relations to other points on the body. I then claim that Leibniz took this fact to imply that there is an equivalence between a body and its perspectival representations. I close by sketching how this equivalence can make sense of Leibniz’s thesis that a body is an aggregate of monads.
CATEGORIES:ASEMP
LOCATION:GCI-273 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:e624af87ac22515932e92b907d61bcc6
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/e624af87ac22515932e92b907d61bcc6
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T063000Z
DTEND:20260708T072500Z
SUMMARY:The Intuitive Historian
DESCRIPTION:People use their commonsense thinking about the past to inform their decisions. Intuitive historical thinking is therefore pervasive in the social and cognitive lives of humans. This type of cognition has not been systematically researched. Recent philosophical psychology is dominated by works that investigate cognitive tools used by intuitive historians – such as episodic memory\, mental time travel\, concepts of time\, or causal reasoning – without directly studying intuitive historical thinking. To remediate this lacuna\, we investigate intuitive historical thinking\, referred to as ‘intuitive history’. We argue against the view that intuitive history can be reduced to any one of the cognitive tools used by intuitive history. The processes and phenomenology of intuitive history are linked to three types of interrelated activities routinely conducted by intuitive historians: managing historical information perceived as significant\, which includes searching\, gathering\, storing\, and updating information about the past\; the interpretation of historical information\, which may include the intuitive historian’s distinctive experiences\, assumptions\, emotions\, and evaluations\; and the use of historical information. Interpretative processes can be influenced by the assumption of pastness\, singularity\, reality\, connectivity or causation\, and significance. We review evidence suggesting that intuitive historians routinely use these assumptions to develop their inquiries into past entities.
CATEGORIES:COGNITIVE SCIENCE
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:3222286d97f3519ea861c3f897393e79
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/3222286d97f3519ea861c3f897393e79
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T063000Z
DTEND:20260708T072500Z
SUMMARY:Slopaganda: The Interaction between Propaganda and Generative AI
DESCRIPTION:At least since Francis Bacon\, the slogan “knowledge is power” has been used to capture the relationship between decision-making at a group level and information. We know that being able to shape the informational environment for a group is a way to shape their decisions\; it is essentially a way to make decisions for them. This paper focuses on strategies that are intentionally\, by design\, impactful on the decision-making capacities of groups\, effectively shaping their ability to take advantage of information in their environment. Among these\, the best known are political rhetoric\, propaganda\, and misinformation. The phenomenon this paper brings out from these is a relatively new strategy\, which we call slopaganda. According to The Guardian\, News Corp Australia is currently churning out 3000 “local” generative AI (GAI) stories each week. In the coming years\, such “generative AI slop” will present multiple knowledge-related (epistemic) challenges. We draw on contemporary research in cognitive science and artificial intelligence to diagnose the problem of slopaganda\, describe some recent troubling cases\, then suggest several interventions that may help to counter slopaganda.
CATEGORIES:EPISTEMOLOGY
LOCATION:Steele-309\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:9a355da481002b967e4e10b0c25d9504
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/9a355da481002b967e4e10b0c25d9504
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T063000Z
DTEND:20260708T072500Z
SUMMARY:Are Individuals Morally Responsible for Deleting Their Social Media Accounts?
DESCRIPTION:Jaron Lanier’s Ten Arguments for Deleting Your Social Media Accounts Right Now (2018) describes a conceptualisation of social media as clearly morally objectionable. Lanier’s call is ultimately to delete social media accounts or abstain from participation. Participation perpetuates its dangers\, but to what extent are individual users morally responsible for their social media accounts? This paper explores that question through a three-fold theory of responsibility. The first two aspects of this theory apply Robin Zheng’s framework of accountability and attributability (2016) to the problem of social media as proposed by Lanier. Then the third aspect looks at the element of necessity and how it hinders the practise of moral responsibility when it comes to the use of and participation in social media. Although social media evidently has moral harms\, not everyone has the capability to refrain from using it without significantly impairing other aspects of their life. In order to promote an effective change to social media and the Internet\, the disparity between the levels of responsibility amongst individuals must be taken into account.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:GCI-275 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:f67f327fcfc82295475cf0886af6f18a
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/f67f327fcfc82295475cf0886af6f18a
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T063000Z
DTEND:20260708T072500Z
SUMMARY:Authenticity Against Oppression
DESCRIPTION:Authentic subjectivity plays a central role in Simone de Beauvoir’s arguments in both The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947) and The Second Sex (1949). In this paper\, I unpack what it means to be an authentic subject. Beauvoir argues that freedom is the ultimate value\, which places great responsibility on us to recognise and work towards our own freedom and that of others. Furthermore\, to be authentic one must recognise\, rather than deny\, our ambiguous existence as both transcendent beings who construct and pursue ends freely\, and immanent beings whose existence relies on the conditions of life being met consistently.\n\nPatriarchal society relegates women (and others) to the immanent sphere\, while simultaneously devaluing that sphere. This is evident in the widespread destruction of our ecosystems and the continued devaluing of reproductive and care labour. Implicit in Beauvoir’s argument\, I suggest\, is the notion that to be an authentic subject one must challenge the dominant system of values that devalues and exploits the immanent sphere. I extend Beauvoir’s work to argue for the importance of women and other oppressed people working together to create an alternative value system that authentically recognises the ambiguity of existence\, and moreover\, the value of the immanent.
CATEGORIES:FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-237\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:5b97eccbb27bf013eb2b307b58be3339
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/5b97eccbb27bf013eb2b307b58be3339
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T063000Z
DTEND:20260708T072500Z
SUMMARY:On the Presuppositions of Indicative Conditionals
DESCRIPTION:Trivalent accounts of conditionals imply that an indicative conditional ""if A then C"" gets the value undefined when the antecedent A is false. Due to how they handle negation\, these theories appear to wrongly predict that an indicative conditional presupposes the truth of its antecedent. However\, as argued by Stalnaker (1975)\, the utterance of a conditional presupposes something weaker\, namely that the antecedent is compatible with the context of utterance.\n\nIn the first part of this paper\, we use the trivalent framework for indicative conditionals and epistemic modals presented recently by Egré\, Rossi and Sprenger (ERS) in ""Trivalent conditionals\, Kratzer style'' to resolve this tension and to adequately derive this Stalnakerian presupposition. We derive it from the fact that (i) conditionals and modals are evaluated not merely extensionally\, but relative to an information state\, and (ii) from a particular instance of Grice's Maxim of Quantity\, which we call ""Avoid Void''.\n\nIn the second part\, we use this principle to restrict some problematic inferences of the connexive logic of conditionals put forward by Cooper (1968) and recast by ERS (2025) as a logic of certainty preservation\, like the entailment from ""not A"" to ""if A then C"" (for A\, C factual).
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-314\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:40473308a126312ec77f85d1aef3fe92
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/40473308a126312ec77f85d1aef3fe92
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T063000Z
DTEND:20260708T072500Z
SUMMARY:How Humanism Supports the Existence of God
DESCRIPTION:In philosophical circles it is widely understood that Michel de Montaigne was a humanist. It is less so understood that he was a Catholic. Drawing on rich experiential research that has culminated in a visit to the cenotaph of Montaigne in Bordeaux\, France\, the Sanctuary of Our Lady Fátima in Fátima\, Portugal\, and the Ring of Brodgar in the Orkney Islands\, Scotland\, Woodman outlines a modern case for the existence of God using a novel humanistic approach.
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:Steele-262\, 3 Staff House Rd\, University of Queensland\, St Lucia QLD 4067
SEQUENCE:0
UID:5655ca3ecaf5bc204759570936f656af
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/5655ca3ecaf5bc204759570936f656af
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T063000Z
DTEND:20260708T072500Z
SUMMARY:From Autopoiesis to Symbiotic Entanglement
DESCRIPTION:Enactivism has recently faced criticism for either leaning too heavily on philosophical speculation without clear scientific grounding\, or relying on some dated empirical work in cognitive science\, especially concerning sensorimotor actions. This paper uses metabolic and microbiome research as a case study to help illuminate both the problem and a path forward. Although “autopoietic” enactivism has fruitfully drawn on research in evolutionary developmental biology\, niche construction theory\, and on phenotypic plasticity\, it has yet to fully integrate insights from microbiome research. We argue\, first\, that a closer look at metabolism and the physiological roles microbiota play &nbsp\;in hosts challenge some of the core autopoietic concepts\, including self-production\, autonomy\, and operational closure. It also introduces heteronomy and symbiosis into cognitive\, developmental\, and evolutionary processes\, and suggests a rethinking of enactivism’s traditional avoidance of mechanistic or reductionist explanations. We also argue there is an epistemic need for a philosophy of science that clarifies how to integrate more mechanistic and reductive biological programs with holistic enactivist frameworks\, and how to reconceptualize the relationship between organisms\, their micro-physical parts\, and their environmental context. Ultimately\, due to these challenges\, we contend that enactivism needs to moderate its commitments to autopoietic theory.
CATEGORIES:OTHER
LOCATION:Steele-206\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:860e3803241659f948b335000d90344c
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/860e3803241659f948b335000d90344c
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T073000Z
DTEND:20260708T082500Z
SUMMARY:Descartes on Representation\, Resemblance\, and Duplex Esse
DESCRIPTION:Descartes’ rejection of the resemblance between sensory ideas and extramental objects and the inferior status of the former in his epistemology makes researchers believe that Descartes takes resemblance as the principle for veridical representation of intellectual ideas. On top of that\, they attempt to explicate the nature of resemblance through property-sharing and identity\, which is upheld by the scholastic reading of Descartes’ distinction between formal being and objective being. I contend that resemblance as the principle of representation cannot be sustained as it is theoretically incompatible with Descartes’ substantial dualism and universal conceptualism\, and it is textually ungrounded. On top of that\, I propose my reading of the objective being according to which it only denotes ideas’ ontological status.
CATEGORIES:ASEMP
LOCATION:GCI-273 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:207645900dd9520cb18a98f48817a94a
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/207645900dd9520cb18a98f48817a94a
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T073000Z
DTEND:20260708T082500Z
SUMMARY:Computation\, Representation and Causation in Neural Networks
DESCRIPTION:Causation in classical computation is relatively simple – it involves a series of events\, each causally dependent on its predecessor. Causation in neural networks can be more complex. One reason for this is the possibility of recurrent or re-entrant signals. This paper investigates this topic. First\, drawing on the analysis of Anne Treisman\, I look at the role that recurrence may play in binding – which in this context can be thought of as the combination of simple representations into more complex representations. Second\, I analyse the kinds of causal patterns involved here through Luigi Pasinetti’s work\, recently translated into English\, on causal dependence and interdependence. The idea\, roughly speaking\, is that neural networks that bind simple representations into complex representations through some kind of recurrent activity will be comprised of states in relationships of interdependence\, rather than the relations of casual dependence that characterise classical computation. In this way\, it is suggested\, Pasinetti’s concepts can be used to distinguish the causal patterns that characterise classical computation from those that characterise the kinds of neural networks described here.
CATEGORIES:COGNITIVE SCIENCE
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:ce13a4ff9df3ff0d89a91cbffa39f185
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/ce13a4ff9df3ff0d89a91cbffa39f185
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T073000Z
DTEND:20260708T082500Z
SUMMARY:Can Parents and Their Children be Friends?
DESCRIPTION:Friendship is a central relationship in our lives\, and exploring the nature of friendship has been of significant philosophical interest. In the Nichomachean Ethics\, Aristotle claims that “nobody would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other good things.” Aristotle accounts for three types of friendship. His account has since been reworked and built upon by numerous philosophers. The nature of the parent-child relationship has also been significantly explored by philosophers. However\, analysis of parents and children as friends has been much less prevalent. While the ‘Friendship Model’ of filial obligations presupposes that parents and children can be friends\, few philosophers have grappled with whether parents and children can become friends. In light of this deficit\, our aim is to consider what constitutes a friendship\, and whether parents and adult children can ever satisfy those conditions. Joseph Kupfer and Laurence Thomas both argue that parents and children cannot satisfy the conditions for friendship. We will argue that while not all parents and children can fit the conditions of friendship\, some can.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-237\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:e9acedbbbea8b802a2c008c47d5859b9
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/e9acedbbbea8b802a2c008c47d5859b9
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T073000Z
DTEND:20260708T082500Z
SUMMARY:Codd's Theorem for Databases over Semirings
DESCRIPTION:Codd's Theorem\, a fundamental result of database theory\, asserts that relational algebra and relational calculus have the same expressive power on relational databases. We explore Codd's Theorem for databases over semirings and establish two different versions of this result for such databases: the first version involves the five basic operations of relational algebra\, while in the second version the division operation is added to the five basic operations of relational algebra. In both versions\, the difference operation of relations is given semantics using semirings with monus\, while on the side of relational calculus a limited form of negation is used. The reason for considering these two different versions of Codd's theorem is that\, unlike the case of ordinary relational databases\, the division operation need not be expressible in terms of the five basic operations of relational algebra for databases over an arbitrary positive semiring\; in fact\, we show that this inexpressibility result holds even for bag databases.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-314\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:14ec07a1f130a9a242d99819043942c8
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/14ec07a1f130a9a242d99819043942c8
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T073000Z
DTEND:20260708T082500Z
SUMMARY:Is "believes that p" vague?
DESCRIPTION:Some have argued that "believes that p" is a vague predicate\; others have denied it. However\, none have applied the standard diagnostics to test this claim. I intend to do just that.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
LOCATION:Steele-206\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:a064865475677a89ca1cbd3e0dd1adaa
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/a064865475677a89ca1cbd3e0dd1adaa
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T190000Z
DTEND:20260708T195500Z
SUMMARY:Josef Pieper's Novel Criticism of Scientism
DESCRIPTION:In his small\, often-neglected book Verteidigungsrede fur die Philosophie (1966)\, philosopher Josef Pieper offers an ingenious criticism of scientism\, the thesis that all knowledge is from science. While proponents of scientism are few and far between for well-known problems such as its self-referential incoherence\, science's descriptive and explanatory limits\, extra-scientific assumptions\, and failure to take seriously the qualitative features of reality (plus its materialist underpinnings\, though not all are worried on this matter\, no pun intended)\, nonetheless Pieper's criticism displaces both scientism and the move towards so-called "weak scientism" (the thesis that science is broader than natural sciences) and "epistemic opportunism" (the thesis that we should be optimists about scientific success). Following the demise of the Early Vienna Circle and logical positivism on what "empirical" and "observation" mean\, Pieper's argument is that scientism intrinsically carries with it an implausible concept of experience\, and so should be rejected. Here is the structure of the argument. Because science is an empirical (a posteriori) endeavor\, it requires an intelligible notion of experience (or observation). Scientism must say that what exhausts experience is simply the natural world as experienced by our senses. However\, this leaves out much of the world as we experience it\, not only in its extra-scientific qualities (Schrödinger provides some entertaining examples) but also in the objects of experience themselves ("moral experience"\, as some call it\, is a paradigmatic example). The theoretical advantages of this broad(er) account of experience (which is incompatible with scientism) are its alignment with moral-epistemic virtues like epistemic justice\, as well as science's praise for dispassionate objectivity. Broader accounts of experience carry concerns as well\, especially Platonic concerns about appearances versus reality\, but all this shows - says Pieper - is that the philosophical act is indispensable.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
LOCATION:ONLINE ONLY\, University of Queensland
SEQUENCE:0
UID:5e026792a13122377bb007b8deb69c6d
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/5e026792a13122377bb007b8deb69c6d
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T200000Z
DTEND:20260708T205500Z
SUMMARY:Aristotle’s Tragic Wonder
DESCRIPTION:This talk will explore Aristotle’s concept of tragic wonder (to thaumaston)\, accompanied by shock (ekplexis). Despite the enormous interest in the&nbsp\;Poetics\, not many scholars (e.g.\, Kyriakou 1995\, 88-96\; Drake 2010) have analyzed closely the importance of wonder for best tragedies. While&nbsp\;any unusual elements can arouse wonder in&nbsp\;Methaphysics&nbsp\;(1.982b12-14)\, tragic wonder should follow a narrower pattern: a logical plot structure that turns “beyond expectation” (para tēn doxan\,&nbsp\;Poetics&nbsp\;9.1452a3). This preference merits a deeper analysis than it has received. We shall investigate (1) why the Homeric epic seems to be given more freedom than tragedy in constructing wondrous incidents\; (2) the reasons for which&nbsp\;even the illusion of a precise dramatic purpose is better than randomness and (3) why this paradoxical tragic structure (logical and yet culminating in shock) surpasses all the other types of plots in the&nbsp\;Poetics. As an illustration\, we will focus on a puzzling case study\, Euripides’&nbsp\;Iphigenia among the Taurians\, which remains an Aristotelian favorite for achieving the wondrous effect despite ending with a series of illogical incidents. Finally\, a sharp distinction will be drawn between the Aristotelian preferences and modern ideas of dramatic suspense.
CATEGORIES:AESTHETICS
LOCATION:ONLINE ONLY\, University of Queensland
SEQUENCE:0
UID:c1d9bd39548c8671b328a3c9ecb64563
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/c1d9bd39548c8671b328a3c9ecb64563
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T210000Z
DTEND:20260708T215500Z
SUMMARY:The Concept of Intensity in Leibniz's Metaphysics
DESCRIPTION:It is generally accepted that Leibniz’s a posteriori argument which seeks to establish that force\, measured by mv2 rather than mv\, is conserved in the universe\, has direct bearing on his broader metaphysical agenda. Leibniz is not simply introducing a new physical quantity and an argument for its conservation. He seeks to furnish a metaphysical foundation of mechanical physics.\n\nThis aim\, arguably\, is even more patent in his a priori argument for the conservation of actio. As Leibniz writes to De Volder\, this argument is the “gate” through which one is to pass to the right metaphysics. I offer to bring into relief the metaphysical significance of the concept of intensity (intensio) in Leibniz’s a priori argument. Leibniz argues that quantity of actio is a product of intensity and extensity (extensio). Intensity is either velocity (when extensity is space) or square of velocity (when extensity is time). When taken in the latter sense\, I argue\, intensity receives a metaphysical inflection. Scholars have traced this notion to the medieval language of latitudo formarum. I contend that it denotes a degree of primitive activity constitutive of a singularity of substance\, akin to Scotus’s notion of intensity as a degree of being’s perfection.
CATEGORIES:HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:ONLINE ONLY\, University of Queensland
SEQUENCE:0
UID:d8cc33baf033bf651310a2d7edabf60f
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/d8cc33baf033bf651310a2d7edabf60f
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T220000Z
DTEND:20260708T225500Z
SUMMARY:Psychiatry as Pre-Paradigmatic Science
DESCRIPTION:Psychiatry faces profound challenges a quarter of the way into the twenty-first century. Most notably\, there are various philosophical disputes pertaining to a) dimensional vs. categorical models of mental disorder\, b) the status of psychiatric kinds\, c) states vs. traits as the central constructs of psychiatry\, and d) the language of “mental disorder” vs. “mental variation.” Furthermore\, these ontological disputes are accompanied by methodological disputes regarding which causal factors are most relevant to formulating generalizations about particular mental disorders. Meanwhile\, the DSM faces both a validity crisis and a comorbidity crisis. These problems have motivated some in the field to formulate new research traditions– such as RDoC and HiTOP– which offer distinct and novel approaches to the subject matter of psychiatry. The central claim that I advance here is that contemporary psychiatry approximates a pre-paradigmatic Kuhnian science. I take Kuhn’s theory of scientific practice and change as an idealized model– one which abstracts away from the details of particular episodes in the histories of particular sciences\, but which nevertheless presents an “ideal type” for how scientific progress often occurs. Two alternative explanations that I will address here are 1) the Human Science Explanation and 2) the Medical Science Explanation.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
LOCATION:ONLINE ONLY\, University of Queensland
SEQUENCE:0
UID:5414f46b35216274ae570c877780241f
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/5414f46b35216274ae570c877780241f
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T223000Z
DTEND:20260708T230000Z
SUMMARY:Check-in Desk
DESCRIPTION:Check-in Desk open.
CATEGORIES:
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:f8bc02a1d2dded4a593539a90a189a92
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/f8bc02a1d2dded4a593539a90a189a92
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260708T230000Z
DTEND:20260709T002500Z
SUMMARY:Vagueness and Nonclassical Probabilities
DESCRIPTION:Thinking in terms of probabilities can give us a valuable lens on uses of vague language. In particular\, it holds out the promise of bringing formally-tractable theories closer to empirical observations about how speakers actually use vague language. However\, most existing applications of probability to vague language assume a classical approach to probability. This may be fine as a first approximation\, but does not deal well with certain observed phenomena that have been used to motivate formal treatments of vague language based on nonclassical logics. Here I have in mind some phenomena around what have been called "borderline contradictions". In particular\, speakers seem relatively happy to agree\, of a borderline case of "tall" (for example)\, that they are both tall and not tall\; but speakers are also resistant\, in such cases\, to agree that such a person is tall\, or that they are not tall. These phenomena have been used to motivate three-valued non-probabilistic theories of vague language.\n\nIn this talk\, try to bring these approaches together\, in a way that hopefully achieves some of the virtues of both probabilistic and nonclassical approaches. I give an outline of some of the reasons probabilistic approaches to vague language seem promising and enlightening. Then I turn to borderline contradictions\, arguing that classical probabilities are not well-suited for understanding this phenomenon. Finally\, I make steps towards a theory of nonclassical probabilities that (I hope) can achieve the goods of existing probabilistic theories of vagueness\, while fitting with a plausible approach to borderline contradictions.
CATEGORIES:KEYNOTE
LOCATION:Steele-206-HYBRID\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:2ce4982cdade859211ae969985f43141
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/2ce4982cdade859211ae969985f43141
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T003000Z
DTEND:20260709T005500Z
SUMMARY:Morning Break
DESCRIPTION:Morning Break
CATEGORIES:BREAKS
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:681a2ba3e1ac69904f026ac1c9ed516f
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/681a2ba3e1ac69904f026ac1c9ed516f
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T010000Z
DTEND:20260709T015500Z
SUMMARY:Hobbesian Honour and Its Constraints
DESCRIPTION:Scholarly accounts of Hobbes’s theory of passions focus on fear of death and glory. Honour is often conflated with glory. I argue that honour is not a passion but a power. Honouring is a natural attribute that recognises another's higher value (power). Honour is always a relative term that varies with the standing of the parties and the context. &nbsp\;If one is honoured too highly\, this is flattery. If too lowly\, then one is dishonoured.\n\nGiven the ubiquity of flattery and miserliness\, how do we know true honour? While not explicit\, Hobbes suggests that self-knowledge measures honours proffered and being dispassionate assists since passions reduce power. The constraints on honour are clearer. Most significant is Hobbes’s principle of equality. In the seventeenth century\, honour was closely aligned to social status: one should act honourably within one’s social rank. Hobbes sweeps rank aside\, insisting we are equal as members of a species. If inequality does exist\, we should treat others as equals in the interest of peace. Honour\, then\, demands modesty in the name of equality and acceptance of impermanence in context and status. Though modest\, honour can be valued more highly than life itself\, as in war and duels. Used wisely\, it is a powerful tool for the sovereign.
CATEGORIES:ASEMP
LOCATION:Steele-206\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:37a6190c30133717c80e6c67a7f6d5cb
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/37a6190c30133717c80e6c67a7f6d5cb
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T010000Z
DTEND:20260709T015500Z
SUMMARY:Linking Solidarity and Decoloniality in Global Health Research
DESCRIPTION:Decoloniality is gaining increasing traction in efforts to change the colonial-rooted structures and practices within global health. In Global Health Research (GHR)\, decoloniality challenges historical injustices\, power dynamics\, and epistemic injustices in research practices with reformative options. While some recent initiatives towards decolonising GHR draw on solidarity as a guiding value\, there are limited works that connect decolonial conceptualisations of solidarity to decoloniality in GHR. This article links a decolonial account of solidarity from the global South to the call for decoloniality in GHR. Using a beehive allegory as an example of conceptualising solidarity in African culture\, it argues that such an account has profound implications for addressing the problems of power hierarchies and epistemic injustice in GHR. Linking a decolonial account of solidarity to decoloniality in GHR helps to re-orient the logic of supremacy and promote humility. This paper considers possible objections against a decolonial account of solidarity and calls for more decolonial conceptualisations of solidarity and other values that can further drive the GHR decoloniality agenda.
CATEGORIES:BIOETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-237\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:52168da3a4478e41b47af5e08ff10982
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/52168da3a4478e41b47af5e08ff10982
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T010000Z
DTEND:20260709T015500Z
SUMMARY:Minimal Self v Narrative Self
DESCRIPTION:The&nbsp\;Sāṁkhyakārikā&nbsp\;is one of the classical texts of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. In this text\, the concept of&nbsp\;Puruṣa is regarded as 'a pure conscious being' and the ultimate reality of the universe. It relates to&nbsp\;Prakṛti&nbsp\;for an evolution. During evolution\, if a living creature is created\, an element of&nbsp\;Puruṣa is believed to be embedded in it\, i.e.\, life/consciousness. Since many living creatures exist on the earth\, a plurality of selves exist. We consider a living creature (i.e.\, a person) a 'narrative self.' In contrast to a narrative self\, we regard&nbsp\;Puruṣa as the 'minimal self.' Against this backdrop\, the paper examines the minimal self's origin\, nature\, and function. It elucidates the differences between the 'minimal self' and a 'narrative self.' It analyzes&nbsp\;Sāṁkhyakārikā's arguments about the minimal self and narrative self by relating them to Dan Zahavi's and Shaun Gallagher's interpretations of the minimal and narrative self. The paper illustrates transcendental and empirical consciousness by considering the minimal and narrative selves. In the end\, the paper submits that the minimal self is a prerequisite for the existence of a narrative self\, and they have an inherence relation to their subsistence.
CATEGORIES:EASTERN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-309\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:c84169bac48ca11f10114471ae4834cf
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/c84169bac48ca11f10114471ae4834cf
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T010000Z
DTEND:20260709T015500Z
SUMMARY:Past History is Always Contemporary
DESCRIPTION:One of Benedetto Croce's main teachings is 'all history is contemporary history': by this he meant that\, however distant in time an event is\, it is contemporary because we remember it and think of it to solve an intellectual problem that concerns us now. For example\, an entity X\, the English civil war\, is contemporary to us and exists now when we think of it because of our present need to oppose absolutism in the name of freedom of thought.\n\nIf no one thought of the English civil war in the 17th century\, it would not exist at all. The present is constantly changing and every new (emerging) thought about the English civil war will change - little or a lot - the content of it.\nFollowing this theory\, there are no timeless entities. Indeed\, one must analyse the characteristics of an entity that can be defined as 'timeless'\, even in Mac Taggart's specific description of the B-series.
CATEGORIES:ENABLING DIVERSE KNOWLEDGES
LOCATION:GCI-273 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:c6e4248165f146b9cbc8b751749f731d
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/c6e4248165f146b9cbc8b751749f731d
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T010000Z
DTEND:20260709T015500Z
SUMMARY:Is Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology Meritocratic?
DESCRIPTION:Virtue epistemology has emerged as an influential alternative to traditional knowledge theories. It has two main branches: reliabilism\, which sees epistemic virtues as cognitive faculties that reliably produce true beliefs (Sosa\, 2007)\, and responsibilism\, which prioritizes acquired epistemic habits over innate faculties\, considering them "appropriate objects of praise and blame" (Axtell\, 1997\, p. 26). Virtue epistemology\, in either of its classical strands\, argues that the epistemic arises from personal virtues. This has been questioned as it understands both cognitive faculties and responsibilist virtues as traits of the individual agent and difficult to apply to collective agents (see Navarro & Pino\, 2021). In our presentation\, we argue that virtues can be traits of the group\, of society\, based on networks of trust and collaboration (see Broncano\, 2020). Many have developed a reliabilist virtue epistemology grounded not in an individual agent but in a collective agent (see Kellestrup\, 2020). However\, if these new reliabilist models aim to account for how agents come to know (based on reliable dispositions) in collective terms\, the main thesis of our presentation is that this new way of understanding virtue epistemology is insensitive to social structures that generate ignorance and epistemic injustices\, such as meritocracy and ableism.
CATEGORIES:EPISTEMOLOGY
LOCATION:GCI-275 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:7f00ee92d891cb37636c107a1c9e3ecc
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/7f00ee92d891cb37636c107a1c9e3ecc
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T010000Z
DTEND:20260709T015500Z
SUMMARY:A Novel Defence of the Ethical Narrativity Thesis
DESCRIPTION:There have been several attempts to defend the Ethical Narrativity Thesis (ENT)\, that is\, the claim that people ought to develop and live according to a self-narrative because it is essential to living well or flourishing. Existing arguments for the ENT have several weaknesses\, some rely on an excessively narrow view of flourishing\, one sets the threshold for self-narrative so low that the concept is rendered trivial\, others only promote a limited ENT whereby self-narratives enable valuable kinds of emotional experience but don’t influence agency. I put forward a novel argument for the ENT that avoids these weaknesses. I claim that self-narratives provide a powerful and irreplicable means of diachronically stabilising intentions because they are ideally suited to anticipating\, constructing\, and shaping our perspectives over time. As such\, self-narration is a valuable tool for achieving self-governance. My view entails that people who don’t self-narrate are relatively vulnerable to failures of self-governance due to temptation and the cognitive burden of deliberation. Self-governance is a necessary (but insufficient) condition for flourishing so people who self-narrate will\, ceteris paribus\, flourish more than those who do not.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:6e914fe55c9374c8cee32c72cb027a5f
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/6e914fe55c9374c8cee32c72cb027a5f
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T010000Z
DTEND:20260709T015500Z
SUMMARY:Stoic Faith
DESCRIPTION:The human condition is inherently challenging. Our lives are coloured by toil\, limitation\, pain\, illness\, impermanence\, and death. Added to these obstacles is an apparent lack of moral economy in the universe. These circumstances render us susceptible to mental disturbances such as despair\, nihilism\, anxiety\, and grief. Ancient spiritual traditions aim to provide a bulwark against these afflictions by reframing the human condition in a manner that allows us to face it with equanimity and courage. In the Western context\, two traditions have been particularly influential. Christianity teaches that while the human condition is fundamentally bad in several respects (e.g.\, suffering\, sin\, death)\, thanks to God’s grace\, the faithful can look forward to an afterlife that is free from the woes of terrestrial existence. Stoicism proceeds by challenging common assumptions about value and well-being\; pain\, illness\, and death are not bad for us because well-being depends solely on virtue. In this paper\, I argue that accepting the Stoic account of well-being\, which is the core Stoic doctrine\, is ultimately a matter of faith\, and that we have good reasons to cultivate this faith. I also argue that Stoic faith is more attainable and stable than conventional religious faith. &nbsp\;
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-315\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:926744c037e3be668cdb7b75bd4056f1
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/926744c037e3be668cdb7b75bd4056f1
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T010000Z
DTEND:20260709T015500Z
SUMMARY:Truth Constrained
DESCRIPTION:I develop a two-part theory of truth according to which the truth of a sentence requires more than just the world being as the sentence says it is. Truth requires this kind of correspondence\, and also something further - what I call `Steadiness'. My proposal builds on the legacy of Bradwardine\, Buridan\, and Swyneshed\, who proposed two-part accounts of truth. Like many theories of truth\, mine is forged in the fires of paradox. In this talk\, I will outline how my account of truth works\, how it ties into the debates about paradoxes\, discuss some of its implications for logic and semantics\, and suggest avenues for further development of the proposal.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-314\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:a13ba6cf4e2cdc058153b4dc39c99d65
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/a13ba6cf4e2cdc058153b4dc39c99d65
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T010000Z
DTEND:20260709T015500Z
SUMMARY:A Structural Dilemma for Frankfurt-Style Cases
DESCRIPTION:Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) are widely regarded as counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). In response\, Widerker (1995)\, Ginet (1996)\, and others have advanced the well-known Dilemma Defense: in any FSC\, either the agent is not morally responsible\, or the agent could have done otherwise. This defense is often thought to depend on a “prior sign”—an indicator of how the agent is likely to act. To address this\, Mele and Robb (1998)\, Hunt (2000)\, and others have revised FSCs to eliminate the role of such signs. This paper sets that debate aside and argues instead that all standard FSCs face a deeper structural dilemma\, one that arises from the very nature of these cases and does not depend on prior signs. As a result\, FSCs cannot serve as genuine counterexamples to PAP.
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:Steele-262\, 3 Staff House Rd\, University of Queensland\, St Lucia QLD 4067
SEQUENCE:0
UID:7f2dd73175aebd3e3081bc7f82395d97
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/7f2dd73175aebd3e3081bc7f82395d97
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T010000Z
DTEND:20260709T015500Z
SUMMARY:Commercial Surrogacy as Illegitimate Work
DESCRIPTION:Is surrogacy a form of legitimate work? Or does the nature of pregnancy and parenthood render surrogacy illegitimate? In this presentation I argue that the best strategy in defence of commercial surrogacy—which I call the “surrogacy-as-legitimate-work” strategy—relies on two implicit assumptions and that once we make them explicit\, we are forced to see that commercial surrogacy inevitably leads to a conflict of core moral rights. As I hope to show\, if commercial surrogacy is a type of work\, it is work that cannot simultaneously protect the right of the surrogate mother to opt out and the right of the commissioning couple to exercise ultimate authority over the foetus.
CATEGORIES:POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-320\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:7a6ac38666a63ebc758ad9b7a189f282
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/7a6ac38666a63ebc758ad9b7a189f282
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T020000Z
DTEND:20260709T025500Z
SUMMARY:Hobbes on Zero-Sum Power
DESCRIPTION:This paper explores whether\, for Hobbes\, having power is intrinsically comparative. Is having power always already 'more power' than someone else\, so that some people having power means that others lack it? In more contemporary terms\, is power 'zero-sum'? Or can many individuals simultaneously have power? I will argue that Hobbes does initially conceive of power as zero-sum\, but that he later repudiates this conceptualisation. I'll reconstruct the weaknesses of his early view\, and how these are remedied in his later work. I'll then trace the ramifications of this conceptual shift for Hobbes's moral psychology of justice and equity.
CATEGORIES:ASEMP
LOCATION:Steele-206\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:52739bd92440b75b5796cd276e20f0ef
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/52739bd92440b75b5796cd276e20f0ef
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T020000Z
DTEND:20260709T025500Z
SUMMARY:Enduring Interests of People with Dementia: Revising the Revision Model
DESCRIPTION:In philosophical literature on dementia\, a key question is how to determine what is in the best interest of people with dementia. Two opposing views exist: one appeals to a person's former values\, while the other suggests that past values matter little\, focusing instead on current perspectives. Franklin Hall recently proposed a third alternative: the "revision model”. This model holds that we only consider past values if they have been revised and the person is answerable for why. I make a case for modifying Hall’s answerability requirement. I draw a distinction between a direct answer and a demonstrable answer. I argue that even when the requirements of answerability are not directly met\, requirements can still be met indirectly: we may identify answers through epistemic resources and contextual clues available to us. In some cases\, where epistemic access is limited and the person cannot offer a direct response\, all we have is the absence of evidence that the answerability requirement has been met\, not evidence that it has not been met. The upshot is that\, in a wider range of cases\, people with dementia may still meet the requirements of answerability\, or at least\, it may remain undetermined whether those requirements are unmet.
CATEGORIES:BIOETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-237\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:d2186920caa59445d65bf57e20c3c822
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/d2186920caa59445d65bf57e20c3c822
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T020000Z
DTEND:20260709T025500Z
SUMMARY:The Nonduality of Subject and Object
DESCRIPTION:According to Asian nondual traditions\, the apparent separation between subject and object is an illusion. If this is true\, then how do we understand the nondual experience and even more importantly how do we experience it? I argue that we can distinguish between two types of nonduality: (1) Nonduality by exclusion: An experience in which there is no distinction between subject and object. (2) Nonduality by inclusion: An experience in which subject and object are non-separate\, but in which an experiential distinction can still be drawn. While there are certainly many reports of contemplative experiences that involve the former\, I am particularly interested in how to experience the latter in everyday life. To explore this and most importantly to experience nonduality directly for ourselves\, I will guide the audience through a series of Douglas Harding’s first-person experiments. While conceptualisations of the phenomenology of nonduality may never be entirely adequate\, I believe that different accounts can be useful for bringing out different aspects of these experiences. I will hence conclude by outlining five potential accounts: reductive identity (the bundle theory)\, substance-mode\, the paradoxical account\, co-constitution and the dialectical account.
CATEGORIES:EASTERN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-309\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:892821cb3e9c1a12129a622ae6f155d9
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/892821cb3e9c1a12129a622ae6f155d9
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T020000Z
DTEND:20260709T025500Z
SUMMARY:Knowledge\, Norms\, and the Unification of Justification
DESCRIPTION:One site of agreement among several proponents and opponents of the knowledge norm of justified belief (KNJ) is that some senses of justification ought to be unified. Consider the deontic sense of justification\, whereby one’s belief itself is justified just in case it follows the norm of belief\, and the hypological sense of justification\, whereby the believer herself is justified in their belief just in case her epistemic performance in so believing is positively evaluable to a sufficient degree. Littlejohn\, for instance\, leverages the equation of these two senses – i.e.\, one’s belief is deontically justified if and only if one is hypologically justified in so believing (DHJ) – to undermine non-factive norms of justification.&nbsp\;\nNow\, DHJ does not suffice to establish KNJ\, but I argue that the most plausible way to do so is by an infallibilist interpretation of DHJ\, called DHJ-i: infallible hypological justification just is infallible deontic justification. I also argue that DHJ-i is a more defensible principle than DHJ. Therefore\, given that DHJ is independently plausible outside of KNJ’s truth-value\, this spells trouble for opponents of KNJ: they must either deny their very position or commit to a problematic denial of this way of unifying justification’s different senses.
CATEGORIES:EPISTEMOLOGY
LOCATION:GCI-275 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:b51b0b44cfb3bcd0ad6187cca64dc86e
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/b51b0b44cfb3bcd0ad6187cca64dc86e
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T020000Z
DTEND:20260709T025500Z
SUMMARY:Interspecies Population Ethics: A Disturbing Problem for Animal Ethics
DESCRIPTION:Animal ethics is increasingly arguing that moral obligations exist to intervene into ecology to reduce wild animal suffering\; this requires control over animal reproduction. This raises serious population ethics concerns that have been ignored by animal ethics. Practical human population ethics has confined itself to comparing reproductive choices that involve a human agent creating one or zero individuals. Because human agents attract reproductive autonomy\, obligations to create more or less individuals than would be freely chosen are not considered. However\, animal ethics is not constrained by animal autonomy\, or values given to biodiversity\, species membership and ecological roles as animal ethics has converged to reject their import. Sustainability is also dismissed as ultimately constraining our relationship to animals and ecology\; technological innovation is always possible. The interspecies population ethics avaliable suggests repugnant conclusions are avoided by a hierarchy of moral standing\; no matter how big the animal population\, a human population remains preferable. I show that animal ethics has harboured implicit support for such a hierarchy from Mill to Regan. I conclude that animal ethics forced to confront population ethics either degrades into a weak anti-cruelty framework or supports eugenics that phases out all non-human animal life.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-315\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:983ab58805d18204123bf372cf74b5d2
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/983ab58805d18204123bf372cf74b5d2
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T020000Z
DTEND:20260709T025500Z
SUMMARY:Vandana Shiva: An Agrarian Virtue Ethics
DESCRIPTION:Vandana Shiva is an ecological thinker and food justice activist renowned for her incisive critiques of industrial agriculture. Shiva’s vision of the appropriate human-nature relation and the&nbsp\;good life\, I argue\, is often expressed via an informal use of virtue language. Although her work makes no direct reference to virtue ethics\, it is deeply suffused with essential components of virtuous appraisal. Shiva’s holistic understanding of ecology and the role of smallholder farmers valorises particular characteristics\, behaviours and actions that are specific to the practice of farming. Across her body of work\, Shiva provides a thick account of virtuous behaviours and dispositions to realise in the agricultural context. In this talk\, I make explicit the agrarian virtue ethics that is arguably implicit in Shiva’s work. I explore particular virtues I deem to best capture her implicit ontology of engaging in a virtuous life.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:c086be2003f37350dca1c67a63421224
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/c086be2003f37350dca1c67a63421224
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T020000Z
DTEND:20260709T025500Z
SUMMARY:Perdurance by Degrees
DESCRIPTION:According to perdurantism\, the survival relation obtains between two person-stages just in case they are both temporal parts of the same person. According to a degree-based view of survival\, the survival relation admits of degrees. This paper considers three ways in which perdurantists can accommodate a degree-based view of survival: they could introduce gradations to the property of being a person-stage (person-stage approach)\, the parthood relation between person-stages and persons (mereological approach)\, or the connection relation between person-stages in a person (topological approach). A formal mereological framework is formulated for representing the perdurantist view of survival\, and it is shown that all three approaches can be implemented in independently motivated extensions of the framework. It is argued that of the three approaches\, the topological approach offers the greatest flexibility when it comes to accounting for non-symmetric instances of survival and allows perdurantism to share the advantages of exdurantism over endurantism.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-314\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:2085f148c0adf1c3f7e62521b2413283
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/2085f148c0adf1c3f7e62521b2413283
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T020000Z
DTEND:20260709T025500Z
SUMMARY:Agency in Free Will Skepticism
DESCRIPTION:Free will skepticism is a position that either doubts or explicitly denies the existence of free will. In contrast\, some proponents of free will—particularly compatibilists—affirm its existence by appealing to the concept of "agency." They argue that if individuals act with agency\, then\, even if determinism is true and their actions lack alternative possibilities or sourcehood\, they still possess the freedom necessary for moral responsibility.\n\nHowever\, free will skepticism does not necessarily focus on agency. If a form of free will skepticism can meet the compatibilist criteria for agency while still remaining valid\, it would present a significant philosophical challenge. In this presentation\, I will examine Galen Strawson’s 'Basic Argument' as an example of free will skepticism and consider the question: "Is free will skepticism incompatible with agency?" I will explore how agency can be satisfied within free will skepticism and whether\, despite this\, it can still raise fundamental doubts about our freedom and moral responsibility.\nSuch an inquiry\, I believe\, can help avoid the issue of talking past one another in free will debates\, fostering a more productive discussion.
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:Steele-262\, 3 Staff House Rd\, University of Queensland\, St Lucia QLD 4067
SEQUENCE:0
UID:70b8968f637b81226d95d1168ee8d2dd
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/70b8968f637b81226d95d1168ee8d2dd
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T020000Z
DTEND:20260709T025500Z
SUMMARY:A Real Old Dilemma for Multiple Realizability
DESCRIPTION:Some proponents of multiple realization attempt to eat their realized cake while having their reduction\, too. The constrained identity account of multiple realization offered by Polger and Shapiro (2016) is such an attempt\, and in this paper I argue that it\, and attempts like it\, will lead to a complex dilemma for proponents of hybrid identity/realization accounts. Either they adhere to Kim’s (1992) principle of the causal individuation of kinds\, in which case they must deal with Kim’s own reductionist dilemma for multiple realization\, or they follow Polger and Shapiro (2016) in weakening Kim’s principle to the causally-relevant individuation of kinds. However\, this leads to a relativisation of kinds to human interests\, and thus to a pragmatist approach to science. Since multiple realizationists tend to be realists (after all\, they think one set of entities at a basic level of reality makes another set of entities real)\, this is a problem for them. After diagnosing the problem they face\, I offer them only unpalatable solutions: accept one or other fork of the dilemma and agree with Kim’s extreme reductivism or accept a pragmatism which admits only a watery realism.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
LOCATION:GCI-273 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:d24cddcdf52890e58886758ab7e8b171
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/d24cddcdf52890e58886758ab7e8b171
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T020000Z
DTEND:20260709T025500Z
SUMMARY:Reading Mill as Pragmatist on Freedom of Expression
DESCRIPTION:The aim of this paper is to present and defend a pragmatist interpretation of John Stuart Mill’s arguments defending freedom of expression. By drawing a comparison between Mill’s arguments in On Liberty and the work of Charles Peirce\, this paper argues that Mill’s fundamental commitment to epistemic fallibilism as a basis for supporting freedom of expression situates him more closely to the pragmatist tradition of collaborative inquiry than the liberal notion of a clash of competing perspectives. This reading of Mill provides a more precise theoretical groundwork for further re-examination of the limits of free speech without necessary reference to the Mill’s utilitarian harm principle\, with the right to voice one’s opinion contingent upon said opinion’s pragmatic contribution to collaborative inquiry in the collective pursuit of truth. His arguments provide further reasons to question liberal ideas of static preferences\, suggesting that freedom of opinion entails being receptive to the experience of genuinely felt doubt as a basis for remaining open to revising our personal commitments and opinions.
CATEGORIES:POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-320\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:4907de94e6f258e3ae2ce4e9d117340b
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/4907de94e6f258e3ae2ce4e9d117340b
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T030000Z
DTEND:20260709T035500Z
SUMMARY:Lunch
DESCRIPTION:Lunch Break
CATEGORIES:BREAKS
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:bef45f4240cf2dd586cb0ef0f4ae5518
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/bef45f4240cf2dd586cb0ef0f4ae5518
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T040000Z
DTEND:20260709T045500Z
SUMMARY:From Reason to Intuition in Spinoza's Ethics
DESCRIPTION:Spinoza emphasizes the value of intuition\, the third kind of knowledge\, which he associates with the greatest human joy (E5p32=Ethics\, Part 5\, Proposition 32). He writes little\, however\, about how we might come to attain intuitive knowledge. The clearest suggestion is that such knowledge somehow arises from a different\, less valuable sort of knowledge\, reason (E5p28)\, but it is difficult to see how it might do so. After all\, for Spinoza\, it appears that (1) reason consists in common notions (E2p40s2)\, which are ideas of what is common to things (E2p38C)\; (2) intuition is knowledge of the essence of things (E2p40s2)\; and (3) what is common to things does not constitute the essence of anything (E2p37). In this essay\, I try to make a little headway against this problem. I argue\, first\, against (1)\, that the&nbsp\;Ethics may suggest that there are other ideas that are also ideas of reason but that are not common notions\; second\, that there is good reason to think that such ideas include ideas of laws of nature\; and third\, mitigating the problem that (3) presents\, that laws of nature do\, for Spinoza\, constitute the essence of things.
CATEGORIES:ASEMP
LOCATION:GCI-275 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:de45a7f567c64d2dbcca6e555bdf3760
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/de45a7f567c64d2dbcca6e555bdf3760
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T040000Z
DTEND:20260709T045500Z
SUMMARY:How Much Explainability is Enough?
DESCRIPTION:Recent debates on the ethical use of AI in medicine have gradually shifted from asking whether explainability as an epistemic property matters morally in terms of adopting a medical AI that cannot be fully understood by humans to determining how much explainability is required across different clinical contexts. This shift recognises that explainability is a matter of degree\, and that the ethical adoption of medical technologies does not always require a full understanding of their underlying mechanisms. Following this view\, some suggest that the level of explainability required should be determined by how a medical AI system would affect a person’s life — the greater the irreversibility\, invasiveness\, or risk of an intervention\, the higher the demand for explainability.\n\nThis paper challenges that position. Using recent research on sepsis scoring systems and their use in the clinical context as a case study\, I argue that the level of explainability required for adopting a diagnostic tool do not track these clinical factors. Instead\, the degree of explainability ethically required should depend on the epistemic objectives the tool is designed to fulfil. In some contexts\, a high level of explainability may be essential even when clinical risks are low.
CATEGORIES:BIOETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-237\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:79a5f2e2a54f3674a6d2cdcb93f430ab
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/79a5f2e2a54f3674a6d2cdcb93f430ab
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T040000Z
DTEND:20260709T045500Z
SUMMARY:Contemporary Philosophical Debates on Nagarjuna's Logic of Emptiness
DESCRIPTION:The doctrine of Dependent Origination is a view of a great Philosopher Buddha. Seeing Dependent Origination is seeing the truth of the Selflessness of dharmas (Emptiness of dharmas). This is a unique view of the history of Philosophy. The doctrine of No-self is a feature of Buddhist teachings\, which is entirely different from all philosophies and beliefs of the world. Nagarjuna appeared several centuries after the Buddha and followed the thought of Dependent Origination to establish the Madhyamika (Sunyata) school or Middle Way. Although many centuries have passed\, Nagarjuna’s doctrine of emptiness is still valid for breaking all attachments. This empty foundation can be seen as the pinnacle of wisdom that has brought Buddhism above all other doctrines. Nagarjuna Philosophy of Logic of Emptiness on Logic Two truths and Logic of Non-Dualism\, or Logic of Eight Negations. The Two Truths logic clearly explains the existence of emptiness as well as its practicality. The logic of Non-Dualism (Eight negations) smashes all thoughts of attachment to worldly phenomena as well as creative ideas of some schools.
CATEGORIES:EASTERN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-309\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:fea94c8782086723901473acf1849cbf
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/fea94c8782086723901473acf1849cbf
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T040000Z
DTEND:20260709T045500Z
SUMMARY:An Extensional Mereology for Fundamental Particles with Intrinsic Properties
DESCRIPTION:Many mereologists think Weak Supplementation is analytic (Simons\, 1987\; Effingham & Robson\, 2007\; Varzi\, 2008)\, while its opponents generally rely on denying Extensionality. Weaker alternatives like Strong Company have been proposed\, but its models seemed physically implausible without time travel (Simons\, 1987\; Cotnoir & Varzi\, 2021). If charge and mass are intrinsic properties of fundamental particles\, however (Lewis\, 1991\; Bird\, 2007)\, then an Extensionality-preserving physical model of Strong Company exists.\n\nThe idea is that calculating mass and charge for isolated fundamental particles requires accounting for self-interactions via perturbative expansions\, represented as Feynman diagrams of increasing order. If mass and charge are intrinsic\, then these self-interactions must be parts of the particle propagator. Indeed the perturbative expansion generates a weak partial order with Reflexivity\, Anti-Symmetry\, and Transitivity. If the bare propagator is treated as a top\, then the poset forms a join semi-lattice interpretable as parthood. As the sequence is infinite every perturbation order will occur\, there are no disjoint parts\, so the strongest possible decomposition axiom is Strong Company. Yet two Feynman diagrams which allow the same perturbations are topologically identical\, so the model satisfies Extensionality. The intrinsic properties of fundamental particles demotivate the analyticity of Weak Supplementation.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:GCI-273 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:28de268b6b3db3d81b225de78db0661a
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/28de268b6b3db3d81b225de78db0661a
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T040000Z
DTEND:20260709T045500Z
SUMMARY:About Nothing in Particular
DESCRIPTION:Parmenides insisted that we could not even think of &nbsp\;non-being (though apparently we could say that)! At least since then there have been (and still are ) two traditions\, one maintaining &nbsp\;that about nothing we could speak positively\, saying for example that it has features\, or\, significantly for the Abrahamic religions\, &nbsp\;that 'from it' everything was created\, and the other that all true sentences in which 'nothing' figures as subject or topic have the logical form of negative sentences denying claims about what there is or could be. This paper traces part of the history of the debate focusing first on Fridugisus of Tours and Anselm of Canterbury as representatives of the two traditions and &nbsp\;taking up a later medieval debate involving Walter Burley and William Ockham about the coherence of reference to impossibilia. At stake are issues about criteria of ontological commitment\, the relation between being and thinkability and (even) the distinction between nothing and God!
CATEGORIES:HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:6f74d96c5a3c186650221b9df2f79619
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/6f74d96c5a3c186650221b9df2f79619
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T040000Z
DTEND:20260709T045500Z
SUMMARY:Apocalypse Now?
DESCRIPTION:Doomsday is the last moment in time. Nothing comes after. In the recent literature on temporal metaphysics\, several theories have been challenged by arguments invoking doomsday. In this talk I focus on the papers of Loss (2019)\, Andreoletti (2022)\, and Bigg and Miller (2024). A shared premise in these arguments is that it would be a problem or drawback for a theory of time\, if it failed to allow for moments of&nbsp\;undetermined doomsday. In this scenario\, time ends\, despite it not being determined to by the laws plus the state of the world. Each of these authors argues that this scenario is at least&nbsp\;possible\, so we should expect a good theory of time to make room for it. In this talk\, I argue against this point. In general\, if a theory of time is incompatible with undetermined doomsday\, then that is merely an interesting but neutral consequence of that theory. More broadly\, we can expect various theories of time to be incompatible with various doomsday scenarios\, up to and including being incompatible with any doomsday at all. I argue that this is not a&nbsp\;prima facie problematic stance to adopt.
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:Steele-262\, 3 Staff House Rd\, University of Queensland\, St Lucia QLD 4067
SEQUENCE:0
UID:bdb6954f52589fec7454875842796901
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/bdb6954f52589fec7454875842796901
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T040000Z
DTEND:20260709T045500Z
SUMMARY:Possibilistic Assessment of Climate Uncertainty and Marine Ice-Cliff Instability
DESCRIPTION:I have argued that uncertainty assessment of climate model predictions should typically be of the extent to which they are epistemically possible and that\, in some cases where they are epistemically possible\, the possibilities should further be ranked as to how remote they are. I have also argued that\, in the climate science context\, an epistemic possibility should be taken to be a possibility that is not recognised to be excluded by what is known and is compatible with knowledge that approximates the basic way things are in the domain the possibility is about. In the present paper\, I explain my position on assessing uncertainty in climate science and consider and respond to two challenges to its application\, specifically\, those of how to operationalise my notion of epistemic possibility and how to classify possibilities that fall short of being epistemically possible. I illustrate my view and responses in the case of the assessment of the possibility of marine ice-cliff instability induced sea-level rise.
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
LOCATION:Steele-315\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:a574922e8f3acff86bbfb1671539fb94
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/a574922e8f3acff86bbfb1671539fb94
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T040000Z
DTEND:20260709T045500Z
SUMMARY:Reciprocal Just Savings
DESCRIPTION:In recent years\, several philosophers have noted\, and tried to resolve\, a seemingly deep tension between Rawls’s accounts of inter- and intragenerational justice\; namely\, that the just savings principle seems to require the very sort of inequalities that the difference principle forbids. In this talk\, I do three things. First\, I reframe and strengthen the tension by showing that it is ostensibly deeper than most have conceived of it. Most fundamentally\, the just savings principle seemingly violates not only the difference principle but&nbsp\;also&nbsp\;a condition of reciprocity that Rawls suggests the parties in the original position would require any principle of justice to satisfy. Second\, I employ this reframing to expose the flaws in several of the leading solutions to the tension to date. And third\, I offer a new solution that goes beyond Rawls’s view—a version of the just savings principle I call the&nbsp\;Compensated Savings Principle.&nbsp\;This principle both exemplifies reciprocity and\, unlike its main rival\, also satisfies a new adequacy condition I propose for the savings principle. According to this&nbsp\;Imperative to Expedite Justice\, the savings principle must give a certain priority to establishing the material conditions needed for just institutions sooner rather than later.
CATEGORIES:POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-320\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:963220712300acdc07f3f4273aafbe42
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/963220712300acdc07f3f4273aafbe42
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T050000Z
DTEND:20260709T060000Z
SUMMARY:Spinoza on the Distinction Between Modes and Propria
DESCRIPTION:This paper challenges the widespread interpretation under which Spinoza understands the modes of God as propria. This interpretation is based on three principal doctrines:(i) Spinoza’s familiarity with the Scholastic tradition which defines propria as God’s necessary but non-essential properties\; (ii) Spinoza’s claim that each mode necessarily follows from the essence of God\; and (iii) Spinoza’s two-category ontology (substance and modes). I argue that the distinction between God’s modes and propria is compatible with (i)-(iii) because\, whereas modes are intrinsic denominations of the only substance (properties that are predicated of a thing in virtue of something inherent to that thing)\, propria are its extrinsic denominations. First\, I argue that for Late Scholastics\, such as Suárez\, the propria of God (such as eternity and infinity) are distinguished from God by reason and hence extrinsic denominations. Second\, I show that Spinoza’s understanding of propria is consistent with Suárez’s characterisation. I contrast this with Spinoza’s view of modes as inherent properties and distinguished from God by a modal distinction. Third\, I contend that by rendering propria as extrinsic denominations\, my interpretation not only accommodates (i)-(iii) but also avoids the challenge of explaining how finite\, durational things can follow from an eternal and infinite substance.
CATEGORIES:ASEMP
LOCATION:GCI-275 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:c82a56a2f777cd1141d007e89a3eed0e
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/c82a56a2f777cd1141d007e89a3eed0e
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T050000Z
DTEND:20260709T055500Z
SUMMARY:Pain suffering and the self. Part II?
DESCRIPTION:Pain asymbolia is a rare condition in which patients report the experience of pain but do not exhibit characteristic motivational/behavioral and emotional responses to a noxious stimulus. Such cases pose a challenge to a characterisation of pain derived from typical episodes in which pain sensation is intimately associated with aversive response and negatively-valenced affect. Pain asymbolia is thus test case for neuroscientific and philosophical theories of the nature of pain experience. Those theories can be described as disconnection\, depersonalisation and eliminativist (pain asymbolia is not real pain) accounts. None entirely preserve the phenomena\, satisfactorily account for the role of neural correlates.\n\nWe argue that pain asymbolia represents a failure of emotional transcription of a nociceptive signal. This explanation depends on the idea that the insula cortex anchors distributed processing that subtends a form of interoceptive active inference. As well as explaining pain asymbolia this account also explains the enigmatic and cognitively ubiquitous role of insula processing. We discuss a recent case in which the patient was subject to a full battery of modern investigative techniques. This is helpful since philosophical discussion often relies on classic neuropsychological reports\, especially the original 1931 study.
CATEGORIES:BIOETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-237\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:a154379b6c5d0e9a78dc4e82995fad8c
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/a154379b6c5d0e9a78dc4e82995fad8c
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T050000Z
DTEND:20260709T055500Z
SUMMARY:Epistemic Encroachment
DESCRIPTION:Impurists about knowledge believe practical factors and considerations about what might be rational for an agent to choose might impose constraints on the scope of what she might know. I shall argue that the most familiar and influential impurist views are mistaken. These impurist views must be mistaken because they are incompatible with something I've dubbed "epistemic encroachment". Epistemic encroachment occurs when considerations about what we know impose constraints on what might rationally be chosen. Epistemic encroachment makes sense of some seemingly robust but puzzling intuitions about choice that\, I shall argue\, our impurists about knowledge cannot make sense of given their distinctive views about the relationships between belief\, credence\, and choice. &nbsp\;
CATEGORIES:EPISTEMOLOGY
LOCATION:Steele-314\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:089d4d255e8200336a574e71be900e36
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/089d4d255e8200336a574e71be900e36
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T050000Z
DTEND:20260709T055500Z
SUMMARY:Sport\, Aesthetics and the Soul
DESCRIPTION:Existing conceptions of sport’s role in education have focused on the development of specific moral values or contextualising sports culture through philosophical discussion. While worthy and important goals\, they retain the subservience of the physical to the mental\, leading to the inherent tension between the instinctual and rational capacities of a moral agent. By treating sport similarly to artistic practice\, we can bring the rational and emotional aspects of the soul together in an embodied context. Through this\, not only is the moral agent free to make choices outside of the dictates of moral law or instinct\, but they reach a state of contemplation of what it means to be moral through beauty.\n\nBy then linking this harmonisation with meditative practices\, as espoused by Yuasa Yasuo and the idea of the unity of mind and body as something to be cultivated rather than as innate fact of human experience\, I contend that a modern physical education program must centre this idea for it to offer a unique perspective on moral education in modern education systems. Finally\, I will offer suggestions as to how this may look in a practical sense\, and how this idea of harmonisation may look in practice.
CATEGORIES:ETHICS
LOCATION:Steele-329\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:db7b0b9ca19262d7b8c2faf83b16d868
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/db7b0b9ca19262d7b8c2faf83b16d868
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T050000Z
DTEND:20260709T055500Z
SUMMARY:Weak Agents Dealing with (Relevant) Information
DESCRIPTION:Recent years have seen growing interest in applying relevant logics to formal epistemology. These logics\, with their relational semantics\, offer a natural framework for modelling agents with incomplete or inconsistent information\, while avoiding problematic classical results such as paradoxes of material implication. When epistemic operators are added to relevant logics\, we obtain systems where agents need not possess the full rational powers assumed in classical epistemic logic—for instance\, agents may not know all valid formulas. However\, even these systems retain a strong idealization: agents remain closed under relevant logical consequence\, knowing all relevant consequences of their knowledge. This talk proposes an alternative approach: a relevant epistemic logic that imposes only a weak\, minimal rationality constraint to agents. In this system\, agents’ knowledge is not closed under all relevant consequences\, thereby allowing for failures of deductive reasoning even within the framework of relevant logic. The aim is to better capture the topicality constraints and cognitive limitations that real agents face. I will outline the formal properties of this system and discuss its philosophical implications for the study of knowledge and rationality.
CATEGORIES:FORMAL METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:GCI-273 HYBRID\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:614dd61f52710b566f6c612720fc953b
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/614dd61f52710b566f6c612720fc953b
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T050000Z
DTEND:20260709T055500Z
SUMMARY:Why Should We Inquire Truth?
DESCRIPTION:This paper explores a possible explanation for why we care about truth. As human beings\, we are naturally inclined to seek truth over falsehoods. Normatively\, we are also expected to believe and assert truths rather than lies. But why is truth so important to us? One common view holds that truth has instrumental value—it helps us achieve our goals. Another view sees truth as intrinsically valuable\, valuable in itself. However\, Wrenn (2010\, 2017\, 2023) argues that both views fall short. He denies that truth itself has value but claims that caring about truth is a moral virtue\; we morally ought to seek it. Following Wrenn’s strategy\, I will also reject the idea that truth itself has value. Instead\, I focus on the process of acquiring truth. I propose that acquiring truth is a kind of achievement\, and achievement is intrinsically valuable. The pursuit of truth involves overcoming challenges and exercising our will\, a core human character. Thus\, the value lies not in truth itself\, but in the act of seeking it. By emphasizing the value of achievement\, we can explain why we ought to care about truth without assuming that truth is valuable in itself.
CATEGORIES:METAPHYSICS
LOCATION:Steele-262\, 3 Staff House Rd\, University of Queensland\, St Lucia QLD 4067
SEQUENCE:0
UID:ac675dce2180ef1903d3434e072a3c5e
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/ac675dce2180ef1903d3434e072a3c5e
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T050000Z
DTEND:20260709T055500Z
SUMMARY:Doing Philosophy: Community of Inquiry Without the Community
DESCRIPTION:As I and many others have argued\, philosophy in community projects provide powerful\, immersive introductions to philosophical thinking for participants. Embedded in the philosophy for children pedagogy of community of inquiry\, my practice has focused on activity-based stimulus that get young people to think together about questions and issues that matter to them. In the last 12 months my focus has been on ‘youth at risk’\, such as young people who are in detention\, drug and alcohol rehabilitation\, or those who attend community colleges because traditional education systems have failed them.\n\nI have learnt two things in the last year. First\, I am no longer doing communities of inquiry (CoI’s)\, and secondly\, I don’t think it matters. Integral to the success of CoI’s is the building of a community over time. But my work is with transient participants\, who may or may not attend from session to session\, so there is often no time\, no continuity that is needed\, to build a community. My question today is: Is engaging in philosophical inquiry – evaluating arguments\, reasoning\, questioning\, etc.\, – enough\, or is the building of a thinking community essential to the pedagogy?
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY IN THE DIASPORA
LOCATION:Steele-206\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:7abcc627277e1773e63f1de17d3272ea
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/7abcc627277e1773e63f1de17d3272ea
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T050000Z
DTEND:20260709T055500Z
SUMMARY:The Logical Import of Non-Epistemic Values
DESCRIPTION:In this paper I provide a novel argument against the Value-free Ideal (VFI) and explore some of its implications. I begin by arguing that no existing critique of the VFI targets the relations of inductive support between evidence and hypotheses (relations of confirmation). In fact\, many critics of the VFI\, like Heather Douglas\, explicitly state that relations of confirmation remain value-free (Douglas\, 2000\, p. 656). However\, I argue that confirmation is value-laden. After briefly surveying different inductive logics\, I claim that the best prospects for a value-free account of confirmation rely on the probability calculus. For these accounts to be value-free\, two conditions must be met: (1) probabilities must themselves be value-free\, and (2) the choice of confirmation function (a function of probabilities) must also be value-free. Condition (1) fails because all interpretations of probability face the reference class problem (Hájek\, 2007)\, and choosing a reference class requires non-epistemic value judgements. Condition (2) also fails\, since the choice of confirmation function is underdetermined by evidence\, theory\, and epistemic values\, requiring further non-epistemic value judgements. Hence\, confirmation is value-laden. I conclude by exploring the implications of this conclusion for contemporary defences of the VFI (e.g. Menon and Stegenga\, 2023).\n\nREFERENCES\n\nDouglas\, H. (2000). Inductive Risk and Values in Science. Philosophy of Science\, 67(4):559–579.\nHájek\, A. (2007). The reference class problem is your problem too. Synthese\, 156(3):563–585.\nMenon\, T. and Stegenga\, J. (2023). Sisyphean science: why value freedom is worth pursuing. European Journal for Philosophy of Science\, 13(4):48.\n\n
CATEGORIES:PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
LOCATION:Steele-315\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:a12d71b1c07c85bf5c93ee8099f9aca3
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/a12d71b1c07c85bf5c93ee8099f9aca3
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T050000Z
DTEND:20260709T055500Z
SUMMARY:Division of Responsibility as a Foundation of Social Philosophy
DESCRIPTION:This paper seeks to relate the notions of a division of labour\, division of knowledge (as in standpoint epistemology)\, and division of authority (as in a separation of powers) to the tasks of social philosophy. Anybody who works in ethical or political theory or similar will be conscious of these concepts and will have some use for them. But because their significance is often forgotten at crucial junctures\, I think it will be worth our while to discuss just how central they are\, and how an awareness of them must shape social philosophy from the very beginning and at almost every step of the way after that. This in particular has consequences for those who try to do social philosophy from ‘the point of view of the universe’ or who advocate for positive duties owed by every human to every other human.
CATEGORIES:POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
LOCATION:Steele-320\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:619b5779dd354387d03b3c4fdad6a9c0
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/619b5779dd354387d03b3c4fdad6a9c0
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T060000Z
DTEND:20260709T062500Z
SUMMARY:Afternoon Break
DESCRIPTION:
CATEGORIES:BREAKS
LOCATION:GCI-Auditorium\, Global Change Institute Building\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:4c16361534b17817b0f2679c7c3ecff5
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/4c16361534b17817b0f2679c7c3ecff5
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T063000Z
DTEND:20260709T075500Z
SUMMARY:Verbal Disputes
DESCRIPTION:A speaker often uses a word to communicate what linguists call an “ad hoc concept” – an occasion-specific meaning – that is different from the word’s stable encoded meaning\, and the hearer can usually construct the intended ad hoc concept through pragmatic inference. Appreciating this linguistic insight can shed significant light on a wide range of issues in both philosophical and public discourse. In this talk\, I explore how the notion of ad hoc concepts can provide a framework for theorising the cognitive-linguistic mechanisms underpinning characteristic instances of verbal disputes. Crucially\, I distinguish between two kinds of communicative failures that frequently occur in verbal disputes – “failures to recognise” and “failures to adopt”. I will analyse cognitive-linguistic factors driving these failures and draw implications with respect to verbal disputes in both public discourse and philosophy. &nbsp\;&nbsp\;
CATEGORIES:KEYNOTE
LOCATION:Steele-206-HYBRID\, 3 Staff House Rd\, St Lucia QLD 4067\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:9e9b4b3b601bb4aa2f53875b7c495181
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/9e9b4b3b601bb4aa2f53875b7c495181
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260520T155816Z
DTSTART:20260709T090000Z
DTEND:20260709T121500Z
SUMMARY:CONFERENCE DINNER 2025
DESCRIPTION:The conference dinner is the concluding event for the AAP Conference 2025\n\nCustoms House\,&nbsp\;399 Queen Street\, Brisbane\ncustomshouse.com.au\n\nAll conference attendees are welcome to attend the conference dinner.\nThis is an additional cost which can be made at the time of registration.
CATEGORIES:SOCIAL EVENTS
LOCATION:Customs House\, 399 Queen St\, Brisbane City QLD 4000\, Australia
SEQUENCE:0
UID:8938246f9939ea8dee903628a17ad2b5
URL:http://aap2026conference.sched.com/event/8938246f9939ea8dee903628a17ad2b5
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR